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ABSTRACT
This dissertation evaluates the construction, negotiation, and contestation of
masculine Subjectivity within articulations of Russia’s post-Soviet national Idea. As
Russia endeavors to define itself after years of turmoil and strife, gender identities have
become deeply enmeshed in understandings of quintessential Russianness. From
discourses of the state under Vladimir Putin to those of the Russian Orthodox Church,
actors with significant social and political power have constructed particular
understandings of what it means to be Russian, and in so doing, have delineated the
parameters of normal, or natural gender identities and sexualities for men.
Drawing from the ideas of Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Žižek, and
others, I analyze the ways in which male corporeality is articulated as an embodiment of
the nation, and point to the consequences of articulations that serve to “naturalize” or
“normalize” certain masculinities over others. Many of the discourses under
consideration have constructed a gendered conceptualization of Russia’s national Idea by
mythologizing nostalgic signifiers of the past and orienting them toward a future ideal in
a way that finalizes the meanings of such signifiers and makes them appear to be eternal
and authentically Russian. Combined, such discourses constitute a national Idea that
serves to monologize conceptions of masculinity, reducing them to an artificial
essentialism. Yet perhaps most importantly, this work demonstrates the constructed and
unfinalizable nature of imposed identities—and the ability, through creative discursive
ii

mechanisms such as literature and film, to push back against the establishment and resist
the centripetal forces of “traditional” modernity.
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INTRODUCTION
MASCULINE SUBJECTIVITY AND THE EMBODIMENT OF A RUSSIAN
IDEAL
In January 2010, employing the same caustic rhetoric that had dominated his
speeches for the past five years, former Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov chastised the
organization of a gay pride parade in Moscow, referring to demonstrations by
“minorities” as “blasphemous and satanic acts under the guise of democratic principles.”1
He insisted that “traditional” Russian morality must be upheld, and that the rule of law
must be the focus of Moscow authorities. Such sentiments have been backed by the
increasingly prominent Russian Orthodox Church, which has cited immorality as a
primary catalyst of Russia’s post-Soviet problems, and has predicated Russia’s future
survival upon the reinstatement of Orthodox ideas and practices. Pro-Kremlin nationalist
youth groups such as Nashi (Ours) and Iduschie Vmeste (Walking Together) have
lambasted authors and artists whose work exhibits profanity, pornography, or otherwise
morally questionable subject matter, aligning themselves instead with an increasingly
conservative and semi-autocratic political apparatus. Combined with the hypermasculinized persona of Vladimir Putin, who has been photographed practicing judo,
tagging Siberian tigers, and fly fishing in all his muscular might, developments such a
these demonstrate the centrality of gender—and in particular masculinity—in the
construction of Russia’s post-Soviet national Idea, where the identities and sexualities of
1

See Yurii Luzhkov calls gay parades “satanic activities” (Moscow, January 27, 2010).
1

men and women have become mutually constitutive of nationalistic discourses of the
post-Soviet narrative.
As Helena Goscilo has pointed out, gender identities and ideas of the nation have
been closely entwined in a mutually constitutive relationship throughout much of
Russia’s long history—a relationship so innate that it has oftentimes been left
unquestioned: “Russianness, like all national identities, is historically grounded in notions
of masculinity and femininity so pervasive that until the advent of feminism they
appeared both natural and incontrovertible.”2 Derived largely from traditional principles
of Orthodox Christianity, the state, or Otechestvo (Fatherland) of Muscovite and Imperial
Russia was defined in accordance with supposedly essentialist and God-given masculine
traits such as strength, fortitude, and rationality, while the nation, or Rodina
(Motherland), became characterized by characteristics such as sensitivity, tenderness, and
purity. Concomitantly, social identities of men and women became reified within
discourses of this gendered nation-state, the characteristics of which had come to be
regarded as representing a natural and timeless social order. During most of Imperial
Russia, the tsar, whose “natural” leadership capabilities were said to have been ordained
by God, was often regarded as Tsar Batiushka, or the benevolent “little father” of the
people. Embodying the sovereign, the tsar served as a model for individual men, who
were considered to be natural-born heads of their families. As written in the Domostroi
(Book of Household Management), men were instructed to punish their wives and
servants “according to the extent of their guilt and the severity of their deed. Lay stripes
2

Helena Goscilo and Andrea Lanoux, “Lost in the Myths,” in Gender and National
Identity in Twentieth-Century Russian Culture, ed. Helena Goscilo and Andrea Lanoux
(DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006) 9.
2

upon them, but, when you have punished them, forgive them.”3 This discourse delineated
rigid boundaries of masculine Subjectivity that were not to be transgressed. Sex was to
serve procreative purposes only, and homosexual behavior, while not treated as harshly
under Imperialism as during the Soviet period, was generally prohibited.
Although liberation from restrictive and paternalistic gender obligations (and
from practices of Orthodoxy more broadly) was heralded as a key objective of the
Bolshevik Revolution, gender during the Soviet period continued to be, as Sarah Ashwin
has pointed out, a “key organising principle”4 of Soviet society, reciprocally constituting
both the national Idea and social identities of citizens. Rather than being defined in
accordance with Orthodox teachings, the nation and identities of men and women during
the Soviet period were constructed in accordance with principles of communism. Gender
“became the basis on which the duties of citizens to the new polity were defined,”5 and
by stipulating the duties of citizens within this new polity, an understanding of the polity
itself began to emerge. Coinciding with egalitarian Soviet principles, women were
granted the right to work outside of the home, but continued to be glorified for their
“natural” child-bearing capabilities. Meanwhile, the “new Soviet man” of the 1920s and
1930s was held up as both an embodiment of and the key to the Soviet state’s future
3

See Carolyn Johnston Pouncy, The Domostroi: Rules for Russian Households in the
Time of Ivan the Terrible, trans. Carolyn Johnston Pouncy (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1994). Although the influence of the Domostroi in Russian society would have
been limited at the time due to the vast illiteracy of the predominantly peasant population,
there is evidence that it was circulated amongst the upper classes, which had a direct
bearing on the educational curricula and legal framework of the time.
4

Sarah Ashwin, Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (New York:
Routledge, 2000).
5

Ibid. 1.
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success. He was to be a heterosexual breadwinning hero—a stakhanovite who
consistently surpassed production quotas, and whose unfailing patriotism and devotion to
the Motherland would transform the Soviet Union into an international superpower.
Despite the ideological disavowal of all things Orthodox during the Soviet period,
this stereotypically patriarchic social order and procreative masculine Subjectivity largely
persisted until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. As supreme leader of the Bolshevik
Party and mastermind of the Revolution, Vladimir Lenin was widely regarded as the
father of the Soviet people, and Josef Stalin was affectionately known as “Uncle Joe,”
despite the many atrocities he committed. During much of this seventy-three year period
of rapid social and economic transformation, men acquired social status through their
contributions to the state. As the power of the state and the utopian ideal of a communist
society assumed an unmovable disciplinary posture over the male body, men were
valorized for their abilities to build a powerful Fatherland and protect the fragile, yet
enduring Motherland. Their bodies were regarded as machines—as asexual automatons
that were charged with both constructing and literally embodying the powerful empire
that the Soviet Union would become. Particularly during the early Soviet period and at
the time of the Second World War, a mutually constitutive relationship was forged
between the individual and society in which the private was almost entirely subsumed by
the public, rendering all matters of the individual and family subject to state scrutiny and
regulation. Patriotism—the pride and dedication that citizens were expected to exemplify
toward their country—was one of the most prominent ideological facets of Soviet
discourse. Young men were instructed to labor tirelessly for the advancement of

4

communism, while defending the Motherland against enemies both foreign and domestic
in every aspect of their lives.
Yet as the empire declined, so too did this seemingly inviolable masculinity:
“Unlike the more traditional image of femininity, Soviet masculinity as cultural construct
was built primarily on the foundation of the political utopia, and once the latter started
showing signs of decay, masculinity as the icon of Soviet modernity underwent a crisis.”6
The body politic had collapsed, revealing a profound lack of both national and individual
identity that had always existed, but which had been masked by the illusion of stability
and permanence. Although masculine Subjectivity in both pre-Soviet and Soviet Russia
was by no means fixed or undisputed, particular manifestations of “normal” or “natural”
masculinity had become deeply institutionalized at the expense of all others, first by
discourses of the church, then by the utopian ideal of communism. Upon the downfall of
the Soviet Union in 1991, the once powerful Fatherland was said to have undergone a socalled “de-masculinization,” becoming characterized not by strength and virility, but
rather by social and political fragmentation, rapid economic decline, and a profound
inability to act. Divorced from its once powerful past, the new Russia was politically and
economically impotent—prostituted out to Western powers, whose proclaimed
ideological supremacy served only to emphasize the ineffectiveness of the humiliated
former superpower. Simultaneously, the social identities Russia’s citizens—particularly
those of men, who had long been touted as family breadwinners, gallant soldiers, and
heroic Stakhanovites—were turned upside down. Men found themselves in a veritable
6

Elena Prokhorova, “The Post-Utopian Body Politic,” in Gender and National Identity in
Twentieth-Century Russian Culture, ed. Helena Goscilo and Andrea Lanoux (DeKalb:
Northern Illinois Press, 2006). 132.
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no-man’s land, as social expectations for them to maintain stereotypically “masculine”
personas persisted, while opportunities for doing so rapidly declined. As a consequence,
many men throughout the 1990s turned to excessive drug use, alcoholism, and suicide as
attempts to escape their inglorious and seemingly unalterable situations.
Upon the downfall of the Soviet Union, a flood of pornographic books and
magazines filled the newsstands, prostitution and violence proliferated, and casual sexual
relations between young people became more commonplace and open. Women went
from being glorified Soviet workers and “hero mothers” to sex objects and even
prostitutes,7 which further confused possible and appropriate social identities for men.
The inability of men to provide for their families was highlighted by the prevalence of
women in the workforce, yet women’s hyper-femininity created further pressure on men
to assume assertive, stereotypically masculine, identities. As the prospects of a successful
transition to a democratic society began to crumble, so too did the brief period of social
liberation. Rapid economic decline, widespread crime, political corruption, and a
perceived deterioration of social morality contributed to Russians’ disillusionment with
Western democracy. Russia’s post-Soviet “sexual revolution” was seen as a Western
import—as an unfortunate accompaniment to democracy and capitalism. The nation had
lost its patriarchic prowess, and with it, the ability of men to attain any semblance of selfidentification and meaning. Consequently, there existed in post-Soviet Russia a desire for
7

As Eliot Borenstein points out, the influx of prostitution in the immediate post-Soviet
period was analogous to Russia’s social, political, and economic climate, as well as the
ways in which the state was forced to prostitute itself out to Western powers for
economic support. See Eliot Borenstein, “Selling Russia: Prostitution, Masculinity, and
Metaphors of Nationalism After Perestroika,” in Gender and National Identity in
Twentieth-Century Russian Culture, ed. Helena Goscilo and Andrea Lanoux (DeKalb:
Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), 175.
6

both a return to the stability of Soviet times and for a unified national Idea—for a return
of the patriarchal order and, in some cases, the explicitly defined gender identities that
had, for better or worse, provided a means of self-identification, which people found
themselves suddenly lacking.
Following the chaos and fragmentation of the 1990s, Russian president Vladimir
Putin proclaimed in 2001 that “The past decade of Russia was stormy, it is possible to say
without much exaggeration—revolutionary…But it is time to firmly say: that cycle has
ended.”8 And indeed, after more than a decade of turmoil and disarray, Russia’s
economic and political institutions have stabilized tremendously under Putin’s leadership.
Russia has regained much of its prominence as an international superpower and the
quality of life has improved dramatically. A middle class has emerged, which continues
to push for increased rights and stability, even now posing a challenge to Putin himself.
This process of national regeneration has been accomplished through the uneasy fusion of
traditional discourses of Imperial and Soviet Russia, such as Orthodox Christianity and
authoritarian leadership, on one hand, and elements of modernity, such as increased
bureaucratization, regulation, and social control, on the other. Under Putin and his
protégée, Dmitrii Medvedev, the economy has been recentralized, media enterprises
renationalized, and civil society brought under the auspices of the state. The Orthodox
Church—oftentimes mythologized as an enduring facet of authentic Russianness—has
served as a moral compass for defining Russia’s new Idea, as well as the roles and
identities of men and women in contemporary Russia.
8

Quoted from “Message of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to the
Russian Federation, April 3, 2001. The translation is mine.
www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru/data/structdoc.html.
7

Although such “traditional” articulations of Russianness have enabled the nation
to once again be conceived of in terms of strength and unity rather than revolution and
chaos, they have simultaneously served to redefine social identities, particularly those of
men, in very particular and exclusionary ways. In their framing of Russian identity,
political and religious discourses give rise to hegemonic conceptualizations of
masculinity that predominate not only over the feminine, but over other masculinities, as
well. Although women continue to face discrimination, harassment, sexual violence, and
the double burden of work and motherhood, the consequences of “normalized” or
“naturalized” masculinities for men have been widely overlooked. Men have not
necessarily been winners in the post-Soviet context: data indicate that the average life
expectancy for men in contemporary Russia continues to hover around fifty-nine to sixty
years, in contrast to approximately seventy-three years for women.9 Rates of smoking,
alcoholism, HIV/AIDS, and suicide tend also to be exponentially higher for men than
they are for women, despite attempts that have been made, particularly by Dmitri
Medvedev, to curb excessive vodka consumption. Notwithstanding significant health
issues, the social ramifications of normalized masculinities for men are also profound.
Rather than allowing for the inclusion of multiple masculinities, discourses of the
church and state, in their articulations of “authentic” Russianness, delineate the
boundaries of a “normal,” or “natural” masculinity that is rigidly defined at the expense
and exclusion of all others.10 Masculinity as constructed within the constellation of this
9

See: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html.
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See: Dan Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2001).
8

constructed Russian Idea not only serves as an Other against which the feminine is
defined; it also positions men in either dominant or subordinate Subject positions,
depending on their approximation to, in the words of Mikhail Bakhtin, a “monologic”
Ideal.11 In contemporary Russia, this Ideal has largely been predicated upon teachings of
the church that are said to represent the authentic foundation of Russianness—but it also
draws from mythologized symbolism of the Soviet period, such as Russia’s glorious
victory in WWII. The continued discrimination against and social persecution of gay
men, as well as the palpable social stigma that persists against men who opt for
fatherhood or other “sensitive” careers over more “manly” options, exemplify the
pervasiveness of this Ideal in Russian society. As Russia constructs a new national Idea
and mutually constitutive gender identities in the contemporary period by mythologizing
sentiments of the past, it could be said that the future is, in many ways, being rewritten.
And this rewriting, by appealing to desires for stability, strength, and a return of the
characteristics that supposedly made Russia great, constructs idealized gender identities
and sexualities that are consequential for gay and straight men alike.
This dissertation evaluates the construction, negotiation, and contestation of
masculine Subjectivity within articulations of Russia’s post-Soviet national Idea, and
assesses the consequences for men. In this work, I consider the roles of the Russian
Orthodox Church, the state under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, and Russia’s
oligarchs, or criminally inclined “businessmen,” in engendering interrelated conceptions
of both Russian identity and masculinity in the post-communist period. Drawing from
11

M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin , ed. Michael
Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1981).
9

the ideas of Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Žižek, and others, I analyze the ways
in which male corporeality is articulated as an embodiment of the nation, and point to the
consequences, particularly for gay men, of articulations that serve to “naturalize” or
“normalize” certain masculinities over others. Many of the discourses under
consideration have constructed a gendered conceptualization of Russia’s national Idea by
mythologizing nostalgic signifiers of the past and orienting them toward a modern future
in a way that finalizes the meanings of such signifiers and makes them appear to be
eternal and quintessentially Russian. Combined, this amalgam of heterogeneous yet
interrelated discourses constitutes a national Idea that serves to monologize definitions of
masculinity, reducing them to an artificial essentialism. Yet perhaps most importantly,
this work also demonstrates the constructed and unfinalizable nature of imposed
identities—and to the ability, through creative media such as literature and film, to push
back against the establishment and resist the centripetal forces of “traditional” modernity.

Theorizing Masculine Subjectivity
Subjected to the oftentimes confining and determinate parameters of discourse,
the masculine Subject has no predetermined essence, or center, but rather is ontologically
lacking prior to its entrance into the symbolic order and its contextualization in time and
space.12 As Jacques Lacan has written, “it is the world of words that creates the world of
things—things originally confused in the hic et nunc of the all in the process of coming12

The symbolic order may be defined briefly as a “social world of linguistic
communication, intersubjective relations, knowledge of ideological conventions, and the
acceptance of the law…” See Dino Felluga, Terms Used by Psychoanalysis (Purdue
University, 2003).
10

into-being.”13 As a “social and political construction that establishes a system of relations
between different objects and practices, while providing (subject) positions with which
social agents can identify,”14 discourse establishes the knowledges and Subject positions
that define particular masculinities and establishes Others against which the “normal” or
“natural” masculine Subject can be defined. It constructs for the Subject a context—a
meaningful history and purpose, and provides a frame of reference for navigating an
otherwise unintelligible terrain. Although constructions of contemporary Subjectivities
may draw from those of the past, such constructions in no way signify a predetermined
progression of history, but rather a mythologizing of that history and a careful
incorporation of past memories into the present (and future). In the words of Michel
Foucault, “discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking,
knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the
subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined…”15 The Subject’s
construction at any given time and place is highly contingent, and represents only one
possibility out of potentially infinite options.
Devoid of any pre-ontological essence, social objects only acquire meaning
within a chain of signification that comprises the symbolic order of discourse. Their
meaning depends upon the ways in which they are “positioned” within this chain—both
13

Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (New York:
Routledge, 1996), 159.
14

David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, “Introducing Discourse Theory and Political
Analysis,” in Discourse Theory and Political Analysis, ed. David Howarth, Aletta J
Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) 3.
15

Glyn Williams, French Discourse Analysis: The Method of Post-Structuralism (New
York: Routledge, 1999), 85.
11

in space and time, and in opposition to significant Others. Consequently, signifiers such
as “masculinity” and “femininity” are not a-temporal or static, but rather acquire different
meanings in different times and places. A particular national “sensibility,” to borrow
Goscilo’s term, may therefore provide a context for understanding masculinity and the
obligations of men, while simultaneously depending upon the repeated actions,
discourses and performativity of this masculinity for its own meaning to be sustained. Yet
if social objects such as masculinity only acquire meaning within a particular context and
are devoid of a pre-ontological essence, where does the chain of signification stop? What
is it that creates and sustains identities beyond all other possible variations? As Slavoj
Žižek explains,
[T]he multitude of ‘floating signifiers’, of proto-ideological elements, is
structured into a unified field through the intervention of a certain ‘nodal
point’ (the Lacanian point de capiton) which ‘quilts’ them, stops their
sliding and fixes their meaning.16
The point de capiton, as a “master signifier,” stops the otherwise endless movement of
signification and “produces the necessary illusion of fixed meaning.”17
During the Soviet period, the master signifier “communism” served as an ordering
principle that partially fixed the meanings of otherwise empty signifiers such as Soviet,
bourgeois, exploitation, and, of course, masculinity. It positioned the masculine Subject
in space and time—against the Imperial period and in anticipation of a future Soviet
utopia—as well as against bourgeois elitism and entrepreneurial aspirations of the West.
Combined, the resultant Subject position served to construct a very particular
conceptualization of the masculine Subject. In contemporary Russia, Orthodox
16

Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York: Verso, 1989). 87.
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Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 149.
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Christianity has served such a function. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
symbolic order within which people had self-identified was thrown into disarray; there
remained only a void where the illusion of unity and coherence once prevailed. As a
mythologized, almost primordial element of Russia’s past, Orthodoxy has been revived
as a prominent master signifier of the national Idea both past and future, and,
consequently, has positioned the masculine Subject within this discourse in very specific
ways.
Out of the multitudinous ways in which the masculine Subject can be constructed,
particular constructions become hegemonic over all other alternatives during different
times and places. If left unquestioned, such constructions become institutionalized and
regarded as “normal,” or “natural”—not as constructions, but as enduring facets of
everyday life. As Saul Newman points out, discursively constructed subjectivities “limit
the individual to certain prescribed norms of morality and behavior,” and exclude
“identities and modes of behavior which somehow do not conform to these norms.”18
Alternative masculinities are “categorized as ‘unnatural’ or ‘perverse,’ as somehow
‘other’ and they are persecuted according to the norms they transgress.”19 By becoming
incorporated into the socio-political institutions in which people interact and self-identify,
such constructed subjectivities serve to “centralize” and “totalize” ideas of masculinity,
reducing it to an artificial and seemingly incontrovertible essentialism.

18

Saul Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of
Power (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), 3.
19

Ibid.
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This constructed masculine Subjectivity is undoubtedly confining—the borders
that define masculinity in different contexts are narrow, and attempts to stray beyond
such borders are always circumspect. However, recognizing the Subject as discursively
constructed also provides opportunities for resistance and change. If the Subject is
viewed not as essential or given, but rather as culturally inflected and constructed within
the symbolic order of discourse, then possibilities for transcending constructions of
“normal” masculinity could potentially exist. As Michael Kimmel has stated:
This idea that manhood is socially constructed and historically shifting
should not be understood as a loss, as something that is being taken away
from men. In fact, it gives us something extraordinarily valuable—agency,
the capacity to act. It gives us a sense of historical possibilities to replace
the despondent resignation that invariably attends timeless, ahistorical
essentialisms.20
Yet how might it be possible to provide the Subject with a sense of agency, without
trapping it within the boundaries of an equally confining and essentialist identity?
Although the ontologically lacking Subject is a Subject of discourse, its
construction is never finalized, or complete. Even as positioned within the symbolic
order, the Subject remains perpetually lacking and “unfinalizable,” even to itself. Infinite
meaning, no matter how “accurately” signified, can never be captured within the confines
of finite discursive properties. Rather, there exists a perpetual gap, or lack between the
signifier and the object that it is intended to signify. As Dylan Evans puts it:
No matter how many signifiers one adds to the signifying chain, the chain
is always incomplete; it always lacks the signifier that could complete it.
This ‘missing signifier’…is constitutive of the Subject.21
20

Michael S Kimmel, “Masculinity As Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the
Construction of Gender Identity,” in The Masculinities Reader, ed. Stephen M Whitehead
and Frank J Barrett (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 267.
21

Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 96.
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The Subject is subverted “not because it is entirely determined by signifiers…but because
its determination by signifiers is fundamentally flawed.”22 Consequently, the Subject
remains in a constant state of “becoming,” characterized by a manqué a être, or “want of
being,” which can never be fulfilled. The lack between the signifier and signified
constitutes an excess of meaning that eludes signification, while simultaneously enabling
it to take place. According to Newman, “Subjectivity is constituted by this gap, by this
failure of signification.”23 It represents a realm of “pure potentiality” in which the Subject
is not predetermined, but rather bears within it at each moment the potential to be
constructed anew.
The omnipresent lack prevents the Subject’s full actualization; yet it also presents
a possibility for a “radical outside”—an “excluded interior,” or “nonessential nonplace”
for resistance. It creates a space from which oppressive constructions of masculinity can
be contested, and from which the construction of new meanings and identities may
emerge. As Žižek has explained, the lack represents “a sublime moment,” a moment of
emptiness that is filled with possibility; a “truly revolutionary moment” caught in the
“infinitesimal lack” between one signifying regime and the next.24 Exposure of the lack, a
rupture in the symbolic order within which the Subject is constituted, not only enables,
but in fact demands, the reestablishment of meaning—meaning that can be drawn from

22

Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of
Power, 138.
23

Ibid. 139.

24

Paraphrased from Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the
Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).
15

sentiments of the past, and which can be directed toward the construction of a future
Ideal, but which is in no way predetermined or given. As Glyn Daly has argued, “It is
because the symbolic, or discursive, order can never fully master its object that we have
an essential plurality written into the structure of reality itself.”25 Bert Olivier echoes this
claim: “It is through language that revision and renewal of the subject is possible via
different self-descriptions,” in which language “can give rise to new, particularizing
variations on a theme of universal import.”26
The possibility of resistance and re-construction is based upon the premise that
the Subject and discourse sustain one another through a mutually constitutive
relationship. The Subject is not constructed unilaterally by discourse, but rather has a
hand in producing the discourse in which it is positioned. The Subject desires what is
perceived to be lacking, or lost, and as a result of defining this lack, substantive meaning
is constructed and reified. Constructions arise through the pursuit of objects that are
viewed as capable of restoring the Subject’s original loss—of alleviating its alienation—
and of providing a renewed sense of unity and purpose. According to some, this explains
why people are willing to risk their lives to save a precious memento, such as a
photograph or letter. Such objects, which include, in Žižek’s terms, “sublime objects”
such as religion and national identity, provide a sense of unity with something that is
perceived to have been lost. They provide meaning, or purpose—a glimpse of a real that
can never be fully attained, but which, if attained, would render the Subject complete.
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The sudden end of the Soviet Union in 1991 revealed the unthinkable: that one of
the most powerful regimes in the world, a stable system upon which many citizens had
come to rely and with which they had come to identify, was, in fact, unstable and highly
contingent. Soviet society was, in the words of Benedict Anderson, an “imagined
community”27 that had been held together by a hegemonic Soviet discourse, anchored
largely by the point de capiton “communism.” Consequently, that which was perceived
as most lacking during the early 1990s was an Idea of the nation itself. The displacement
of Soviet discourse revealed a profound gap, or lack, in the symbolic order within which
the masculine Subject had been constituted, demanding fulfillment. The result has been a
reconstruction of Russianness based on mythologized memories of the past, and an
unceasing tug of war over the gender identities that are both caught up in and charged
with embodying these new and uncharted Ideas of Russianness.

Negotiations of Masculinity and the Russian Idea
The Russian Idea (Russkaia ideia), as articulated by preeminent Russian
philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev, corresponds to a character and calling of the Russian
people.28 It comprises “a set of basic values that constitute the self-identity of Russians
across social divisions and coalesce into a national project or historical mission.”29 The
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Idea is a “philosophical conception of the national character” that has at its heart “the
notion of the country’s messianic mission, rooted in the vision of Moscow as the Third
Rome.”30 A bit broader than concepts of nationalism (natsionalizm) or patriotism
(patriotizm), the Russian Idea serves to differentiate Russia from Western culture,
politics, and religious traditions. It has influenced politics for centuries, and can be found
in writings as prominent as those of Fyodor Dostoyevsky. The notion that Russia may be
characterized by a unique Idea has also been invoked by heads of state such as Boris
Yeltsin, who announced a competition for formulating an “Idea for Russia” (ideia dlia
Russii) in 1996, as well as Vladimir Putin, who claimed that a Russian Idea would “come
about as an organic unification of universal general humanitarian values with the
traditional Russian values that have stood the test of time.”31 It has been predicated upon
the argument that Russia is somehow unique—not Western and distinct from the rest of
Eastern Europe. Although characterizations of the Russian Idea have not remained static
or unchanged, gender, and in particular masculinity, has always been present as a key
constitutive feature.
Setting the stage for the regeneration of Russianness in the contemporary period
were the so-called “oligarchs,” or criminally-inclined “businessmen” who emerged on the
social and political scene in the late 1980s and early 1990s and embodied everything that
Russia had historically not been. As the first chapter will argue, these men, by adopting
Western style business practices and taking advantage of an opportune and lawless time,
came to be both envied and despised. Their well-fed, pampered, and well-clothed bodies
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literally exuded signs of wealth and abundance, while the rest of the population struggled
to come to terms with a very haphazardly orchestrated and inegalitarian process of
privatization. The oligarchs mapped out a new Idea of Russianness that was characterized
not by a respect for traditional cultural practices and “values that have stood the test of
time,” but rather by an individualistic free-for-all that directly contradicted ideologies of
an empire lost. In the words of Michel Foucault, these spaces that were etched out and
embodied by the oligarchs may be referred to as “heterotopias”—spaces that directly
contradicted both the failed utopia of Soviet life and the promise that democracy and
capitalism once held for post-Soviet Russia. The oligarchs and their criminal antics
inspired for many people a desire of a return to the perceived stability of the past, even if
this stability carried with it the possibility of diminished freedom and increased state
power.
Against the chaos, instability, and criminality of the immediate post-Soviet
period, the Orthodox Church and the state under Putin have contributed uniquely to both
a post-Soviet national Idea and to ongoing negotiations over masculine Subjectivity.
Through their return to “traditional” ideas and practices, these heterogeneous, yet
oftentimes interrelated actors have served to anchor otherwise “floating signifiers” into a
newly constructed web of significance. Within each discourse, the relationship between
the masculine Subject and Russian identity are articulated in slightly different ways: the
discourse of the church predicates the salvation of the soul (both individual and national)
on the adoption of ‘traditional’ practices that pertain largely to the family and matters of
sexuality; and the state, by discursively connecting the individual male body with the
body politic, constructs (and in turn reinforces) a gendered conceptualization of
19

citizenship based on centralized political policies and the resurrection of historical
symbolism. Together, these two actors have appealed to many people for their ability to
not only regenerate a sense of stability and permanence in the post-Soviet period, but also
to restore a prideful sense of Russianness to an otherwise lacking populace. Yet as will be
discussed in chapters two and three, the constructions of Russianness that have emerged
within state and church discourse have been consequential not only in terms of their
centralizing and authoritarian tendencies, but also for the very specific constitutive
Subject positions that they mandate.
Hearkening back to both Imperial and Soviet times, Vladimir Putin, first as
president, then prime minister, and now as president again, has become an almost tsarlike figure in contemporary Russia. The president has attributed Russia’s post-Soviet ills
to a lack of patriarchic authority, and, combined with rhetoric of democracy and progress,
has based his constructions of an Ideal future upon a return to mythologized ideas and
practices of the past. In the name of reconstructing a modern Idea of Russia, he has
centralized the economy, established control over media enterprises, and revived
prominent national symbols such as the double-headed eagle of the tsar and the national
anthem of the Soviet Union. While pronouncing the end of the Soviet Union as the
greatest tragedy in Russian history, the president has, similar to his predecessor Boris
Yeltsin, described Russia as a nation built upon principles of Orthodoxy, and has
advocated a return of Orthodox traditions and practices to Russian society. He has invited
heads of the church to official state functions, effectively blurring any boundary between
church and state, and has leant careful political support to the inclusion of Orthodox
education in school curricula. These developments are highlighted in the second chapter,
20

entitled: Vladimir Putin and the Body Politic: The Coalescence of Corporeality and
Temporality in Putin’s Russia, points to the development of a mutually constitutive
relationship between the construction of the masculine body and the body politic—where
men are once again being touted as both exemplars and builders of a future Russia
characterized by strength, power and prestige.
The church has reemerged in the contemporary period as a significant point de
capiton of the Russian national Idea—and consequently has served to stipulate “normal”
or “natural” gender identities in very particular ways. Discourse of the church has defined
Russia’s lack in terms of “Godlessness,” sin, and an overall lack of “spiritual-morality,”
attributing the disintegration of society to a disregard for traditional family practices and
a “darkened state of the human heart.”32 According to many church writings, the only
way of ensuring the future survival of the nation-state itself, as well as the spiritual
salvation of Russian citizens, is through a reinstatement of Orthodox teachings and
practices—teachings and practices upon which, the church claims, Russia was founded
with the adoption of Byzantine Christianity in 988. As apparent in the church’s 2004
Basis of the Social Concept, most teachings and practices are centered upon issues of
morality and proper conduct of Russian citizens—particularly with regard to the roles of
men and women and their places within both the family and the larger “family” of society
more broadly. As Archpriest Krechetov Valerian has put it, “God created Adam first,
then Eve, so that a hierarchy must exist; the head of the family is the father, then comes
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the mother.”33 In much church discourse, immorality in the family and the improper
upbringing of children are named responsible for the decline of both individuals and
society. Without a return to traditional teachings and practices, future salvation remains
elusive. Interestingly, one of the venues into which the church has recently made its foray
has been the Russian Armed Forces, where it has had a particularly prominent role in the
“spiritual-moral” education of men and young boys. Such initiatives of the church have
received broad political support from the state, and have been well received by a
populace in search of an “authentic” Russian identity and the return of a normal way of
life.
As powerful and monolithic as centripetalizing discourses such as these have
become in recent years, their hegemony has not been left unchallenged. Although
oppositional voices exist within each discourse, such sentiments are oftentimes muffled
in a society plagued by increasingly rigid standards of media control. The more effective
locus of resistance, where alternative conceptualizations of the nation and gender
identities can be constructed with relative, albeit cautious autonomy, is within the
discourse of popular culture, particularly film. Cultural products have, for centuries,
provided a position from which hegemonic constructions may be contested, or alternative
viewpoints asserted, and a space forged for new alternatives to emerge. With the relaxing
of censorship in the 1980s and 1990s there emerged an array of popular culture
productions—predominantly in the forms of detective fiction, mysteries, and provocative
“postmodern” works by the likes of authors such as Victor Pelevin, Vladimir Sorokin,
and Venedict Erofeev—which, in the post-Soviet period, have served to oppose
33
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hegemonic constructions of the church, state, and nationalist youth organizations. Art
depicting the desecration of national and religious symbols or sexual “immorality” has
been severely chastised by the church and banned by the state, as has the production of
certain films, pornographic or otherwise. Consequently, such works have also provided
much fodder for these discourses’ nationalist initiatives. Nevertheless, by mocking both
the chaos of the post-Soviet period and the hegemonic constructions that followed,
productions of popular culture have become powerful instruments in providing a space in
which alternative conceptualizations of both the national Idea and masculine Subject may
emerge.
The fourth chapter, consequently, addresses this ability to mock both the past and
present, and to forge new possibilities for both masculine Subjectivity and Russianness
through performativity in late and post-Soviet film. This chapter addresses the ways in
which post-Soviet filmmakers, now unimpeded by censorship or strict provisions of the
state, have sought to push back against the establishment—not necessarily by creating
something new, but by mocking, trivializing, and recontextualizing symbols and practices
of the past. They have capitalized upon a “play” of signification, re-exposing the lack by
which the Subject is constituted, thereby revealing the constructed nature of hegemonic
articulations of both Subjectivity and the nation, and making a space for alternative
possibilities to emerge.

Literature Review
This dissertation is interdisciplinary in nature, traversing areas of inquiry as
diverse as gender studies, cultural criticism, nationality studies, and Russian culture,
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history, and politics. Drawing primarily from ideas of discourse theory and
psycholinguistics, an effort is made to provide a new way of looking at a combination of
topics and issues that have each been addressed individually to some extent, but which
have not yet been brought into a single, coherent project. The post-Soviet period has
witnessed an onslaught of research on Russian national identity as related to politics, the
economy, and ethnicity. Scholars such as Sheila Fitzpatrick, Richard Sakwa, Ronald
Grigor Suny, Vera Tolz, and Serguei Oushakine have written on the complexities of the
post-Soviet context, reflecting on the difficulty of constructing a new national identity
amid turbulent times.34 Few such projects, however, sketch out the contours of this
identity in explicitly gendered terms, or show the gendered nature of the historical
symbols that go into constructions of the new Russia. Russian culture and history
scholars such as Helena Goscilo (and particularly her edited book with Andrea Lanoux,
Gender and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Russian Culture) is a notable
exception, as is Sarah Ashwin’s Gender, State, and Society in Contemporary Russia and
Rebecca Kay’s Gender, Equality, and Difference During and After State Socialism.35
These scholars each bridge cultural and political divides in their analysis of
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representations of gender in Russian culture and in their tracings of gendered experiences
in the late and post-Soviet context.
The bulk of the work that has been done on gender in Russia focuses on issues
faced by women, looking in particular at women’s economic, political, and legal rights
after communism. With regard to masculinity in Russia specifically, Rebecca Kay’s Men
in Contemporary Russia addresses many of the empirical changes that were experienced
by men upon the Soviet Union’s dissolution and explores some of the difficulties of
coming to terms with the post-Soviet environment. Elena Meshcherkina has also written
about the perils of men in the contemporary context, as demonstrated by her chapter in
Ashwin’s book, entitled: “New Russian Men: Masculinity Regained?”36 Other studies
that address issues of masculinity oftentimes assume a queer approach, such as
exemplified by Brian Baer’s Other Russias, as well as Dan Healy’s work on gay
masculinity in the Soviet period and pornography in post-Soviet Russia. Kevin Moss,
Laurie Essig, and Luc Beaudoin have also contributed to this rich literature on queer
studies in Russia, from perspectives that are oftentimes at once critical and political,
drawing from a wealth of cultural media.37
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It is common for research on gender in Russia to evaluate one particular aspect of
culture or society, such as a specific genre of literature or film. Such scholars oftentimes
employ the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault in their work,
as is the case of Yana Hashamova, whose major book, Pride and Panic: Russian
Imaginations of the West in Post-Soviet Film draws from Freud and Lacan to explicate
Russia’s post-Soviet view of the West—and itself—through film.38 Birgit Beumers has
also made a significant name for herself as a preeminent scholar of post-Soviet film
studies, taking a largely historical approach to her 1999 book Russia on Reels: The
Russian Idea in Post-Soviet Cinema.39 And although his work focuses on Hollywood
film, Martin Flanagan makes use of Bakhtin’s ideas on the novel in his interpretations of
contemporary cinema.40 With regard to literature specifically, Mark Lipovetsky, Mikhail
Epstein, and Alexander Genis have written on postmodernism and its relationship to
Russian culture, most notably through their works: Borders and Metamorphoses: Viktor
Pelevin in the Context of Post-Soviet Literature, and Russian Postmodernist Fiction:
Dialogue with Chaos.41 Finally, the work of cultural critics such as Eliot Borenstein has
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addressed cultural productions in a contemporary context through work such as Overkill:
Sex and Violence in Contemporary Russian Culture.42
It is somewhat curious that the scholarship that has been done on Russia’s
“oligarchs,” all of whom are men, has not taken a gendered approach to explaining either
the behavior of these men or their impact on Russian society, politics, and identity. As
discussed in the following chapter, work such as David Hoffman’s the Oligarchs: Wealth
and Power in the New Russia and Paul Klebnikov’s Godfather of the Kremlin: The
Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism43 are thorough, albeit fairly
sensationalized accounts of the Oligarchs’ scandals, as told from economic and political
perspectives. They seldom address these antics as they relate to Ideas of Russianness or
masculinity. Similarly, much of the work that has been done on the Orthodox Church—
one of Russia’s oldest and most prominent institutions, tends to be approached from a
historical perspective, rather than postulating what the church’s return to contemporary
society might mean for the future of Russia and the men and women whose lives are
shaped by its teachings and practices. John Garrard and Carol Garrard’s Russian
Orthodoxy Resurgent provides such a historical account of Orthodoxy across the
centuries, which is particularly insightful with regard to the church’s historical
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relationship with the Russian military.44 Zoe Knox provides a comprehensive overview of
the church as a key element of the Russian Idea as expressed by Berdyaev in her book
Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism.45 But
unfortunately, neither of these prominent works dedicates a significant amount of time to
matters of gender and the family.
This dissertation provides a fairly expansive glimpse of post-Soviet Russia’s
process of self-identification and construction of gender identities, while simultaneously
providing a more detailed analysis of four prominent aspects of contemporary Russian
society. This analysis is neither all-inclusive nor exhaustive, but it does fill many of the
gaps that have been left by scholarship that has been conducted on similar topics. In
general, this work is intended to provide both a fairly broad picture of gender and the
nation in post-Soviet Russia, while also investigating, through a unique discursive
approach, some rather specific issues in ways that have not been addressed previously.
Each chapter is intended to stand alone, but should also weave together into a
comprehensive narrative on the ways in which the masculine Subject has been
constructed, contested, and lived in the context of post-Soviet Russia’s national Idea.
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CHAPTER ONE
MASCULINITY AS HETEROTOPIA—OLIGARCHS AND THE REMAPPING
OF THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
In the capitalist world, you cannot be free without money, so people
choose money in order to become free, or so they believe. While they’re
chasing this money, of course, they lose part of their freedom. It’s a
complicated never-ending story, but this is it.46 –Tatiana Tolstaya, 2007
The downfall of the Soviet regime altered the Russian landscape in ways that had
not been seen since the overthrow of the tsar at the hands of the Bolsheviks: borders were
redrawn as Soviet satellite states declared their independence; industries, businesses, and
property that had been managed predominantly by the state were thrust haphazardly into
private hands; and an influx of Western goods and practices undermined ideas of
individual and collective identity that had persevered, although not uncontested, for more
than seventy years. In the face of this tumultuous change, the ideologies and practices
that had long shaped citizens’ lives were turned upside down, leading to fundamental
questions about what kind of Idea would come to characterize the inceptive Russian
nation-state and what place men and women would have in this new and uncharted
context. During much of the Soviet period, the strength of the empire was synonymous
with masculine prowess—a construction in which men were to be both architects and
embodiments of a future communist utopia. Positioned within a symbolic order in which
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the private was subsumed by the public, and where individualistic pursuits were trumped
by the development of a common good, masculine Subjectivity was defined not in terms
of individual achievement, but rather on the basis of a man’s contribution to the
collective—to the development of a classless society in which citizens would provide for
the common endeavor according to their ability and receive the fruit of this effort
according to their needs. As stipulated by the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, only when
liberated from the shackles of capitalist labor could one truly be free.
Although the paradise on earth once promised by Soviet communism was
eventually revealed to be little more than a romantic revolutionary chimera, Soviet life
had afforded citizens a unique sense of stability, identity, and freedom through
collectivity. Despite the censorship, travel restrictions, and overall lack of civil society
that characterized the lived reality of most, citizens were unencumbered from the
necessity of procuring fundamental provisions such as housing, health care, education,
and employment. And due to a history that in many ways can be characterized by the
ability to overcome difficulty and persevere through adverse times, there existed
tremendous pride in the Soviet Union’s many accomplishments. Within this context, men
and women found their places—places that provided them with a stable and meaningful
purpose in the construction of a radiant future. Although women were officially regarded
as equal contributors to the communist project, it was the “New Soviet Man” who was
held up as a national Ideal to be emulated and praised—represented by the powerful
leaders, soldiers, and laborers who were charged with protecting the Motherland,
defending the Fatherland, and literally embodying the courage and fortitude of the
empire. With the downfall of the Soviet Union came the displacement of the monolithic
30

discourse in which masculinity and femininity had been defined, revealing an
omnipresent lack that was both liberating and constraining—one in which people
suddenly found themselves uninhibited by the oftentimes draconian mandates of Soviet
life and free to craft a future of their choosing, but where this newfound freedom would
paradoxically impose its own debilitating limitations.
Freedom in the new Russia was not immediately realized as a positive
development. Rather, the dissolution of structure and oversight that the Soviet Union had
provided enabled a veritable free for all, where crime, corruption, and extreme economic
inequality came to characterize life in the post-Soviet context. Some of the most
prominent cartographers of this post-Soviet space were the New Russians, or so-called
“oligarchs”—a powerful group of businessmen who, through their criminal antics and the
immense fortunes that they amassed, would come to remap the contours of both Russian
identity and masculine Subjectivity. In some respects, Russia’s oligarchs could be said to
typify the newly liberated Russian man, as their virtually unimpeded pursuit of wealth
and power during the late 1980s and 1990s imposed upon them few limitations:
enormous homes, private jets, and beautiful women were theirs for the taking, as they
navigated the post-Soviet terrain effortlessly, “cavorting with thugs, prostitutes, easing
their way with plenty of cash.”47 Through crafty political maneuvering and by gaining
control of Russia’s most lucrative oil, media, and automobile industries, oligarchs came
to fruition as a type of New Russian48 who capitalized on the unbridled lawlessness of the
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defunct Soviet empire in pursuit of their own self-seeking objectives. A host of books,
most of which are highly sensationalized, details the oligarchs’ exploits: Godfather of the
Kremlin; Sale of the Century—Russia’s wild ride from communism to capitalism; and
Casino Moscow—A tale of greed and adventure on capitalism’s wildest frontier are
examples of the fascination that has developed with regard to Russia’s richest men.
Among the glitterati, anekdoty proliferate, inquiring in dry Russian humor about why an
oligarch would purchase a yacht for 30 million dollars when he could have been even
more frivolous and purchased the same yacht for 50 million. As Mark Lipovetsky wrote
in 2003, oligarchs have become almost mythological entities: those “beings possessing a
sui generis code of behavior incompatible with mortals.”49
This mythologized portrayal of the oligarchs, in which they “were viewed as
standing financially above—yet in other aspects dramatically below—the norms of
mundane reality,”50 arose largely from business tactics that were lauded as innovative and
clever on one hand, but scorned as illegal and fundamentally unethical, on the other.
Oligarchs exploited political connections and economic resources to which most citizens
had no access, channeling these resources not toward the good of the inceptive nationstate, but rather toward the expansion of their own financial holdings. Money laundering,
embezzlement, pyramid schemes, and contract killings became the order of the day, as
these men paid off prominent officials to gain control over the political and economic
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institutions that should have been regulating their practices. As a result of the overall
lawlessness of the time, the illegality of oligarchs’ activities went largely unquestioned in
the early post-Soviet period; it was difficult to deem such behavior illegal when Russia’s
legal system was in shambles and was, in many ways, operated by the same men who
now stand accused of violating its boundaries. As David Hoffman reminds us, “Russian
capitalism was born into an airless space, a vacuum without effective laws and a state so
badly weakened it could not enforce laws that were on the books.”51 Russia’s lacking rule
of law provided a sort of free-for-all for those who were there to take advantage of an
opportune time. Oligarchs exploited the weakness of the state, making a fortune off of the
legacy of the Soviet system, while ironically using their Soviet ties to advance their own
interests.
In sensationalized accounts, Russia’s oligarchs have been referred to as “leaders
of the new Russia, architects and apostles of a new order.”52 In the process of building
their empires, the oligarchs engaged in a reconfiguration of the post-Soviet space,
crafting a new symbolic order and positioning themselves to become the de facto rulers
of Russia. As these ultra-wealthy men took control of the extraction of natural resources,
erected new buildings across the Moscow skyline, and introduced Russia to certain goods
and opportunities that were out of reach during Soviet times, the topography of Russia
was literally remapped. In more ideational terms, oligarchs’ activities redefined Russia’s
symbolic space as a land of capitalist potential, in which men’s success became measured
not in terms of their service to the state, but rather in accordance with their political
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power and the width of their pocketbooks. Even a new language emerged—one that
included Western terms such as “biznes,” (and correspondingly, biznesmen and the less
common feminine variant biznesmenka), “marketing,” and “distrib’iutor,” while
antiquated Soviet terms such as tovarishch (comrade) were relegated to the pages of
Pravda. For some people, the oligarchs’ “business” endeavors demonstrated the
possibilities that existed for Russia to redefine itself after years of Soviet stagnation, and
for individuals to pursue personal freedoms that had long been prohibited by the state.
Cheered on by commentators in the West, the oligarchs embodied the newly liberated
Russia, serving as living representations of capitalist opportunity. Western corporations
began to see in Russia not a Cold War adversary, but rather a lucrative business partner—
a land with vast, untapped resources that were managed by a cadre of young and
enterprising entrepreneurs.
However, not everyone has shared this reading of the oligarchs’ text. As the postSoviet period unfolded and the wealth disparities between these New Russians and the
rest of the population became increasingly pronounced, the men who had made their
fortunes during an opportune and lawless time came to be viewed by many Russians as
enemies of the people—as merciless kleptocrats who were raping the Motherland for
their personal gain. While the majority of the population struggled to get by in their tiny
apartments, standing in long lines to secure whatever meager provisions they could
afford, the bodies of the oligarchs were pampered and well fed, enjoying long holidays on
glamorous, private yachts and at vacation resorts abroad. Largely as a consequence of the
oligarchs’ endeavors, Russians’ first taste of capitalism and democracy was decidedly
unpalatable: The oligarchs ushered in a cult of Western-inspired consumerism in which
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material possessions were valorized over culture and tradition, and where the free market
came to be viewed as synonymous with crime and corruption, rather than the freedom
and individual potential that some Western advocates had so heavily promoted. As
Stephen Fortescue has argued, “perceptions of morality, equality and social justice are
too important to the legitimacy of any politico-economic system, much less one in as
difficult and delicate a transition process as Russia.”53 With politicians at their beck and
call, the oligarchs and their lawless escapades deprived the state of much needed
legitimacy, leading to vast public distrust and severely hampering Russia’s already
fledgling reform efforts.
Public opinion polls that were conducted by the Levada Center beginning in the
early 1990s unsurprisingly reveal low public confidence in then-president Boris Yeltsin
and his entourage. The leader’s disapproval rating hovered around 90 percent for much of
his tenure in office, peaking at 93 percent upon the devaluation of the ruble in October
1998.54 Many Russians expressed regret over the dissolution of the Soviet Union, siting
economic and political instability as primary concerns. When asked in 2003 what they
felt had been the biggest impediments to Russia’s economic growth, “the laziness of
bureaucrats” and “the ‘oligarchs’ and their lack of interest in the economic revival of the
country” took top honors.55 But it was not only economic inequality and political
corruption that stirred public outrage: In the minds of many citizens, the oligarchs
represented the antithesis of Russianness. They came to be viewed as culturally ignorant
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and uncouth opportunists who were selling out the heart of Russia in pursuit of selfish,
individualistic endeavors. The days in which stadiums had been packed to the brim for
poetry readings by the likes of Yevgeny Yevtushenko and Bella Akhmadulina were
over—traded in for counterfeit Levi jeans and pirated Western movies. Consequently,
while re-mapping the Fatherland to accommodate their financial and political ambitions,
the oligarchs and their shady business practices simultaneously mapped out a different
type of space—a symbolic and discursive space that made painfully evident everything
that Russia was not, and which played a significant role in generating desires for the
construction of a new Russian Idea that was characterized not by chaos and
unpredictability, but rather by stability and a return to the cultural practices that had once
made Russia great.

Heterotopic Masculinities in the New Russia
In the words of Michel Foucault, the spaces that were mapped out by the
oligarchs’ economic and political exploits could be thought of as “heterotopias”—spaces
that undermined any semblance of existing order and ran in direct contradiction to the
failed utopia of Soviet life, while simultaneously evoking a collective yearning for the
stability, security, and national pride that Russia lacked. The oligarchs’ pursuit of
personal objectives at the expense of the common good, their manipulation of natural and
financial resources, and their re-ordering of the political system as a highly competitive
and hierarchical environment directly opposed the collective and centripetalizing
processes of the tightly regulated Soviet state. At the same time, their actions brought into
clear view the pervasive lack of identity and optimism that characterized life in the post36

Soviet context—the lack of a future utopia, or “placeless place” that was in many ways
desired, but which remained markedly out of reach. Whereas utopias represent “unreal”
spaces that “have a general relation of direct or inverse analogy with the real space of
society,”56 heterotopias “constitute a sort of counter-arrangement” of this unrealized and
inaccessible Ideal.57 Through actions that ranged from Boris Berezovsky’s manipulation
of the political apparatus to Roman Abramovich’s literal re-mapping of the Russian
frontier, the oligarchs’ practices comprised a constellation of heterotopic spaces that
generated desires among the Russian populous to revive historical memories and
practices that were said to be at the heart of Russian identity, but which had been eclipsed
by the influx of Western ideas and a rather involuntary break from the past.
As Russel West-Pavlov explains, space “is not a pre-existing receptacle for
human action, but is created by that action; space, in turn, exerts its own variety of
agency, modeling the human actors who have configured it.”58 Conceived in physical,
symbolic, and discursive terms, the heterotopic spaces that were shaped by the oligarchs’
practices mutually constituted particular manifestations of masculine Subjectivity that
came to be at once envied and despised—masculinities that were themselves heterotopic,
signifying clearly the problems and non-Russian characteristics of the post-Soviet period.
Embodying the uncultured lawlessness of capitalist “freedom” in the new Russia, these
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Subjectivities painfully undermined the relatively stable conceptions of both masculinity
and nation that had characterized a powerful empire lost. They represented a new
economy of sexual exchange in which wealth and individual success became defining
features of masculine prowess, and where men who lacked the ability to pursue such
objectives were regarded as lazy alcoholics who were forced to depend on their more
resilient wives and girlfriends for support. Ironically, notwithstanding their overt, “hypermasculine” personae, the oligarchs, with their Western leanings and their penchant for
criminal activity, simultaneously catalyzed the already escalating disdain of male
homosexuality in the post-Soviet context, which has oftentimes been viewed as a nonRussian phenomenon—as something that has been brought to Russia from the West, and
which previously predominated mainly among criminals in the Gulag.59 By pointing to
everything that an “authentic” Russia is not, Oligarchs’ activities have mapped out not
only what it means to be Russian in the post-Soviet context, but also what it meant to be a
“normal” Russian man.
As explained in the introductory chapter, the masculine Subject is a Subject of
discourse—it is neither predetermined nor essential, but rather emerges out of an
omnipresent lack and is shaped by the context in which it is positioned, while
simultaneously giving shape to that context. In certain respects, the heterotopias that the
oligarchs’ practices engendered provided this lack with substance: they came to
constitute an environment in which political cronyism prevailed, where credentials could
be bought and sold, and where Russian tradition and culture were shoved to the wayside
in favor of über-sexualized consumerist pursuits. As women became hyper-feminized,
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influenced by the availability of Western fashion and embracing an overt sexuality that
had hitherto been prohibited, the success of men, rather than being defined in terms of
their contributions to the state, came to be understood hierarchically—in competition
with one another and on the basis of personal wealth and status. The chaotic post-Soviet
space that was fomented in large part by the oligarchs’ activities not only generated
logistical impediments to navigating everyday life—it also undermined both individual
and collective identities that had been given the illusion of stability and permanence, and
generated desires for the re-construction of an Idea that was uniquely Russian and for a
space in which men and women could once again find their places. As Ruth Levitas
points out:
The sense of ‘something’s missing’ can be read in every trace of how it
might be otherwise, how the ever-present sense of lack might be assuaged.
From this a much wider view of utopia emerges, in which it becomes not a
blueprint or prescription, but the expression of desire for a better way of
living.60
Despite the diversity of the oligarchs’ endeavors, their practices ran against traditional
understandings of Russianness in almost every respect, each contributing to a narrative in
which this “trace of how it might be otherwise” could be read clearly.
It was against this backdrop of discontent that the semi-authoritarian, centralizing
policies of Vladimir Putin and the conservative, moralizing principles of the Russian
Orthodox Church gained notoriety in Russian society and discourse.

60

Ruth Levitas, “Introduction: The Elusive Idea of Utopia,” History of the Human
Sciences 16, no. 1 (2003): 1-10.
39

In 2000, the chaos, pauperization and fatigue of ordinary Russians made
them eager to trade what liberties they had in the democratic Russia for
Putin’s ‘diktatura zakona’ (dictatorship of the law).61
And indeed, Alec Rasizade’s assertion is supported by public opinion polls: in 1990, 62
percent of respondents agreed that “most [people] cannot live without the tutelage of the
state.” By 2011, this number had grown to a whopping 79 percent.62 In 1994, 54 percent
of respondents suggested that “order in the state” is more important than respect for
human rights, which received only 25 percent of the vote. Although the percentage of
respondents who advocate human rights had increased by 2011, 53 percent of those
surveyed continued to prioritize state order. In 2011, only 55 percent of respondents
agreed that “Russia needs a democracy,” and only 23 percent felt that Russia needs a
democracy “such as those in developed countries of Europe and America.”63 Putin came
to power in December 1999 promising to eliminate oligarchs as a class, while clamping
down on the crime, corruption, and the shadow economy that had come to constitute a
way of life over the past decade. In his much-touted “Millennium” speech, he lamented
both the failures of the Soviet state and the abysmal conditions of post-Soviet Russia,
declaring that “Russians want stability, confidence in the future and the ability to plan
ahead for themselves and their children, not just for a month but for years and even
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decades.”64 And as a result of the marked improvements that took place during his
incumbency, he quickly became a new “father of the people,” positioning himself at the
crux of tradition and modernity, and symbolizing, through his strong-handed governance
and machismo persona, what the Ideal man in contemporary Russia should be.
Justifying its actions as demanded by the chaos and “immorality” of the postSoviet period, the Orthodox Church has also gained significant traction, playing an
important role in the reconstruction of an authentic Russian Idea and “normal,” or
“natural,” conceptions of masculine Subjectivity. During a 2008 interview with Spiegel,
Patriarch Kirill was asked about the church’s stance on the supposedly interrelated issues
of crime, fraud, murder, and homosexuality, all of which, over the course of the
interview, became tied in with the rise of the oligarchs and capitalism in the new Russia.
“Crime and corruption were rampant after the collapse of the Soviet Union,” the
interviewer commented. “Murder, robbery and fraud became mass phenomena. Wasn’t
this a defeat for the church?” Kirill responded by pointing to the moral relativity that
“foreign influence” and consumerism introduced to the presumably otherwise
uncontaminated nation-state: “Reviving morality is a long process,” the patriarch
maintained.
Our economy was in ruins, foreign influence was growing and so was the
consumption mentality, the focus on performance, all of these postmodern
ideas which treat everything as relative and no longer require us to
distinguish between truth and lies.65
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Later in the interview, Kirill applied the same logic to the increased visibility of
homosexuality in Moscow, referring again to moral relativism of the West: “What
troubles you, for example, about homosexuals marching through the streets of Moscow in
a parade, just as they do in Berlin or Amsterdam?” The interviewer asked. “It distorts
the boundary between good and evil, between sin and sanctity,” said Kirill. “We aren’t
talking about just any decision. We are talking about morals. They want us to believe that
morality is relative. But that’s completely untrue.” 66
Over the course of this discussion, and with regard to constructions of
Russianness and masculinity more broadly, the influx of Western ideas embodied by
oligarchs—most of whom are Jewish—played a central role. Although the patriarch has
been careful to not criticize the wealth of the oligarchs too harshly, he has simultaneously
made clear the church’s disapproval of their lack of charity and overall neglect of the
country. When former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov criticized Roman Abramovich for
his purchase of the Chelsea Football Club as “not the kind of good deed that is essential
for our spiritual atmosphere,” Patriarch Kirill agreed that the outburst was “very correct
and necessary.” “The names of people with colossal fortunes were mentioned today…but
I do not know whether they feed ten people each day,”67 the patriarch added. Luzhkov,
who is sometimes regarded as one of Russia’s “original” oligarchs, has fared better with
the church than many others. By adamantly condemning homosexuality as “satanic” and
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repeatedly ensuring that gay pride parades that were scheduled to take place during his
tenure in office were either prohibited altogether or were met with a harsh police
response, the former Moscow mayor has positioned himself as a “normal” Russian man,
seeking to counter the Western influence that has pervaded the city and return Russia to
its traditional roots. Luzhkov has also endeavored to reconfigure the post-Soviet space in
Orthodox terms, overseeing the reconstruction of the famed Cathedral of Christ our
Savior, which had been destroyed by Stalin, as an exact replica of the original. As
Hoffman describes the new church, “the structure itself was an imposing castle by the
Moscow River, with a fairy-tale look that shimmered from a distance.”68 As mayor of
Moscow, Luzhkov enjoyed considerable popularity before being ousted by Dmitrii
Medvedev in September 2010.
The power that Putin and the church have amassed as a consequence of their
perceived abilities to establish strength, stability, and national identity in the ailing
nation-state—to provide hope for a more prosperous future in which the heterotopic
spaces etched out by the oligarchs would be left in the past—has brought about new Ideas
of both Russianness and masculine Subjectivity. Indicative of this process is the
perpetual mapping and re-negotiation of the oligarchs’ places in Russian society: the
literal and discursive spaces that the oligarchs carve out for themselves and the reactions,
both politically and in the private ream, to those spaces. The oligarchs who have erected
at least a façade of charity toward Russia and who have in some small measure
acquiesced to Putin’s political proclivities have enjoyed exceptional comfort within
Russia’s borders; conversely, the men who are perceived to have become rich at the
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expense of the nation, or who have challenged Putin’s stabilizing political authority, have
literally been either expelled from the Russian landscape or relegated to its most remote
and inhospitable corners. The process of unraveling this mapping of the Fatherland
requires us, as West Pavlov has remarked, to
[l]ay bare the conditions of possibility which allow meaning to be
generated—and upon which truth is then delineated, not as something
essential, intrinsic, or eternal, but as the contingent product of a process of
production.69
The remainder of this chapter provides examples of the ways in which three of Russia’s
most prominent oligarchs—Roman Abramovich, Boris Berezovsky, and Mikhail
Khodorkovsky—have contributed to the construction of an ever-changing cartography of
the post-Soviet space and considers the implications of this narrative for understandings
of both Russianness and Subjective masculinities in contemporary Russia.

Oligarchs and the Remapping of the Fatherland
Among the many significant players who emerged on the scene during the late
Soviet and early post-Soviet periods, Abramovich, Berezovsky, and Khodorkovsky
exemplify the diversity of heterotopic spaces that the oligarchs’ activities have
collectively comprised.70 Educated at prominent Soviet institutions and with Western
mentors such as Rupert Murdoch and Geoffrey Sachs at their service, these powerful men
quickly acquired the keys to capitalist ingenuity in the soon-to-be post-Soviet
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environment. Berezovsky (Abramovich’s mentor) is perhaps the most controversial and
glamorized of the oligarchs, having made his fortune by dealing in shady car
manufacturing schemes and media enterprises before fleeing to London in 2000 amid
charges of illegal business activities. Berezovsky has since become a fierce critic of
Vladimir Putin, asserting that the leader is returning Russia to a totalitarian state and
calling for his resignation. Abramovich has literally traversed the Russian map—holding
stakes in some of Russia’s most prominent oil, aluminum, and airline industries, in
addition to engaging in curious political activities in the Far East—and is the only one out
of the three oligarchs herein discussed who, due to his close ties with the Kremlin and his
girlfriend’s support of the arts, continues to thrive in contemporary Russia. And although
Khodorkovsky’s fate has not been sealed definitively, the repeated denial by Russian
courts to release him from the Siberian prisons where he has been held since challenging
Putin’s authority in 2003 generate little optimism about his future and reaffirm the strong
grip that Putin maintains over political, economic, and social affairs. After his oil
company Yukos was carved up and appropriated by the state, Khodorkovsky, who was
once Russia’s wealthiest man and an ardent proponent of capitalism and democracy, has
been made into a living example of boundaries in Russia that are not to be transgressed.
Together, the activities of these three men paint an interesting portrait of the ways
in which oligarchs’ activities, sometimes brutally corrupt and at other times modestly
charitable, have both shaped and served as barometers for public and political perceptions
of what constitutes Ideal Russianness and Russian masculinity in the contemporary
period. In the discussion that follows, diverse biographical snapshots of each man under
consideration are presented as constitutive of a particular narrative of Russianness, each
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contributing to the larger symbolic order in which the parameters of masculinity are
perpetually negotiated and rewritten. These accounts are neither all-inclusive nor
exhaustive; rather, they are intended to serve as examples of the differing types of
activities in which oligarchs have engaged and to demonstrate the ways in which those
activities have contributed to a mapping of the post-Soviet space that differed
dramatically from those of the past, and which in many ways have catalyzed desires for
the establishment of a centralized and authoritative voice in the contemporary period.
Chapters two and three provide analyses of the ways in which Ideas of Russianness and
masculine Subjectivity have developed within discourses of the state under Putin and the
Orthodox Church. This chapter is in large part intended to complement those analyses by
exemplifying the role that oligarchs played in catalyzing the emergence of a more heavyhanded, distinctively Russian type of freedom over that offered by Western-style
capitalism and democracy. As with any discursive “text,” the reception of the text is as
important as its production. As such, attention will also be paid to the ways in which
oligarchs’ activities and their implications for Russia have been received and interpreted,
mainly through literature, film, and critical news reports.
Democracy and Freedom as Mapped Out by Boris Berezovsky
Boasting that he and six other men controlled over 50 percent of Russia’s gross
domestic product, Boris Berezovsky coined the term “oligarch” and reconfigured the
post-Soviet space in ways that in many respects made possible the ascendance of Putin,
the church, and popular desires for stability and a normal Idea of Russianness.71 Formerly
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one of the richest and most powerful men in Russia, the young and ambitious Berezovsky
embodied capitalist and consumerist freedom—becoming an almost God-like figure
whose practices comprised heterotopic spaces that would lead to his ultimate exodus
from Russia. The oligarch’s virtual ownership of Russia’s most prominent automobile,
media, and airline industries were the keys to his success, while simultaneously setting a
corrupt standard for carrying out business in the new Russia. His role in the extraction
and distribution of natural resources (oil and aluminum) represented an unabashed
reconfiguration of the land itself for financial gain, while sending enormous amounts of
capital abroad rather than reinvesting it in his home country. And his political
maneuvering, in which Berezovsky is credited with almost singlehandedly catapulting
Boris Yeltsin into his second term as president of Russia, in many ways laid the
foundation for Russia’s future political trajectory. Ironically, had Berezovsky not ensured
Yeltsin’s reelection, Yeltsin would not have named Putin as president, and Berezovsky
might not be in exile today. In many respects, the oligarch’s pursuit of unlimited
individual freedom led to his own demise—to constructions of a future, unrealized utopia
in which there would be no room for him and his shady business practices.
The son of a Jewish construction engineer and a pediatric nurse, Berezovsky, who
was born in Moscow in 1946, attended a forestry institute before arriving at the Institute
of Control Sciences as a researcher in 1969. Known for having an exceptionally
analytical mind and steadfast energy and willpower, he quickly proved himself as a
scientist and mathematician, eventually heading his own laboratory that was dedicated to
use of applied mathematics to study decision-making processes. Throughout the
ascendance of his lucrative career, the aspiring oligarch achieved nearly every degree and
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award that the Soviet Union conferred, including the Lenin Komsomol Award, the State
Award, and the Lenin Award.72 Although the process of earning a doctorate degree
during the Soviet period was oftentimes more political than academic, Berezovsky
navigated the terrain fastidiously, eventually acquiring the coveted title of PhD, as well.
Yet perhaps more important than Berezovsky’s scientific and academic aptitude (it has
been written that by his own admission, he wasn’t a brilliant scientist) was his ability to
network—to forge connections by giving speeches and organizing seminars both
domestically and abroad, and to work his way into corporate and political circles that
would eventually afford him tremendous opportunity.73 As the Economist reported in
March 2000, “Mr. Berezovsky embodies the distinctive characteristic of the ruling elite in
post-Soviet Russia: cynical ruthlessness. By his own account, two guiding principles for
dealings with other people are that ‘everyone can be bought, and everyone has a price’.”74
These “guiding principles,” which soon became standard practice in the business world,
would detrimentally taint perceptions of capitalism, democracy, and masculinity in
Russia for years to come.
Some of Berezovsky’s most scandalous business practices revolved around his
dealings in the automobile industry. He began by selling computer software, mainly to
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Soviet committees who were persuaded to buy his programs. One of the companies for
which he would come to provide software support was Avtovaz, The Soviet Union’s
largest car manufacturer. Then in the Volga River town of Togliatti in 1988, Berezovsky
founded the car dealership Logovaz, which would eventually come to account for 10
percent of Avtovaz’s Russian sales (approximately 45,000 cars annually).75 Yet these
sales transpired within a space of criminality and corruption. According to Forbes,
Avtovaz sold the typical Lada to dealerships for approximately $4,800; the dealer would
then sell the same car to the consumer for around $7,500, leaving Avtovaz “bleeding cash
and piling on debt,”76 while the dealer raked in an almost 50 percent markup. Not only
did Berezovsky make a tremendous profit from markups—he financed his operations
with the manufacturer’s own money: Typically, domestic consumers would pay for cars
upfront, but dealers would not pay Avtovaz for the cars until after they had already been
sold. By delaying payments—particularly during times of rapid inflation—the dealer kept
his pockets stuffed full of other people’s cash. Another of Berezovsky’s trademark
schemes was his “re-export” strategy, in which he would alter documentation in order to
make it look like he was exporting cars out of Russia, affording him lower prices from
Avtovaz, then “import” them back into Russia and receive dollars for the cars he sold. It
also didn’t hurt that the Avtovaz chairman, its head of finance, and its head of aftersale
service each owned substantial stock in Logovaz.77 Top executives at Avtovaz benefitted
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personally from dealing with Berezovsky’s Logovaz, themselves engaging in corrupt
business operations.
Avtovaz produced more than 700,000 cars annually, oftentimes duplicating
vehicle identification numbers in order to avoid paying taxes. In total, it is estimated that
this fraudulent business cost the federal budget approximately $600 million.78 Yet given
the lawlessness of the time, the company had to do what it could to stay afloat. It was not
uncommon for car parts, and even entire cars, to be purloined—oftentimes directly off of
the assembly line. Workers’ salaries were so low that the theft and resale of car parts
proved more profitable than gainful employment. And indeed, the corruption was well
guarded: In 1994, Radik Yakutian, the head of the investigative department of the Samara
Region’s prosecutor’s office, was assassinated while investigating Avtovaz’s practices.
Paul Klebnikov, the Russian-American journalist and Forbes reporter who made a
successful career out of investigating Russia’s oligarchs, was assassinated outside of
Forbes’ Moscow office in 2004. Although his murder has not been solved definitively, it
is widely assumed that his investigation of the murder of Vladislav Listyev, for which
Berezovsky was a suspect, played a strong role in his killing. Even as early as 1997,
when the Ministry of Internal Affairs carried out “Operation Cyclone” and raided
Avtovaz, the combined effort by the prosecutor’s office and the tax police uncovered
evidence that the “businessmen” associated with the manufacturer had carried out no
fewer than 65 murders of company managers, dealers, and business rivals.79

78
79

Rasizade, “Putin’s Mission in the Russian Thermidor,” 9.
Klebnikov, Paul. “The Day They Raied Aeroflot.” Forbes 163, no. 6 (1999).
50

This embezzlement, tax evasion, and violence also characterized Berezovsky’s
ventures in the oil, airline, and television industries. In the early 1990s, Berezovsky took
control of the oil giant Sibneft for $100 million, which was well below its estimated value
at the time, in addition to presiding over a large stake of Aeroflot, the Soviet Union’s
premier airline.80 As Paul Klebnikov wrote in 1999:
Aeroflot was one of the crown jewels of the Russian industry. It had
landing rights all over the world, relatively new aircraft and a steady
stream of foreign exchange revenues… Aeroflot, in short, was a plum, and
Berezovsky, with his connections to President Yeltsin’s family, was in a
position to take control.81
After ousting Aeroflot’s old management team, Berezovsky put his own associates in
place and began shuffling money back and forth within a network of companies that
Berezovsky controlled. Aeroflot’s foreign offices were ordered to “remit up to 80 percent
of their foreign currency revenues to Andava S. A.,”82 an obscure financial company in
Lausanne, Switzerland. Through a complicated scheme in which interest rates,
commissions, and currency exchanges were manipulated in Aeroflot’s favor, Berezovsky
proceeded to amass great wealth through the company, which later became known
mainly for its unsafe flying record and the shoddy conditions of its planes. Through his
other companies, he also purchased shares in Nezavisimaiia Gazeta and Kommersant, as
well as television networks ORT and TV6—media enterprises that would prove
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beneficial for advancing his political interests.83 Combined, Berezovsky’s corrupt
business activities gave rise to spaces in which criminal activity became standard
practice, and where Berezovsky, as an increasingly rich and powerful man, was at once
envied and abhorred.
But his mapping of the Russian market does not stand alone: Through his
longtime relationship with Boris Yeltsin and his chief of staff, Berezovsky worked his
way into the president’s inner circle, gaining considerable political power and influence,
and affirming the hierarchical and competitive system that the Soviet political apparatus
had become. Realizing the financial and political benefits that a Yeltsin presidency could
provide, Berezovsky used his control over Russia’s media networks to slander Yeltsin’s
opponents and all but guarantee his reelection in 1996. He and his fellow businessmen
are said to have also bankrolled Yeltsin’s campaign, spending over $140 million when
the legal limit for each party was only $3 million. As Forbes reported in 1996:
As in the U.S., most people in Russia who give big money to political
campaigns hope for favors. The difference is that in Russia the payoff is
often direct… The fox now guards the chickens.84
Yeltsin, who was rarely sober enough to make his own decisions, let alone conduct
official, presidential business, rewarded Berezovsky for his contributions by appointing
him deputy secretary of the National Security Council, then secretary of the Organization
for Coordinating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). And in 1999,
Berezovsky won a seat in the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, for the poverty83
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stricken southern republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia. Such posts would later prove
advantageous by providing Berezovsky with diplomatic immunity from prosecution.
Similar to the ways in which Avtovaz associates owned stock in Logovaz, it also didn’t
hurt that Yeltsin’s immediate family had stakes in some of Berezovsky’s businesses.
That the president’s son-in-law had been directly involved in money laundering at
Aeroflot would make it difficult to prosecute Berezovsky without also exposing the
corruption of Yeltsin and his kin.
Given the cornucopia of scandalous practices that were at the heart of
Berezovsky’s political and business careers, it is of little wonder that public reactions to
his activities have been generally negative and that they have in many respects served as
a springboard for Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. As Berezovsky continues to promote
himself as a staunch defender of democracy and capitalism, public perceptions of the
“free market” continue to flounder in the new Russia, as well. Berezovsky has lived in
self-imposed exile in London since 2000, when his relationship with Putin (whom he
helped get elected) soured. In 2007, he was tried in absentia and sentenced to six years in
prison for embezzlement at Aeroflot. Then again in 2009, Berezovsky was sentenced to
thirteen years for defrauding Avtovaz and was ordered to pay 58 million rubles ($1.9
million) in compensation.85 As efforts to extradite him back to Moscow continue to prove
unsuccessful, Berezovsky ridicules his trial as an anti-democratic “farce” and calls for
Vladimir Putin to be ousted from office—by force, if necessary. He has harshly accused
Putin of rolling back democratic freedoms in Russia—the same “freedoms” that enabled
85

See “Berezovsky Sentenced to 13 Years for Defrauding Avtovaz,” The St. Petersburg
Times 49, no. 1487 (2009).
53

Berezovsky to earn his millions, which he quickly funneled out of Russia and into foreign
banks. In a 2000 interview with Gregory Feifer, a fellow of the Institute for Current
World Affairs, Berezovsky stated: “The main goal is to maintain what we’ve achieved in
the last ten years—sometimes with great difficulties—which is a truly democratic
state.”86 Such criticisms have only grown louder over the years, particularly after
Berezovsky had absconded to London and no longer feared Putin’s wrath:
In spring and summer 2000 Putin initiated the first step in his plan to turn
Russia away from the decentralization and diversification effected under
Boris Yeltsin and back toward the strong central state we knew in Soviet
times. In those months he signed a number of decrees dismantling
independent centers of power that had been devolved to other branches of
government and regions and restoring that power to the center. His aim
was the opposite of democracy: to concentrate power in one hand—his
own.87
This 2004 criticism against Putin’s authoritative tendencies was amplified further in
2005, when Berezovsky accused the president of being a “terrorist” who was trying to
reestablish Soviet centralization in Russia. Lamenting the loss of progress made during
the Yeltsin administration, Berezovsky explains:
Putin has moved in another direction: He is trying to restore for Russia the
same heavy-handed, centralized system of control just like the old Soviet
Union was organized, including through his military campaign against the
Chechens. This is his big mistake. It didn’t work for the Soviet Union and
it won’t work for Russia.88
But who is to say that it didn’t work for the Soviet Union? Clearly, the system had its
faults and at times witnessed devastating consequences—consequences that are
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resurfacing with gusto in the contemporary period. But as popular nostalgia for the
positive aspects of Soviet life indicates, the centralized and heavy-handed system that
Putin’s policies have fostered may be constraining in many respects, but it may also
promise a different sort of freedom that was woefully lacking in Berezovsky’s Russia.
This popular sentiment is particularly evident in Russian fiction and film, where
Berezovsky has been both glamourized and not so subtly mocked. The most prominent
portrayals of the oligarch include Yuli Dubov’s novel Bol’shaia Paika, (The Big Cut),
and Pavel Lungin’s 2002 film Oligarkh (Tycoon), which is based on Dubov’s book.
Dubov wrote his novel from first-hand experience as Berezovsky’s business partner,
leading some critics to suggest that his account of Berezovsky’s life and activities may be
in some ways guarded. Generally, however, the novel is deemed to be an accurate
portrayal of the oligarch’s rise and decline. The film, which makes interesting use of time
and space to create an aura of mystery and distance, is particularly successful in its ability
to illustrate not only Berezovsky’s quick wit and driven nature, but also public reaction to
his exploits. Although the names of the characters in the film differ from the real-life
counterparts they represent, the resemblance of the main character Platon Makovsky to
Berezovsky—who changed his name to Platon (Plato) Elenin while in exile in 2004—is
unmistakable: Makovsky’s business, Infocar, is a direct reference to Berezovsky’s
Logovaz; he later acquires a television channel through which the viewers get a peek at
his highly orchestrated life and activities; and for much of the film, he is presumed to
have been assassinated in a car bombing, similar to the event that nearly claimed the life
of Berezovsky and decapitated his chauffer. The film poignantly demonstrates both the
public fascination and the disdain that Russia’s oligarchs engendered, painting a vivid
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picture of life in the lawless 1990s and sharply juxtaposing the bleak present with hopes
for a better future. As Harley Balzer wrote in 2003:
New Russians, in short, present us with a dichotomous perception: on the
one hand, they are people who have caught the wave of change, and
turned it to their advantage; on the other hand, they are corrupt, boorish,
and, unforgivably, illicitly rich.89
Lungin’s film effectively captures both aspects of the oligarchs and post-Soviet life.
All events that take place in the film are positioned in relation to Makovsky’s
death, which supposedly occurred shortly after government forces raided the
headquarters of his business, Infocar. That Makovsky is presumed dead in the beginning
of the film allows the entire story to be told by his associates, through their recollections
of interactions with Makovsky and their descriptions of him and his life. As Lucy Fisher
has aptly observed of the temporal dimensions of Lungin’s film:
[I]ts flashbacks are bizarrely interlocking and sometimes embedded within
one another like Russian stacking-dolls, thus, creating a mystifying
temporal enigma and conundrum for the spectator.90
The film’s style in many respects represents the chaos and confusion of the time, while
simultaneously juxtaposing a future without Makovsky (Berezovsky) with a present in
which the oligarch essentially owned the post-Soviet space. This portrayal of Makovsky
symbolizes the distance and omnipotence that surrounded Berezovsky’s life in
Moscow—he is portrayed as an almost God-like figure, with his “disciples” eulogizing
his most memorable qualities, and with the intricacies of his business practices only
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brought to life through the experiences of others. Capitalism is the new object of worship,
with a Jewish deity having given his life for promises of a future that is anything but
Russian.
The scandalous nature of Makovsky’s endeavors is particularly revealed through
an emphasis on the relationship between certain non-Russian aspects of his persona and
the advent of Western style “freedom” in the new Russia. As the film flashes back to the
time just before Makovsky’s death, a television reporter who is covering the
government’s raid on Infocar explains that the state is attempting to demonstrate how “it
no longer needs oligarchs,” pointing out that Makovsky’s net worth of $5 billion is not
enough to spare him from such public humiliation. The oligarch responds by stating that
“we are in Russia—my only crime is being a free man.” Meanwhile, groups of angry
protestors shout for Makovsky to “go live in Israel,” while supporters of the Communist
Party in traditional dress sing patriotic songs in celebration of the event and yell for
Makovsky to “stop robbing the people.” Through a narrative that jumps back and forth
between Makovsky’s life and the time just after his death, the film clearly portrays the
oligarch’s lavish lifestyle: the yacht that he purposefully sinks, while his fellow ultrawealthy passengers nonchalantly swim ashore (thankful that they at least salvaged the
shishkebobs); the extravagant birthday party, where the oligarch makes his grand entrée
atop an elephant and receives gifts that range from an Akhal Teke horse to a beauty
queen wrapped in cellophane; and the lavish banquet-style meals over which Makovsky
and his colleagues discuss their most recent business dealings. Interestingly, one of the
characters in the film that demonstrates a sort of regret for this new Russia is the wife of
Makovsky’s partner, Viktor. At Makovsky’s lavish birthday party, the woman chides the
57

men for stuffing their faces while the country starves. In a drunken tirade, she exclaims
that she doesn’t eat caviar, but only drinks vodka—”vodka Rodina” and therefore is
“with the people.” Taken together, the events in this film demonstrate both the envy and
disdain surrounding Russia’s oligarchs, and Berezovsky in particular, serving as a kind of
counterpoint to the narrative that that was being exclaimed loudly in everyday postSoviet life.
Through a combination of his nefarious business endeavors and his enormous
wealth and power, Berezovsky has etched out a heterotopic space in the post-Soviet
context that has come to be viewed as selfishly opportunistic and fundamentally nonRussian. The fact that Berezovsky is Jewish also does little to generate sentiments of
national belonging, as the majority of Russians identify as Orthodox Christian and
oftentimes view people from other religious and ethnic backgrounds with skepticism, if
not outright hostility. The claim is sometimes made that oligarchs have been targeted in
Putin’s Russia because of their Jewish faith (many of Russia’s Jewish oligarchs, such as
Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, have been severely
reprimanded), while others argue that the role of religion has been exaggerated.
Undoubtedly, both religious and ethnic minorities tend to be “feminized” in Russia—
perceived as somehow weaker and less gallant than their “authentic” Russian
counterparts, and therefore also less entitled to positions of power and prestige. Either
way, it has been made clear that the men such as Berezovsky, who are perceived to have
amassed wealth at the expense of the nation, or who have opposed Putin’s now idolized
masculine prowess, are unwelcome in the contemporary Russian context. Conversely, as
will be demonstrated next in a brief overview of Abramovich’s unique endeavors in the
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Far East, those who have capitulated to Putin’s demands, and who are perceived to have
contributed charitably to the common good, have fared well in the narrative of Putin’s
Russia.

Roman Abramovich and the Construction of a Utopian Ideal
As Yuri Govorushko put it, “If money is no object, distance and time are, it
seems, no problem.”91 Beginning in early childhood, Roman Abramovich’s life quickly
became characterized by the transcendence of both space and time. Born in the Volga
town of Saratov, Abramovich was orphaned at four years of age and sent to live with his
grandparents in Moscow. He later moved to the Arctic region of Komi to stay with his
uncle, who was an oil official, before going on to complete military service and then
graduating from Moscow State Academy of Law.92 Taken under the wing of fellow nownotorious oligarch Boris Berezovsky, Abramovich dabbled in business projects that
ranged from selling rubber ducks out of his Moscow apartment during perestroika to
managing oil and pig farming companies. Having already made a fortune in tires and
commodities trading by the time he reached his early 20s, Abramovich rapidly expanded
his business empire: by 2003 (shortly after Berezovsky’s departure to London), he had
acquired a nearly 80 percent stake in the oil company Sibneft, half of the aluminum
monopoly RusAl, and 25 percent of Aeroflot, which still remained Russia’s principle
airline carrier. In addition to these multiple business endeavors, Abramovich purchased
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the Chelsea football club in 2003, vowing to watch every game. Yet amid this long list of
diverse political and economic undertakings, Abramovich’s most bizarre—and perhaps
most symbolic—pursuit was arguably his governance of Chukotka, one of Russia’s most
desolate and impoverished Far East regions. It has largely been this experiment with
governance that has bestowed upon Abramovich a reputation of benevolence in certain
circles while keeping him in good standing with Vladimir Putin, whose oil interests in the
region continue to expand.
At the behest of President Putin in 2001, Abramovich became governor of the
Chukchi Autonomous Okrug, which had been declining rapidly since the Soviet collapse
and the departure of military installations from the region in the late 1980s. The region,
which was then nine time zones away from Moscow (about 100 km above the Arctic
Circle) and had a meager population of 73,000, was “the most socio-economically
distressed of the Russian Federation’s 89 regions after war-torn Chechnya.”93 At the time
that Abramovich was elected as governor with 92 percent of the vote, most of the houses
in Chukotka lacked hot water and indoor plumbing; the electricity supply was sporadic,
and “other than vodka, radio [was] the only source of entertainment.”94 According to
Yuri Zarakhovich, Chukotka looked like “a handful of undersized building blocks tossed
across the featureless tundra.”95 Consequently, over the first three years of his tenure in
office, Abramovich paid for the construction of forty-six new homes at $50,000 each, in
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addition to financing the construction of hotels, movie theaters, bowling alleys,
supermarkets, an indoor skating rink (because outdoor temperatures, which sometimes
dip as low as -40 degrees Fahrenheit, are too cold for outdoor skating) and a public bathbarbershop. Perhaps most importantly, he ensured that the salaries of public sector
workers were paid on time—something that had not happened since long before the
downfall of the Soviet regime. To subsidize many of these projects, Abramovich reached
into his own pocket (primarily through his investment company, Millhouse Capital),
giving people whose subsistence derived mainly from reindeer herding new opportunities
and an increased standard of living. He even paid personally to send approximately 8,500
children on vacation to the Black Sea, offering them an escape from Russia’s brutal
“summerless Far East”—all to the tune of approximately $200-$300 million.96
Some villagers reportedly bowed before Abramovich and wept at the
improvements that the new governor had bestowed upon their tiny enclave. He had
literally built a semi-modern city out of one of the most desolate regions of Russia, which
in many respects had been hit hardest by years of Soviet decline and post-Soviet neglect.
As reported by The Guardian in 2004: “The identikit image being pieced together for us
was of a self-made man who was not only powerful and wealthy, but acutely aware of
those who had done less well in the tumultuous 1990s, when the Soviet Union fell.”97
Abramovich’s spokesman, John A. Mann, echoed this claim:
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Roman’s [sic] changed the lives of 70,000 people in his province,
Chukotka. They used to be starving and now they all have Dolby Surround
Sound. Do you think they’re complaining? But for Roman it’s not an ego
thing.98
Yet this modernization project has also given rise to questions regarding Abramovich’s
motives and his treatment of the indigenous residents. While some villagers were
cheering Abramovich’s reforms and thanking him for his generosity, others quietly
voiced contempt for being treated as inferior citizens, and for the ways in which
Abramovich forcefully changed their way of life. Indeed, a few of his efforts to “bring
‘civilized life’ to the ‘end of geography’” have been humorously unsuccessful. In one
instance, bands that were flown in to perform at an ice fishing contest complained about
the cold weather and lip-synched all of their songs, while local police officers dozed off
in a heated jeep, failing to control the throng of young people who battled to gain
entrance to the concert hall. In some ways, the line that distinguished modernization from
colonialism in Chukotka was at times a sketchy one.
Abramovich’s “modernizing” projects were also accompanied by controversial
migration policies, which would generate further animosity among the town’s more
senior residents. At the time of his election victory, his administration’s officials
proposed for Chukotka an ideal population target of 30,000-35,000, which would be
composed mostly of younger residents. Pensioners were therefore encouraged to move
out of Chukotka, both in order to alleviate the financial burden on the younger generation
and so that the elderly residents could be closer to the center, where they could, in
principle, receive appropriate health and housing services. Understandably, this
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resettlement program generated a substantial amount of negative publicity in Chukotka,
as well as in the resettled colonies and in the broader national media.99 For a majority of
Chukotka’s inhabitants, residence in the region was viewed as service to the Motherland,
which “should be compensated by considerable material inducements to living in the
North.”100 Having worked in their communities for essentially their entire lives, many
residents—particularly of the older generation—were not only accustomed to the harsh
weather and landscape; they had also developed strong friendships and memories in the
region. The idea that they should simply pick up and move to a different location struck a
decidedly dissonant note. Yet even in light of this rather oppressive initiative,
Abramovich continued to be hailed publically as a hero for his seemingly benevolent
actions in the region. He had expanded the new Russian space to the farthest reaches of
the map, and in so doing, demonstrated the powerful and unified nation-state that Russia
could become, while simultaneously making clear that oligarchs could have a potentially
beneficial impact on post-Soviet life.
Why did Abramovich undertake this stint as governor in Russia’s least hospitable
climate, and what do his actions reveal about the oligarchs’ role in constructing a postSoviet space? As governor, his annual salary hovered around a mere $11,500, which
reportedly included an “Arctic bonus.”101 Although this salary was more than acceptable
for Russian standards, it was hardly pocket change for a man who was already a well99

Thompson, “Migration and Resettlement in Chukotka: A Research Note,” 77.

100

Ibid., 77.

101

Andrew Higgins, “You Don’t Often Find This Kind of Mogul in the Arctic Snow --Russian Tycoon’s Whim Drags Baffled Friends, Bodyguards Into Aiding Blighted
Region,” The Wall Street Journal (2001): A.1.
63

established billionaire. Some commentators have suggested that Abramovich has political
ambitions, which he felt could be bolstered by a bout of governance in one of Russia’s
most desolate regions. Other suggest that he was trying to make good with Kremlin
officials such as Putin, who had recently begun to appoint governors to Russia’s regions
rather than allowing them to be elected to office. As an elected official, Abramovich
would also be immune to prosecution for some of his less gallant practices. Or perhaps,
for a man who perceived himself as having few limitations or challenges, this trek into
the Far East was simply a test of his capability and omnipotence. As Abramovich once
commented, “It’s a new endeavor for me. I’ve never run a territory. I’ve never publically
talked to people. I’ve got to try it just to see whether I like it.”102 Yet as Russia’s oil
interests continue to expand in the Far East, it becomes increasingly apparent that
Abramovich was backing the Kremlin’s efforts to map out territory that would enable the
country to keep its economy, propped up by petro dollars, buoyantly afloat.
Presently, Abramovich’s most pressing problem seems to be that of figuring out
where to park his 530-foot yacht, “Eclipse,” which is reportedly so large that it cannot be
docked at a standard berth.103 The space that the oligarch has carved out for himself has
enabled him to share his time between Russia and glamorous locations abroad,
continuing his contribution to the national good through charitable donations to the arts,
the Orthodox Church, and Russia’s sports scene. As the New York Times reported in
2008, Abramovich’s National Football Academy, which “aims to develop Russian soccer
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and support the national team,” has a budget of approximately $60 million.104 His fashion
model girlfriend, Daria Zhukova (daughter of oil magnate Alexander Radkin Zhukov and
the mother of Abramovich’s sixth child), founded in 2008 the IRIS foundation, which is a
non-profit organization that is dedicated to the promotion of contemporary culture.
Through the foundation, Zhukova has become a prominent figure on the Moscow art
scene. Abramovich has also purchased a 200-acre ranch in Snowmass, Colorado for
$36.4 million, which is reportedly located just minutes away from the $11.8 million “skiin, ski-out” house that he purchased two months earlier.105 Although Abramovich has
shuttled substantial portions of his wealth out of Russia and into foreign investments, he
apparently has also navigated and contributed to the post-Soviet space in acceptable
ways. He has not always used his wealth in a way that appeals equally to all, but he has at
least displayed a modicum of charity toward Russia and has refrained from directly
challenging the popularity of Vladimir Putin, thereby enabling him to live both within
and outside of Russia freely. As will be demonstrated next, charity work is only
acceptable when it is not tainted with Western inclinations, and when the source of such
generosity refrains from challenging the authority of the state. The actions of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky etch out powerfully boundaries in Russia that are not to be transgressed.
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From Riches to Rags: Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Hopeful Rise and Inevitable Decline
Out of the three oligarchs herein discussed, Mikhail Khodorkovsky is in many
respects the anomaly. Like the other two, Khodorkovsky built for himself a lucrative
career out of the remnants of the declining Soviet system. And like his contemporaries,
he engaged in devious practices that stand in direct opposition to what is now considered
to be legal, legitimate activity. Yet in addition to his capitalist pursuits, Khodorkovsky
was also an adamant proponent of Western-style democracy and a robust civil society. He
dedicated much of his wealth to charity within Russia, and was, in many respects, poised
to become a powerful political figure in the post-Yeltsin era. And for this political
ambition, which came to fruition at the same time that Putin was consolidating his power
and cracking down on the oligarch class, Khodorkovsky has been severely reprimanded.
His oil company, Yukos, was carved up and appropriated by the state as Khodorkovsky
was put on trial for the same crimes that everyone else in his circle had also committed.
He was forcefully removed from his position of power and prestige, only to be relocated
to a space of a different type—one that began in the small glass “aquarium,” as he called
it, where he sat throughout his trials for tax evasion and fraud, then to a cell in the Far
East where he would spend the bulk of his time sewing prison uniforms and anticipating,
hopelessly, the date of his next appeal. Unlike the experience of Berezovsky,
Khodorkovsky’s downfall was due in large part to his liberal tendencies and Western
leanings; and unlike the case of Abramovich, it can be attributed to his failure to
acquiesce to Putin’s authority. Surprisingly, Khodorkovsky’s legal affairs generated little
attention in Russia, as the majority of the population approved of his imprisonment and
believed, it seems, that his trial was generally fair.
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Born on June 26, 1963, to a Jewish father and an Orthodox Christian mother,
Khodorkovsky graduated in 1986 from Moscow’s Mendeleev Institute of Chemical
Technologies, where he studied and excelled at chemical engineering. While at
university, Khodorkovsky served as deputy head of the Komsomol (the Communist
Youth League), where he made a number of professionally advantageous connections.
Ironically, it was out of this communist background that Khodorkovsky emerged as a
champion for free market enterprise, and which enabled him to begin re-sketching the
Russian business landscape. His membership with the communist organization allowed
him to travel abroad, which was when, as Martin Sixsmith reports: Khodorkovsky “found
the capitalist world far removed from the evil stereotypes he and his generation had been
fed by the Kremlin.”106 Consequently, as the state’s grip over the economy loosened
during Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost’, Khodorkovsky and one of his
Komsomol associates, Alexi Golubovich, opened a private café at their local Komsomol
headquarters. The café, which was funded largely by the State Bank of the USSR where
Golubovich’s parents conveniently worked, was visited most frequently by the
Komsomol’s well-connected directors.107 It became an instant success, in many ways
rendering the biography of Khodorkovsky as synonymous with Russia’s grand entrée into
its precarious experiment with capitalism.
Under Gorbachev’s new perestroika policies, a clause existed that enabled
educational institutions to form research and development centers in specialized fields.
106

Martin Sixsmith, Putin’s Oil: The Yukos Affair and the Struggle for Russia (New
York: Continuum International, 2010), 18.
107

Ibid., 19.
67

Recognizing the potential that this clause might engender, Khodorkovsky founded the
“Center for Inter-Industry Scientific and Technical Progress,” known in Russian by its
acronym, Menatep. The purpose of the enterprise was “to conduct market research for
large manufacturers and introduce them to new technologies”108 for, of course, handsome
fees that translated into even more attractive profits. Menatep would eventually become
the financial center of Russia’s oil giant Yukos, which would lead to both tremendous
wealth and the ultimate downfall of Khodorkovsky. As business at Menatep began to
expand, Khodorkovsky realized the necessity of expanding his team, bringing on board
Leonid Nevzlin and Mikhail Brudno. Rumor has it that Nevzlin and Brudno, who were
both Jewish, were deeply resentful for their treatment under the Soviet system and
consequently were eager to break from the past as Khodorkovsky’s business partners.109
Khodorkovsky’s third associate, Platon Lebedev, was slightly older than the others and
also anxious to break with Russia’s communist past; in breaking with this past, Lebedev
would see Khodorkovsky through an abbreviated yet enormously successful career—
before following his business partner to prison in snowy Siberia.
In December 1995, Khodorkovsky acquired Yukos, which had been created in
1992 through the merger of Yuganskneftegaz and Samarneftegaz, for $160 million in
cash and “a promise of $150 million in investments.”110 Yukos later gained control over
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Siberian oil fields, and by 2003, the company’s capitalization was approaching $30
billion.111 As Vadim Volkov points out, the company’s growth can be attributed mainly
to the rise in oil prices after 1999, large foreign investments, elaborate tax schemes, and
the “creation of an efficient management structure with the highest proportion of foreign
citizens among the top management and shareholders of any Russian company.”112 In
2003, Yukos reportedly paid $3 billion and 26 percent of its stock for 92 percent of
Sibneft,113 creating Russia’s largest oil company and the fourth largest company in the
world. This merger resulted in a company with vast reserves and a greatly increased share
of oil production, which soon began negotiations to sell a large portion of its shares to US
investors such as ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco.
By increasing the company’s size, introducing international transparency
standards, and involving foreign investors, Khodorkovsky was clearly
moving toward a much stronger and independent position vis-à-vis the
state, perhaps strong enough to be able to ignore the implicit contract.114
Although concerns began to mount with regard to Khodorkovsky’s own wealth and
political ambitions, the ties that he was developing with the West were perhaps even
more alarming to both the Kremlin and to other Russian onlookers who were already
fearful of the non-Russian influence that continued to creep across the borders. The idea
that the West could gain control of Russian oil fields and pipelines, or that capital would
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be sent abroad, sat uneasily with politicians in Moscow. And despite Khodorkovsky’s
more charitable side, he was still an oligarch who was viewed with suspicion and disdain
by much of the Russian population.
On July 2, 2003, billionaire Platon Lebedev, chair of the Board of Directors of
Menatep, was arrested and charged with financial fraud that dated back to the 1993-94
privatization of the phosphate-producing plant Apatit; he was also charged with tax
evasion by Menatep subsidiaries in Tomsk Oblast.115 Then on October 25, Mikhail
Khodorkovsky was arrested and charged with fraud, tax evasion, and theft. The General
Procuracy froze 44 percent of Yukos stock, most of which belonged to Khodorkovsky
and his associates. And following year, the Federal Taxation Ministry “filed $27.5 billion
in tax claims against Yukos for unpaid taxes and fines.”116 In fewer than one and a half
years, Russian federal authorities auctioned off the oil mining company
Yuganskneftegaz, which produced 62 percent of Yukos’s oil for $9.35 billion. In turn, the
company was snapped up by the state oil company Rosneft for less than $30,000.117 The
final nail was driven into the coffin when Lebedev and Khodorkovsky were each, after a
long, humiliating, and widely publicized trial, handed eight-year prison sentences in
remote corners of Siberia. Combined, the events made clear, in no uncertain terms, who
was in charge in the new Russia. Putin had promised to clamp down on the oligarchs, and
in Khodorkovsky’s case, he did so with enthusiasm. The stakes that Khodorkovsky
controlled in Russia’s most lucrative industry, combined with the possible political
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challenge that he posed to Putin, gave Putin cause to reclaim his space and make a public
example out of Khodorkovsky and his Western inclinations.
Although Khodorkovsky engaged in many of the same shady business practices
of his wealthy compatriots, it was his philanthropy and ardent promotion of Westernstyle democracy that differentiated him from the rest of the pack. Khodorkovsky created
summer camps for children (mostly orphans), as well as Internet training centers for
teachers, and forums in which journalists could openly discuss issues of Russian
democratic reform. He promoted philanthropic programs through Yukos in areas where
the company operated, some of which involved support of student governments. Critics
oftentimes chastised such efforts as political posturing, as Khodorkovsky had also
become one of the most vocal critics of what he referred to as “managed democracy.”
Aware of the potential consequences of voicing opposition to Putin directly,
Khodorkovsky initially limited his criticism to the security services and media, but later
would clash with Vladimir Putin in ways that would prove detrimental. He is oftentimes
referred to by his supporters as a dissident for his efforts to oppose what some people see
as centralized authority under Putin. But as Susan Glasser and Peter Baker point out:
[T]he idea of a dissident with overseas bank accounts and an army of
lawyers and publicists writing blogs and Twitter feeds on his behalf from
safe quarters in London and Washington seems paradoxical.118
Khodorkovsky is no modern-day Solzhenitsyn, and as polls indicate, most Russians were
happy to see him go.
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When respondents were asked in 2005 if they would vote for Khodorkovsky if he
were to be included on a list of candidates, 57 percent said “probably not / definitely not,”
compared to the meager 28 percent of respondents who indicated that they would
“definitely” or “probably” vote for him.119 And interestingly, for all of the international
hubbub that surrounded Khodorkovsky’s trial and imprisonment, 77 percent of survey
respondents indicated that they did not intentionally follow reporting on the trial of
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, and only 9 percent blamed Putin for their arrests. Most
respondents were undecided about who was responsible for Khodorkovsky’s arrest, while
23 percent named the Attorney General.120 The space that Khodorkovsky had begun to
carve out for himself elicited support and sympathy from some Russian citizens; but for
others, it served to reinforce Russia’s need for a strong state and a style of democracy that
was uniquely Russian. That Khodorkovsky was sent to a modern-day “Gulag” in many
respects reiterates the link between criminality, capitalism, and unfavorable masculinities
in the post-Soviet context. Khodorkovsky epitomized Western democratic ideas and
everything that would presumably come with them—crime, consumerism, and overt,
diseased, “unnatural” sexual inclinations. Despite his charitable undertakings, his
endeavors directly opposed the collectivist mentality that had framed the Soviet
experience for the past seventy years. Democracy and capitalism were non-Russian
imports, promising a future of hierarchy and inequality rather than freedom through the
collective and a dedication to the common good.

119

See: http://www.levada.ru/press/2005091401.html.

120

See: http://www.levada.ru/press/2005101204.html.
72

Conclusion: Heterotopic Masculinities and the Limitations of Post-Soviet “Freedom”
As Alec Rasizade has pointed out:
[I]t is self-evident how the colossal enrichment of the few, while the
overwhelming majority were cast in poverty, explains the oligarchs’
unpopularity and the truism that democracy and a free market became in
Russia synonymous with disorder, corruption, larceny and injustice.121
The “New Russians” who worked at corporate head offices, banks, and at media
enterprises earned an estimated $5,000 to $20,000 per month, while the “legions of
workers at the host of bureaucratic, scientific, educational, cultural and other institutions
established in Moscow for the needs of the Soviet superpower”122 were oftentimes paid
less than $100 per month, which was well below the cost of living in Moscow. And of
course, Abramovich, Berezovsky, and Khodorkovsky are only three tycoons out of many
who amassed great wealth and power during a lawless and chaotic time: Antoly Chubais,
who orchestrated Russia’s privatization process, is oftentimes blamed for the devastating
economic decline of the post-Soviet period. Oleg Deripaska, Russia’s aluminum,
construction, and car industry magnate, became Russia’s first billionaire at age thirtyfive. Known previously for his loyalty to the Kremlin, Deripaska became targeted by
Putin in 2009 amid unrest in Pikalevo, a town in which Deripaska owns cement factories.
The leader likened Deripaska to a cockroach and ordered him to pay all outstanding
wages owed.123 Then there is Vladimir Gusinsky, the media magnate who was awarded
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Russia’s first private television network, NTV and the media conglomerate Media-Most,
which included a series of radio stations, magazines, and a satellite communications
network. Gusinsky was arrested in 2000 amid charges of tax evasion, although the arrest
is widely seen as politically motivated. His television network was taken over by the
now state-owned Gazprom in compensation for debts owed.
For most of the oligarchs who emerged on the scene upon the disintegration of the
Soviet regime—those previously mentioned, as well as men such as Vladimir Potanin,
Mikhail Prokhorov, Mikhail Fridman, and many others—the lawlessness and corruption
of the time became a normal, everyday reality. It is likely that each of them engaged in
the kinds of questionable business practices that have sent some into exile and others into
prison. And it isn’t as though the government itself has been a knight in shining armor.
As Marshall Goldman put it, “Yukos may have been guilty as charged, but state
authorities have not behaved much better.”124 Undoubtedly, the arrests and retribution
that have been handed down by the Kremlin have been politically motivated, as Vladimir
Putin has endeavored to establish, and then maintain, his grip on power and his influence
over Russia’s ever-expanding economy. Nevertheless, the oligarchs’ abilities to navigate
the political terrain of an increasingly authoritarian leadership have also served as litmus
tests not only for determining the boundaries of acceptable behavior, but also for
sketching out a broader picture of what it means to be Russian, and more specifically, a
Russian man in the post-Soviet context. The spaces that the oligarchs’ activities have
comprised and reactions to those spaces point to ideas of individual and collective
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freedom that continue to be renegotiated in the post-Soviet space—freedoms that speak
directly to ideas of both Russianness and “normal,” or “natural,” masculine Subjectivity.
The downfall of a powerful empire in which the pursuit of individual ambition
was eclipsed by the development of a common good, and where men and women had
found their places within a symbolic order dedicated to the pursuit of a future communist
utopia, revealed a gaping lack of both individual and national identity that has not been
easily fulfilled. The influx of Western incarnations of capitalism and democracy that
accompanied the dissolution of the Soviet Union have sat uneasily with many Russians
who have come to equate such imports not as the ticket to freedom, but rather as
presenting a new set of limiting constraints and as fundamentally non-Russian. After all,
unlike other developing countries such as China, Russia has historically had no
substantial experience with a market economy; in fact, the constraints that were perceived
to be a product of capitalism were anathema to the development of a communist society
in which people would, according to the dictates of Marxism-Leninism, truly be free.
Much in the same way that the New Soviet Man embodied the power and prestige
of the now-defunct empire, the oligarchs came to embody, and in many respects
constitute, this capitalist “freedom” in the new Russia. Through their scandalous business
practices, hierarchical political cronyism, and their pursuit of individual prosperity at the
expense of the common good, the “businessmen” who made a fortune during an
opportune and lawless time came to comprise heterotopic spaces in new symbolic orders
of Russianness that simultaneously opposed both the failed utopia of Soviet communism
and generated desires for the construction of a more stable, unified future. They
represented everything that Russia was not, and in so doing, contributed in large part to
75

the ascendance of the centrepitalizing and moralizing principles of Putin and the
Orthodox Church, which have begun to marshal new and consequential understandings of
both Russianness and masculine Subjectivity in the post-Soviet context. The Fatherland
has been remapped in ways that were not in any way predetermined or predictable, but
which will undoubtedly continue to alter Ideas of Russianness for years to come.
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CHAPTER TWO
VLADIMIR PUTIN AND THE BODY POLITIC: THE COALESCENCE OF
CORPOREALITY AND TEMPORALITY IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA
“I want a man like Putin, who’s full of strength. I want a man like Putin, who doesn’t
drink. I want a man like Putin, who won’t make me sad. I want a man like Putin, who
won’t run away…”125
Produced by amateur songwriter Alexander Yelin in 2002 on a $300 bet, the song
“A Man Like Putin” (Takogo kak Putin) became an instant pop-culture success. In a
video that combines techno-pop style music with a contemporary slant on Russian
propaganda, a Putin impersonator named Anatoly Gorbunov and a man who is
presumably Yelin watch another video of two attractive young women from the band
“Singing Together” (Poiushchie Vmeste), singing the praises of Vladimir Putin. Fed up
with their boyfriends who drink and fight, the women declare their desire for someone
like Putin and praise the leader for his strong, responsible demeanor. The women’s
singing, which takes place against a backdrop of the red, blue, and white Russian national
flag, is interwoven with footage of Putin at his inauguration, signing official legislation,
and practicing judo, while patriotic imagery such as gilded Orthodox cupolas and the
grandeur of the Moscow Kremlin provide an aura of opulence and might. In the end,
“Putin” indicates his admiration for the song, winking to the camera, signaling thumbs
up, and congratulating the director with a hip handshake of approval.
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Despite the initial ambivalence of local DJs and television producers to broadcast
a song that they feared might offend the president, A Man Like Putin soon flooded the
airwaves. Supporters of Putin played the song in nightclubs and at karaoke bars, and to
many people’s surprise, the president himself took a liking to the song, playing it
regularly at official rallies during his second bid for office. Not everyone has shared this
enthusiasm for A Man Like Putin, which has been perceived by some as emblematic of
the leader’s increasingly autocratic dominance over Russian media outlets and his largely
unopposed political ascendance. And as evidenced by the protests that took place across
Russia in advance of the 2012 presidential elections, skepticism of Putin’s authenticity
and questions over his preferred place in Russian society and politics has been growing
precipitously.126 Yet by mockingly endowing the president with many of the qualities that
Russia (and Russian men) so desperately lacked, the song appealed to citizens who had
grown disillusioned by the hardships of post-Soviet life—and particularly to women, who
had become dismayed by the lack of strength, stability, and dependability of their
husbands and boyfriends. As a young and confident leader, President Vladimir Putin
represented what the ideal man should be. And by extension, he embodied the powerful
nation that Russia could once again become.
Emerging from the rubble of a once robust empire, the inceptive Russian nationstate became characterized not by emancipation from the repressive yoke of communism,
but rather by weakness, fragmentation, and a profound inability to act. Economically
devastated, the body politic that had been united paradoxically by both the pursuit of a
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future Soviet utopia and the hardships of Soviet life became riddled with crime,
corruption, and a loss of collective identity. Lacking the might of a powerful Fatherland,
Russia was prostituted out to the West both economically and culturally, as its borders
were redrawn and its national character redefined.127 And the difficulties that the end of
Soviet rule in 1991 engendered persisted throughout the 1990s and into the new
millennium: The 1998 economic collapse and consequent devaluation of the ruble left
Russia’s economy further devastated and the state with virtually no middle class, leading
to a sense of hopelessness and fear over what the future may hold. Russia’s humiliating
defeat in the Chechen war of 1994, the Moscow apartment bombings in 1999, and the
hostage takings at the Dubrovka Theater and in Beslan highlighted Russia’s weakness
and reasserted the necessity of bolstering national security and collective self-sufficiency.
Coupled with a rapid influx of prostitution, pornography, and the hyper-sexualization of
women, events such as these constituted a time of unprecedented change—change that
threw into disarray any coherent conception of Russianness, while simultaneously
inscribing itself onto the male body in particular and consequential ways.
A handful of men who were either well connected politically or who happened to
be in the right place at the right time during Russia’s haphazardly orchestrated process of
privatization became instantly wealthy, giving rise to a class of New Russians—the socalled “oligarchs” who quickly became known for their enormous private homes,
beautiful wives and girlfriends, and “their own well-fed and pampered bodies.”128
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Adorned with opulent symbols of Western-style individualism, their bodies exuded signs
of wealth and power that contrasted starkly with the rest of the male population. After all,
the majority of men, suddenly finding themselves out of work and without many options,
turned instead to the bottle and relied on their more resilient wives for financial
support.129 On the bodies of these men became inscribed the hardships of everyday life:
excessive alcoholism, drug use, and the disappearance of state-sponsored health care
capped the life expectancy at a dismal fifty-seven for most of the 1990s; crime and
violence, which had become commonplace in the post-Soviet period, claimed the lives of
many at an early age; and the displacement of the pension system left neglected veterans
of the Afghan war (Russia’s Vietnam) sitting hopelessly on city streets.
The crumbling of Soviet institutions, which became indelibly inscribed on the
bodies of those who endured the hardships of the time, simultaneously contributed to a
radical reconsideration of what constituted “normal” or “natural” masculinity in the postSoviet period. Following the repeal of Article 121, which had banned sex between men in
the Soviet Union, a prominent gay masculinity began to assert its presence in Soviet, then
Russian society. Although life was in many ways more difficult for people who became
suddenly visible but remained largely unaccepted, the appearance of gay bars and clubs,
sex shops, and glossy publications such as Sobaka (Dog), Kvir (Queer) and GQ Russia
helped to foster a burgeoning new community, which, by challenging the state-mandated
asexuality of the Soviet period, has required all men to readjust their conceptualizations
of masculinity, sexuality, and the male body. As Luc Beaudoin put it in 2011:
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Russian men need gayness to define themselves. Masculine queerness
glorifies the male body through which men now see themselves, and
reflects the limitations of society today: whether porn stars, transvestites,
transsexuals, poets, or self-identified heterosexual literary and cultural
figures, all use the queer gaze to reset the definition of the Russian man.130
This framing of masculinity, which is not dependent upon dominance over or submission
to women, has challenged “traditional” understandings of what men should be, while
simultaneously constituting an important new dimension of Russianness.
Both grotesque and beautiful, pampered, diseased, and sexualized, the male body
has come to signify the complexities of Russianness in the post-Soviet period, serving as
a terrain upon which society is mapped: a society in which Orthodox Christianity
competes for popularity with the pornography that flows freely online and in metro
stations; where devout Russian babushkas stand alongside ultra-nationalist skinheads in
opposition to still fledgling gay rights movements; and where wealthy, Western-style
“businessmen” serve as constant reminders of the individualistic consumerism that has
become the nemesis of those who long for a return to the stability and predictability that
Soviet institutions provided. The body has become a living representation of the
possibilities and prohibitions of post-Soviet Russia, making directly visible the changes
and contradictions that characterize life after communism. Such changes and
contradictions, underscored by both the popularity and disdain that have developed
around President, then Prime Minister Putin, shine a glaring light on Russia’s stultified
quest to map out both a new national Idea and a redefined masculine Subjectivity—two
concepts that had become inextricably fused during both pre-Soviet Russia and the Soviet
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period, but which so far have failed to be worked out in the uncharted context of
contemporary Russia.
As an unlikely choice for president, Putin faced an onerous set of tasks upon his
ascendance to office in December 1999: stabilize and rehabilitate the economy; protect
and defend Russia from terrorist threats (particularly from neighboring regions of
Chechnya and Dagestan); revive and restore dignity to the political apparatus; and
perhaps most importantly, generate a renewed sense of identity and purpose among an
otherwise disunited Russian populace. And through his multifarious strategies, Putin has
largely succeeded in plucking Russia from the ruins of its shattered empire and
engendering a semblance of stability and hope for the future. Fueled by Russia’s oil
boom, the economy has grown by an average of 7 percent per year since 1998, resulting
in an increased standard of living for many citizens.131 And although Russia’s political
apparatus is still widely plagued by corruption and cronyism, it has assumed greater
stability and regularity than it exhibited in the 1990s, which has contributed to an
enhanced sense of security. Whether or not successes such as these are directly
attributable to Putin, they were reflected in the leader’s approval rating, which, during
most of his tenure his office, hovered between 70-80 percent.132 As Rafael Khachaturian
remarked in 2009, “In the eyes of many Russians, Putin represents a stabilizing force,
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ready and able to advance the national interest after the country was eclipsed by the West
for too long.”133
For Putin, this advancement of the national interest involved reclaiming a Russia
that to many people had been lost. Much in the same way that the Orthodox Church has
posited a return to “traditional” Orthodox teachings and practices as central to ensuring
the future salvation of Russia, Putin sought to revive in Russia some of the historically
mythologized characteristics that make it unique—against the foreign vulgarity of
Western discourse—and predicated the nation-state’s future success on this
reestablishment of Russian patriotism. Although Putin declared that he was “against the
restoration of an official state ideology in Russia in any guise,” he has also argued that
the many objectives set before Russia could only be accomplished with unity and
coherence of the Russian people:
The fruitful and creative work, which our country needs so badly, is
impossible in a divided and internally atomized society, a society where
the main social groups and political forces do not share basic values and
fundamental ideological orientations.134
These ideological orientations, Putin asserted, can be found in Russia’s long past. The
“foundation for the consolidation of society,” he maintains, “is what can be called the
primordial, traditional values of the Russians.”135
Through a persona which itself exudes “traditional” masculine prowess, coupled
with political initiatives undertaken during his incumbency, Putin’s efforts to consolidate
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society and construct a new aura of Russianness have engendered a curious coalescence
between corporeality and temporality that has positioned the male body as a prominent
signifier of Russia’s inceptive national Idea. By drawing from (and in fact reifying)
historical memories of both the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods, and by integrating these
memories into a contemporary narrative of Russianness, Putin has created an illusion of
temporal continuity, forging a link between nostalgic imaginings of the past and desires
for a unified and stable future. Although this resurrection of the past has enabled Putin to
reclaim patriotic ideas and practices that have historically been regarded as
quintessentially Russian, these memories bear within them institutionalized connotations
of masculinity which, when integrated into contemporary discourse, bestow upon the
male body a form of disciplinary power that is more diffuse than that of pre-Soviet and
Soviet Russia, but which nevertheless has served to redefine masculinity in accordance
with what are regarded as authentic attributes of Russian identity. It positions the
masculine Subject in opposition to undesirable Others within a new symbolic order of
Russianness, while simultaneously inscribing this Subject into the narrative of the larger
body politic.
This chapter examines the intersection of corporeality and temporality in Putin’s
Russia, highlighting the ways in which Putin’s constructions of Russia’s post-Soviet
national Idea, infused with symbolism and practices of the past and directed toward a
future Ideal, have positioned the masculine Subject as a prominent signifier of
Russianness, while simultaneously depending upon traditional representations of the male
body for their existence. The first short section addresses the resurgence of patriotism in
Putin’s Russia, explaining how Putin’s articulation of Russia’s lacking patriotic might has
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a temporal and gendered dimension. Secondly, examples of Putin’s attempts at
constructing a unified understanding of Russianness through temporal continuity are
provided, first demonstrated by his discourse on Russia’s demographic crisis, then by the
revival of patriotic symbolism and representations of the leader himself. Lastly, the level
to which these constructions have been successful/institutionalized is assessed and
challenges to Putin’s discourse, particularly as evidenced by opposition to Putin that has
developed in late 2011 and the first few months of 2012, are considered.

Patriotism and Masculinity in Putin’s Russia
As one commentator wrote just before the official presidential election in March
of 2000:
Before the future president of Russia, from the very beginning of his
activity, will be the problem of choice: whether to stay in keeping with
tradition, which defines the character of supreme power under Yeltsin, or
to establish a new model that is more adequate to modern requirements.136
Soon after Putin’s ascendance to power, it became clear that he would do both.
Representing a stark contrast from the drunken inaptitude of his predecessor Boris
Yeltsin, Putin acknowledged the failures of the Soviet Union and advocated the
development of a Russian-style democracy. He declared that Russia’s tumultuous,
revolutionary past had ended, and touted the benefits of increased cooperation with both
the West and the rest of Eastern Europe. Yet in the same breath, Putin lamented the
downfall of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th
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Century”137 and advocated a remembrance of the USSR’s many historical
accomplishments. He made no apologies for his professed Orthodox beliefs or for his
background as head of the KGB, the Soviet Union’s secret security service—both of
which have held a certain appeal for citizens of different persuasions. According to
Richard Sakwa, “The attempt to link up with the past, to restore the torn fabric of society,
to draw on intellectual traditions and cultural values of yesteryear, all reflect [a] posttraumatic pursuit of a usable past as the grounding of the present.”138 This linkage with
the past not only grounds the present; it provides a link to the future, as well.
Defined only by a pervasive void that was revealed upon the downfall of the
Soviet Union, the inceptive Russian nation-state was ripe for the advent of unifying
sentiments that were capable of rallying the people and providing hope for the future. As
Marlène Laurelle has noted, “at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the early
Yeltsin years, the polls were unanimous in showing that Russians had a very negative
view of themselves.”139 Surveys throughout the 1990s indicated that Russians were
ashamed of their country; they viewed the era of Peter the Great as one of the brightest
times in Russia’s history and held a formidable desire for the return of a strong and
capable state.140 Emerging in the midst of this social and political discontent, Putin began
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the process of crafting a new conceptualization of Russianness—one that invoked
symbolism and practices that were perceived to have been lost, and which instilled a
renewed sense of patriotic fervor.
Distinct from nationalism, which smacks of repressive Soviet ideology and
conjures images of Western chauvinism, patriotism is understood much more broadly as
representing an authentic love for one’s country and its historical accomplishments. In his
December 1999 “Millennium Manifesto,” Putin made this difference clear:
Patriotism. This is a word that is often used in an ironic or even abusive
way. However, for most Russians, it retains its original, positive meaning
completely. It is a feeling of pride in one’s Fatherland, its history, and its
accomplishments. It is an attempt to make our country more beautiful,
richer, stronger, and happier. When these feelings are free of national
conceit and imperial ambitions, there is nothing objectionable, it is inert. It
is a source of courage, fortitude, and strength of the people. Having lost
their patriotism and the associated pride and dignity, we lose ourselves as
a people, capable of great deeds.141
In much of Putin’s post-Soviet discourse, patriotism has become a mandala of sorts—a
mystical symbol that represents a search for unity and completeness, once again
bestowing upon the individual a sense of dedication and duty to country. The generation
of this patriotism has been dependent upon the careful selection and reification of
memories from both the Imperial and Soviet periods, and the incorporation of these
memories into contemporary discourse at the expense of all others. Under Putin’s rule,
symbolism and practices of the Orthodox Church have been integrated into political
maxims and national ceremonies, while the negative consequences of power that is
shared by church and tsar are rarely recalled; imagery of Stalin and the Soviet Union’s
WWII triumphs have been glorified in an array of public functions, while the atrocities
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committed by the dictator himself have been downplayed; and although contemporary
leaders have made great efforts to glorify authentic Russian culture à la Pushkin and
Dostoyevsky, little mention is made of Russia’s great Silver Age literature, which
allowed for substantially more liberal portrayals of diverse gender identities and
sexualities.
As elucidated in the section that follows, Putin’s careful selection of historical
symbolism, integrated into contemporary political discourse and combined with the
glorification of his own Ideal body, contributed initially to the promise of a future that
many Russians desired: one in which stability, strength, and cultural unity prevailed, and
where Russia had regained an Idea that was uniquely its own. Within this discourse, the
male body is positioned as a living representation of Russianness—a signifier capable of
fulfilling Russia’s lack and securing a prosperous future. The health and procreative
capabilities of the body are regarded as crucial for ensuring the future of Russia itself, in
addition to restoring the patriarchic prowess that has historically characterized imaginings
of the nation-state. Yet as will also be discussed, such positioning of the male body
simultaneously generates manifestations of masculine Subjectivity that impact the lives
and potentialities of Russian men in negative ways, requiring them to conform to a
construction of “normality” that is anything but normal. And as evidenced by the antiPutin sentiments that have been directed against the leader and his shows of machismo as
of late, it is apparent that not everyone is buying the leader’s exploits. With Russia’s
future hanging in the bounds, the confluence of masculinity and Russianness provides a
barometer for the perpetual process of negotiation and turmoil that continue to
characterize the contemporary Russian context.
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Constructing the Body Politic
The initiatives that Putin has undertaken in pursuit of a unified conception of
Russianness have positioned the male body as a signifier of Russia’s national Idea in two
primary ways: First, as exemplified by Putin’s discourse on Russia’s demographic crisis,
the male body has been subjected to a prohibitive and regulatory discourse in which it is
scorned for its lack of physical fitness and for its failure to conform to a procreative,
heterosexual Ideal. In this example, men are presented as undesirable Others who are
responsible for society’s ills and who potentially threaten the future of Russia itself.
Secondly, Putin’s revival of historical memory has created an illusion of temporal
continuity and patriotic fervor that has enabled him to position his own body at the crux
of tradition and modernity, giving rise to a masculine Subject that has a sense of agency
and an ability to act. Embodied by a head of state who, in different guises, has at times
been regarded as representative of the Russian nation-state, this Subject cultivates a set of
expectations for individual men to emulate, in addition to bridging the greatness of
Russia’s past with hope for its future: over the course of Putin’s ascension to power, the
assertion of his own masculinity came to symbolize the rehabilitation of Russia itself.
In both examples, the power that is exacted upon the male body is both productive
and prohibitive. It defines what the Ideal man should be and dictates the appropriate uses
of his body, while simultaneously issuing prohibitions against behavior that is deemed to
be destructive and non-Russian. Yet as Michel Foucault reminds us, such power, in its
many guises, is “exercised rather than possessed.”142 It does not reside purely in the
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hands of one leader, such as Vladimir Putin, but rather emerges through an amalgam of
diverse institutional and historical knowledges. As Russia’s semi-authoritarian head of
state, Putin’s discourse carries significant clout and has extensive reach into the Russian
population. His control over media outlets has enabled his voice to be heard at the
expense of opposing viewpoints. But Putin’s articulations are not purely his own; rather,
they draw largely from a repository of Orthodox and Soviet patriotism, which converge
to produce a centralizing and monoglossic understanding of what constitutes “normal,” or
“natural” masculinity. Through Putin’s policies on the demographic crisis, coupled with
his revival of patriotic fervor and his own celebrity-like status, the male body has become
directly implicated in securing the future of the Russian people—while simultaneously
becoming subjectified within this stifling and monologic discourse.

Russia’s Demographic Crisis—Ensuring the Future by Remembering the Past
On December 1, 2010, Putin appeared on Larry King Live, answering a host of
questions that ranged from Russia’s involvement in Chechnya and Afghanistan to the
possibility that Russia might host the 2018 World Cup. At the end of the interview, Larry
King asked the prime minister about Russia’s stance on gays in the military. Putin
avoided the question initially, choosing instead to elaborate on his response to King’s
previous policy-related inquiry. When pressured again to address the question at hand,
Putin raised an eyebrow, sighed deeply, and launched into a discussion about Russia’s
demographic crisis and the importance of supporting mothers and families. “The situation
is very acute with regard to demography,” Putin explained. “We’ve been undertaking
very serious efforts to change the situation,” and have been largely successful. However,
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“one gender marriages will not give you offspring. Therefore, we are very patient with
sexual minorities,” but see great importance in supporting mothers and the birth of
children. Asked again by King to answer the question of whether gays are able to serve
openly in the Russian military, Putin answered tersely, “There are no prohibitions.”143
Putin’s attribution of homosexuality to Russia’s demographic crisis demonstrates
poignantly one of the ways in which the male body has become a signifier of
Russianness, giving rise to a masculine Subject that is literally subjected to a restrictive
and future-oriented discourse. The downfall of Soviet control that began with perestroika
and glasnost’ enabled the advent of gender identities and sexualities that had previously
been effectively silenced, but which, since finding their voice, have frequently been
blamed for Russia’s decline. “Non-traditional” (netraditsionnii) masculinities have
become associated with Western decadence and self-seeking individualism, which have
been said to at once contradict Russia’s past and threaten its future. As Brian Baer has
convincingly argued:
The sudden appearance of homosexuality in the midst of Russian society
incited denunciations of Western influence as well as Spenglerian
interpretations of Russian history, in which homosexuality, imagined in
terms of effeminacy and emasculation, appeared as a symptom—and a
metaphor—of the decline of post-Soviet Russia in general and of the postSoviet male in particular.144
With little else left of its past and no promises for the future, Russia’s greatness has
become defined largely in terms of the characteristics and practices of its people. The
idea that these people are steadily dwindling—their bodies diseased and infertile—
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signifies the demise of the nation-state itself. Consequently, efforts to eliminate this
symptom of Russia’s decline and restore a state of traditional “normality” have been
central to Putin’s future-oriented political endeavors.
Between 1993 and 2010, the population of what is now the Russian Federation
decreased from 148.6 million to 141.9 million.145 The declining male population in
particular, which has been decreasing steadily since WWII, combined with the low life
expectancy of men in the post-Soviet era has generated renewed concern about the
condition of the male body (and consequently the strength of the nation-state they
constitute). Although Putin has addressed the need to bolster Russia’s health care system,
improve road conditions, and enhance Russia’s dilapidated pension system, he has
simultaneously invoked patriotic imaginings of the past that specify particular uses of the
male body and predicate the future of Russia on this body’s health and virility. Drawing
from teachings of the increasingly popular Orthodox Church, Putin has sought to increase
the birth rate through the restoration of traditional families—procreative, heterosexual
unions that will produce at least two offspring and be compensated monetarily for doing
so. Men must, as Putin maintains, return to more upstanding “moral” behavior and take
initiative for their health and physical fitness—a state of being which the leader embodies
personally. Finally, an influx of non-ethnically Russian immigrants, coupled with an
exodus of ethnic Russians, has given rise to a portrayal of non-ethnic Russians as
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effeminate and weak, while Russian men are presented as Ideal heroes of the nation.146 In
each of these articulations, the male body is subjected to a diffuse form of disciplinary
power that renders it both constitutive of and subject to desires for a strong and
quintessentially Russian future.
Referring to the family as the “fundamental unit of society,”147 Putin explained in
2006 that “the problem of low fertility cannot be solved without changing the relationship
of society towards the family and its values.”148 According to Putin, the family,
consisting of a husband and wife united in matrimony, not only ensures procreation and
therefore an increased birth rate, but also provides an appropriate environment for the
upbringing (vospitanie) and education (obrazovanie) of the next generation. As such, the
restoration of a traditional, “moral” family was declared to be a matter of national
security and one of the “main tasks of the demographic policy of the Russian Federation
until 2025.”149 Drawing from discourse of the Orthodox Church, Putin issued a decree
(ukaz) in 2006, which had a stated goal of “strengthening of the family institution [and]
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the revival and preservation of spiritual and moral traditions of family relationships.”150
He further welcomed the Orthodox Church into the discussion in 2007, stating bluntly
that the revival of this family that he seeks would be impossible without the support and
influence of Orthodoxy: “Today, we appreciate the desire of the Russian Orthodox
Church to return to the life of Russian society the ideals and values that for centuries
were, for us, our spiritual orientation…”151 “The state may establish and create favorable
social conditions for families…but the revival of moral values of the family, without the
Church, will not work.”152 Supported by Putin, the Orthodox Church has spoken out
forcefully about the importance of restoring a family—or in its terms, “malen’kaia
tserkov,” (little church)—which, it claims, is based on the God-given teachings that
constitute the essence of Russianness.
An event entitled the “Moscow Demographic Summit: Family and the Future of
Humankind” was held in June of 2011 at the Russian State Social University in Moscow,
with the intended purpose of bringing together those concerned about demographic
decline in different parts of the world. Although portions of the summit focused on
increasing living standards and health care as means of bolstering populations, many
participants framed the issue negatively, in opposition to what they considered to be nontraditional familial arrangements. The welcoming remarks made by Patriarch Kirill, the
conservative leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, exemplify this stance:
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I greet with all my heart the participants of the Summit whose aim is to
defend traditional family values and to analyze the world’s demographic
problems…Organized by the World Congress of Families, this forum
stands up for inviolability of human life, it speaks out against abortions,
so-called same sex ‘marriages’, euthanasia, drug addiction and
alcoholism.153
The summit, which was welcomed and supported by the Russian State Duma, was more
of a forum on the revival of traditional practices and the exclusion of so-called nontraditional gender identities than it was an effort to increase population counts by
bettering people’s quality of life, health care, and other factors that directly limit its
growth. It demonstrates effectively the politicization of the body in contemporary
Russian society, under the auspices of reinstating the patriotic and traditional ideas that
supposedly once made Russia great.
In addition to defining the family in unyielding Orthodox terms, the roles of men
and women within this family, particularly regarding the upbringing of children, have
been clearly delimited. As articulated by both Putin and the representatives of the church,
the primary child-rearing responsibilities belong to women, while men’s involvement in
the family is limited to their procreative and protective capabilities. Lamenting the low
birth rate as a “fertility” issue, women are regarded as the main caretakers and nurturers
of their families. The support of women’s health, as well as their financial status and
ability to return to work after their child-rearing tasks are complete, have taken center
stage in a number of Putin’s speeches. In a move that invokes a certain nostalgia for the
Soviet “hero mother,” who was publically commended and showered with an array of
social honors and privileges for giving birth to eight or more progeny, Putin has pledged
to increase the payment made to women who produce multiple children. Yet
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conspicuously absent from this discourse is any mention of the responsibility of men to
be involved and caring fathers, or the possibility that men, as well as women, could stay
home and care for children. Instead, men are chastised for partaking in “immoral”
practices such as smoking and drinking, and are encouraged to take care of their own
health in order to better fulfill their more traditional (and religiously sanctioned) roles of
procreator, breadwinner, and protector.
In light of a low male life expectancy, the health of men—and the care and
regulation of their bodies—has been a primary concern in the post-Soviet period. As
such, the male body has become directly implicated in Russia’s future, which is portrayed
as literally dying out. According to Putin: “a serious problem is the death rate of people
of working age, ninety percent of whom are men.”154 He continues:
Obviously, key factors of mortality are living conditions and
lifestyles…Experts believe that a significant proportion of deaths that
could have been prevented are somehow related to alcohol abuse.155
Undoubtedly, as life became increasingly unpredictable following the downfall of the
Soviet regime, many men turned to excessive alcohol and drug use as ways of freeing
themselves from an otherwise inescapable reality. On the other hand, the loss of male life
is not new to Russia; according to some estimates, the Great Fatherland War (WWII)
claimed the lives of more than 27 million people, most of whom were men. The
demographic “crisis” has been developing for some time, but has only recently been used
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by Putin to equate the health of men with the health of the state itself, rendering the
problem a serious national concern and a powerful biopolitical issue.
While glorifying the male body for its potential strength and resilience, Putin and
his allies have condemned the improper, immoral use of the body as non-Russian and
linked to harmful Western influence. Even portrayals of the male body in art, television,
and literature have been highly regulated under Putin’s watch, oftentimes under the guise
of protecting Russia from potentially dangerous foreign ills. In 2007, the now-notorious
photograph entitled The Epoch of Clemency, which portrays two Russian policemen
kissing in a snowy birch grove, was removed by the government, along with sixteen other
works of art, from the exhibit “Sots-Art: Political Art in Russia.”156 The exhibit was
finally reopened in Paris, where it gained considerable notoriety. Then again in 2009, an
art exhibit that was organized at the Sakharov museum by Tretyakov Gallery directors
Andrei Erofeev and Yuri Samodurov drew criticism for bringing together works that
were considered to be “pornographic, antireligious, or otherwise objectionable.”157 After
a right-wing nationalist organization called the People’s Synod complained to the
Moscow prosecutor’s office that the art “insulted the feelings of religious believers,” the
case was sent to court. During the trial’s proceedings, an Orthodox priest began his
testimony by referring to Erofeev as “a servant of Satan.”158 As incidents such as these
demonstrate, the portrayal of non-masculine men, coupled with criticisms of Russia’s
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sacred Orthodox faith, are viewed widely as threatening the “authentic” foundations of
the Russian culture—and its future. Such representations detract from the traditional
image of the male body as a powerful machine and the father of both the individual
family and the family of the larger Russian nation-state.
Putin’s revival of both Orthodox and Soviet practices have extended to the male
body a form of disciplinary power that is diffuse, but which nonetheless serves to define
what constitutes normal, or natural masculinity. His discourse that predicates the survival
of Russia itself upon the adoption of traditional gender identities and familial practices, at
once “establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an
increased domination.”159 It subjectifies the body to a constraining discourse in which the
boundaries of permissibility are not to be transgressed, while simultaneously issuing
edicts on what constitutes appropriate behavior. By directing his policies toward the
highly politicized objective of saving the Russian population and securing a prosperous
future, Putin has subsumed individual bodies to the auspices of the state and oriented
these bodies toward the pursuit of a patriotic endeavor in ways that haven’t been seen
since Soviet times. It is once again the duty of citizens to provide for the collective,
which means adhering to traditions and practices that are deemed to be historically and
quintessentially Russian. The next section addresses the ways in which the revival of preSoviet and Soviet symbols, coupled with imagery of Putin as an Ideal man, has served to
position the male body as a signifier of a potentially strong and prosperous Russia.
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Putin and the Embodiment of a Russian Ideal
If we agree that the symbols of the preceding epochs, including the Soviet
epoch, must not be used at all, we will have to admit then that our
mothers’ and fathers’ lives were useless and meaningless, that their lives
were lived in vain. Neither in my head nor in my heart can I agree with
this.160
Putin’s resurrection of historical symbolism and the positioning of himself as
Russia’s Ideal man began in grand style with his official inauguration on May 7, 2000.
As Boris Lanin describes it, “Putin strode energetically through Kremlin halls that were
lined with dignitaries and soldiers dressed in new versions of tsarist-era uniforms.”161
Filled with opulence and splendor, the inauguration was an event that could have been
plucked directly out of Imperial Russia. Upon the gilded walls that encased the ceremony
hung Russia’s coat of arms—the double-headed eagle that originated during the
Byzantine Empire that had been modified and reestablished as a symbol of Russia.
Patriarch Aleksii II, the supreme leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, stood
prominently in the front row of the proceedings. After receiving the constitution and
taking the official oath of office, Putin addressed the ceremonial attendees, stating:
I consider it my sacred duty to unite the people of Russia and to gather
citizens around clearly-defined tasks and aims, and to remember, every
minute of every day, that we are one nation (Rodina) and we are one
people. We have one common destiny.162
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Putin would spend the next eight years crafting this destiny, positioning himself as both
its author and its dramatis.
As cultural critics Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson have written,
“Contemporaries can achieve greatness in their own time if they are represented and
sensed as existing in a special sort of world beyond familiar contact.”163 By engendering
a renewed sense of patriotism and evoking public nostalgia for a more stable time (even
if this memory of stability is almost entirely constructed), Putin has created such a world
and positioned himself within it as a commanding head of state who is capable of leading
Russia to greatness. Through the restoration of national holidays, in which men from time
immemorial are glorified for their service to the Fatherland, in addition to the revival of
national symbols such from both the pre-Soviet and Soviet eras, which invoke nostalgia
for a once powerful state and united people, Putin has brought together an amalgam of
disparate events into a coherent symbolic order of Russianness in which representations
of the male body—his own body—converge with mythologized temporal markers to
produce a powerful manifestation of masculine Subjectivity that is mutually constitutive
of a larger Russian body politic.
Russian history is no stranger to festive national holidays, replete with military
parades, marching bands, and other assorted patriotic hoopla. Recognizing their potential
for rallying citizens around a common sentiment, Putin has revived and redefined many
pre-Soviet and Soviet holidays—holidays of empires that no longer exist, but which
evoke powerful emotions in a populace that is unified by little else. In post-Soviet Russia,
the majority of holidays that have been revived, newly created, or modified and reinstated
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in some way tend to glorify the historical accomplishments of great men, particularly in
the armed forces. In keeping with Soviet tradition, professions that are deemed to be
those involved in protecting and defending the nation (Rodina) are afforded their own
day of commemoration. Police officers, cosmonauts, customs officers, and security
agents have their own special holiday, as do the different branches of the Russian army
and navy. In 2006, Putin enacted a presidential decree that resulted in the creation of
fourteen new holidays to commemorate Russia’s military alone. Days off are now given
for military lawyers, military police, migration services workers, the presidential guard,
tank workers, intelligence agents, and biological and chemical weapons defense
personnel.164
Many of these holidays are celebrated with grand pomp, while others are referred
to as dni voinskoi slavy Rossii (days of Russia’s military glory), and are not “days off”
holidays. Such holidays include celebrations of the victory of Alexander Nevski over the
Teutonic knights in 1242, as well as that of Dmitri Donskoi over the Tatars in 1380.165
While bolstering the prestige of Russia’s military and providing it with an opportunity to
flex its patriotic might, some of these newly celebrated holidays, such as the
commemoration of Alexander Nevski’s victory, could be interpreted as potentially
having an anti-Western sentiment, as well.166 Such holidays, which under Putin’s watch
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This use of Alexander Nevski to invoke anti-Western sentiment is not new. Sergei
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have also been infused with Orthodox rituals and practices, have not only served to
engender a sense of patriotism and pride in Russia’s historical accomplishments; they
have also served to reify historically gendered concepts of state and nation, while
glorifying the strength and capability of the male body to protect and defend a fragile, yet
enduring Motherland.
Two holidays that particularly glorify men and render them constitutive of
Russia’s greatness include the annual May 9 celebration of Russia’s victory over Nazi
Germany in WWII and the Defender of the Fatherland Day (Den’ Zashchitka
Otechestvo). The May 9 celebration is widely regarded as one of Russia’s most important
holidays—and one that invokes the most profound patriotic emotions: According to some
estimates, Soviet Russia lost approximately 27 million citizens in WWII, most of whom
were men. The final triumph of Soviet troops was viewed as tantamount to the salvation
of the Soviet Union itself. Given this significance, the commemoration of this grand
success is accompanied by celebrations marking the victories of Soviet troops in the 1943
Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Stalingrad, as well as a commemoration of the day in
1944 that the siege of Leningrad finally ended. During contemporary celebrations of
such events, it is not uncommon to see veterans of the Soviet military fully turned out in
their Soviet uniforms, their chests covered with medals that were awarded by Stalin and
his generals. Rather than contrasting with more youthful Russian attendees, these
veterans in many ways set the tone of the celebration—and provide the younger
generations of military servicemen with a role model to emulate.

contrasts the greatness of Nevski’s army with the brutality of the Teutonic Knights (the
Germans).
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First celebrated on February 23, 1922 to commemorate the creation of the Red
Army in 1918, Red Army Day became Soviet Army and Navy Day in 1949, then in 1995
it was renamed Defenders of the Fatherland Day by Boris Yeltsin, still intended to honor
people who serve in the Russian Armed Forces. In 2006, Vladimir Putin changed the
name to the singular Defender of the Fatherland, which was intended to dedicate the
celebration not only to soldiers, but also “to every citizen who is responsive in one way
or another to the national cause.”167 Defender of the Fatherland Day is frequently
regarded as a complement to International Women’s Day—it is a day when wives and
girlfriends buy small gifts in honor of the men in their lives, and when Russian
servicemen receive national recognition for their contributions. By referring to the
holiday in the singular, which also renders the term grammatically masculine, Putin
extends this honor and associated obligations to all men, thereby reviving a sense of
Soviet-era dedication that men were expected to exhibit toward their homeland.
Of course, the celebration of such holidays would be incomplete without
prominent symbols of patriotism such as the Russian national flag, anthem, slogans, and
coat of arms, all of which have been reconstructed from references to the past. The
tricolor white, red, and blue Russian flag was first adopted in 1917 as a symbol of the
provisional government, only to be readopted in the post-Soviet era. The armed forces
also have their own flag, which was redesigned in 2003 to include the double-headed
eagle of the Tsar, as well as the Soviet five-pointed stars proposed by Trotsky. The flag is
red and contains the slogan “Motherland, Duty, Honor,” which was used by Tsarist
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armies in the 1500s.168 As Laruelle points out, such symbolism “combines the two
previous regimes; the red flag represents the Soviet period while the double-headed eagle
at its center symbolizes the imperial era.”169 Although music of the national anthem
remains unchanged from Soviet times, the lyrics have been rewritten—by the same
composer who penned the two previous versions, first under Stalin and again after
Stalin’s death. Combined with revived symbolism of the Orthodox Church, these
historical references to Soviet and Tsarist rule make a powerful statement at celebrations
and political events, creating a sense of temporal continuity with empires long gone.
They position Putin as an almost Tsar-like figure, demonstrating a greatness and power
that could be Russia’s once again.
Amid this resurrection of national holidays and symbolic imagery, one symbol in
particular makes such meaning possible to begin with and establishes a direct and
mutually constitutive relationship between masculinity and Russianness. On November 4,
2006, which not coincidentally was National Unity Day (Den’ narodnogo edinstva),
Putin declared that 2007 would be the “year of the Russian language” (god ruskogo
iazika). His objectives were to cultivate a positive image of Russia in the near abroad,
while returning to Russia the patriotic characteristics that have historically made its
culture and history unique. And this emphasis on developing “true” or “authentic”
Russianness through language has continued throughout his incumbency. Seated next to
Patriarch Kirill at an organizational meeting for the Day of Slavic Writing and Culture,
which was scheduled to take place on May 24—the name day of Patriarch Kirill—Putin
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stated that “Language, spiritual, cultural and historical heritage - is what defines a
national identity that binds a people, society, and hence the whole country.” He
continued, “The great educators Cyril and Methodius established, not only for the Slavic
people, but for all of civilization, a truly priceless gift—the first Cyrillic alphabet.”
Let me stress again: this is necessary for all of us; essential for the
establishment in society of true moral values and orientations, respect for
our native country and her culture, respect for the memory of our
ancestors.170
The Russian language determines the parameters of expression and meaning,
allowing for the articulation of particular “moral values and orientations” at the exclusion
of others, while simultaneously serving as a powerful symbol of Russianness. It makes
possible certain understandings of Russian culture, history, and politics that cannot be
expressed by any other means, drawing a direct connection with the past and enabling
such memory to persist into the future. Indeed, language enables both the nation and the
roles and identities of its citizens to exist at all, giving rise to an “imagined community,”
as Benedict Anderson once famously put it.171 Yet this power to produce meaning—to
enable cultural understanding and self-actualization—simultaneously delineates the
contours of impossibility. As a language that is inherently gendered and which derives
from Old Church Slavonic, a well known weakness of Russian is its inability to articulate
contemporary expressions of sex and gender through terminology other than profanity
(mat) or highly scientific, text book jargon. By advocating a return to “traditional”
Russian, Putin is effectively re-gendering the Russian national landscape, while
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simultaneously eliminating from Russian discourse the existence of gay masculinities,
which rely largely upon mat and terminology imported from outside of Russia for their
articulations.
Putin’s initiatives to restore the use of the Russian language were widely
supported in light of what many people saw as an invasion of western obscenity. As
Deputy Minister of Culture and Mass Communications Minister Andrei Gagarin noted
during an interview with RIA Novosti in 2007:
In advertising there are many English borrowings—and people complain
about it. Today there is a nasty trend: the cinema and television screen
sometimes air profanity… the year of the Russian language is important
for us because it is an occasion to once again appeal to the Russian
culture, to its roots, because the language – is the image of the nation.172
This sentiment has been echoed forcefully by youth groups such as Nashi (Ours) and
Idushchie Vmeste (Walking Together), who have lambasted contemporary Russian
authors such as Vladimir Sorokin for supposedly perverting the Russian language and
culture. Through traditional uses of Russian, the Ideal body is brought to life through
discourse; but its construction depends upon a re-articulation of what has already been
said—on the confining and patriarchic rigidity of the church—which is then oriented
toward the production of a unified and coherent future.
Putin’s reinstatement of the Russian language demonstrates his efforts to reclaim
ideas that are perceived to have been lost to history, or which have been infiltrated by
destructive non-Russian influence. This re-appropriation of ideas that are uniquely
Russian is also evident in Putin’s self-presentation, where the leader positions himself at
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the intersection of tradition and modernity, assuming nearly every possible guise and
situating these representations within a discourse that is unwaveringly Russian. As
Cassiday and Johnson point out:
[T]he initially blank slate of Putin’s personality was inscribed in the
course of his eight years in office with a highly sanitized version of
Russian machismo: the President’s image lays claim to sexual, political,
and physical prowess but repudiates vices traditionally associated with
masculinity in Russian culture, including drunkenness, smoking, and
inconsiderateness.173
In a manner that in many ways rehabilitates Russia’s recent and distant past, Putin has
positioned himself as a living and breathing representative of a masculine Ideal—and by
extension, a signifier of the strong and prosperous nation-state that Russia could
potentially become.
Immediately upon assuming the office of the presidency, the young leader’s
physicality and personal conduct represented a stark contradiction to the personal and
professional deterioration of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, who had become famous for
his public drunkenness, lack of stately demeanor, and frequent gaffes to the media. With
his recurrent stumbling, slurred speech, and increasingly erratic behavior, Yeltsin, whose
head of security once referred to him as a “suicidal alcoholic who was unfit to govern,”
did little to inspire confidence in Russia’s future. The BBC echoed this sentiment in the
late 1990s, concluding that “the body politic was in appalling health, headed by a man
who had become an international embarrassment.”174 Putin, conversely, was composed
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and articulate—never missing an opportunity to display his powerful yet measured
masculine prowess, returning credibility to the ailing body politic, and forging a future
that was uniquely Russian.
In a carefully choreographed mélange of activities and images, Putin has
positioned himself as a prominent signifying link between Russia’s past and its future.
His personal website boasts an extensive photo album in which the leader is captured in a
variety of personae that are both historical and contemporary. Ranging from photos that
portray Putin in an official capacity, to those that offer a more personal glimpse of the
leader, Putin is situated prominently as a head of state who is everything that Russia is
not.175 As the antithesis of both Yeltsin and the failings of the post-Soviet experiment
with democracy, “[t]he President’s attributes in both visual and textual media typically
include his sobriety, intelligence, competence, vigorous physical and psychological
health and, above all, his manliness.”176 Putin is remarkably capable of assuming nearly
every possible guise, which has enabled him to reclaim both memories of the past and
events of the present as constitutive of the new Russia.
Asserting his measured, yet capable super-hero status, the leader has co-piloted
fighter jets, commanded an aircraft carrier, and led a submarine research expedition to the
floor of lake Baikal. Putin has also been photographed downhill skiing, whitewater
rafting, and swimming the breaststroke in murky waters, in addition to tagging a Siberian
tiger in the Far East, a polar bear in the Arctic, and also in the East, a Beluga whale
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named Dasha.177 In the fall of 2009, images emerged of the leader fly-fishing and
horseback riding bare-chested in the Tyva Region of Siberia, sporting only green fatigues
and trendy reflective sunglasses. During one of President Obama’s trips to Russia, Putin
captured attention by taking to the streets with the Night Wolves—a Russian take on the
Hell’s Angels—who proudly displayed the Russian flag along their journey. As
photographs of the event circulated the Internet, the leader boasted that he had even
performed a wheelie. Yet in light of these hyper-masculinized stunts, the former KGB
officer and judo black belt has also been sure to demonstrate a softer side—praising the
horse that carried him across the Siberian steppes, cuddling with puppies and other small
animals, and feeding a baby elk from a bottle.178 This amalgam of imagery and events
culminates in a representation that is, for many, Russia’s Ideal man. They position Putin
within a discursive framework that pays homage to the past while simultaneously
demonstrating the power that Russia could potentially regain.
Yet as with any discursive text, the reception and interpretation of constructed
meaning is as important as the discourse itself. The Subject of an utterance, no matter
how seemingly established, is still susceptible to the critical gaze of others. Putin’s
ascendance to greatness would have been impossible outside of the context that he has
had a strong hand in creating. Without the ceremonial pageantry of national holidays,
symbolism of the pre-Soviet era, and a return to the language that for centuries has made
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an Idea of Russianness possible, Putin would have made little sense. And still, the
multiple guises that Putin assumes are open to interpretation and scrutiny. How
successful has this discourse been? Has the reinstatement of historical memory, coupled
with imagery of Putin as the Ideal leader, truly inspired hope in the Russian people, or
has it been perceived as merely a façade, masking Russia’s persistent disunity and
distracting citizens from the real problems that the country faces? How have Putin’s
antics impacted understandings of Russianness and masculine Subjectivity in this period
of post-Soviet turmoil, and how have such constructions been carefully resisted?

The Popularity of Putin: Fleeting Fad or the Epitome of Russianness?
Viewed for over ten years as the most powerful politician in Russia, Vladimir
Putin developed a cult of personality that rivals that of many movie stars. Although the
sentiment is by no means universal, the support and adoration that have been bestowed
upon Putin by radically different segments of the Russian population have been profound.
Ranging from youth groups such as Nashi (Ours), who idolize Putin in ways that differ
little from the ways in which the Young Pioneers looked up to Soviet leaders of the past,
to radical Orthodox parishioners, such as “Mother Fotina,” who believes Putin to be a
reincarnation of the Apostle Paul,179 Putin’s followers are devout and unwavering in their
support. “The first strong national leader to emerge out of the chaos of the immediate
post-Soviet period, he has inspired expressions of adulation the likes of which Russia has
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not seen since the Stalin era.”180 Amid some of the highest approval ratings of any
national leader, Putin has seen his likeness depicted in art, carved into busts, and even
molded into giant pieces of chocolate. In the small town of Chelyabinsk, a “Putin bar”
opened up, where one could buy “vertical power” kebobs and “when Vova was little”
milkshakes.181 As Cassiday and Johnson point out, the song “A Man Like Putin,” which
became an instant pop culture success, has also made it into “several thousand Chinesemanufactured stuffed bunnies, which were reportedly ‘selling like hotcakes’ in the Urals
city of Yekaterinberg in early 2004.”182 Informal fan clubs have sprung up all over
Russia, one of which has made the outlandish claim that St. Petersburg should be
renamed “St. Putinsburg.”183 Even politics have not been immune to this Putin fanfare: In
January 2011, the parliament of Kyrgyzstan voted to name a 4,500-meter mountain in the
Tien Shan mountain range “Mount Vladimir Putin.”184
This “Putin mania,” as it has been described,
[o]ffers Russians, many of whom felt themselves deprived of both cultural
and individual identity during the chaotic 1990s, the opportunity to
articulate new modes of subjectivity that, although they seem to pay
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homage to a vanished past, also reflect contemporary social, political, and
communicative reality.185
Upon first assuming power in Russia, Putin embodied the stability, reliability, and
strength that both Russia and Russian men were perceived to lack. His capable and
measured persona, in addition to the successes that Russia has achieved under his
tutelage, oftentimes eclipse and even justify the centralization of power and backsliding
of democratic reform that have transpired during his incumbency. Pew and Levada polls
from the late 1990s and extending into the 2000s have consistently indicated that people
are most concerned about the strength of the state and the stability of their daily lives;
democratic freedoms have consistently appeared at the bottom of the list. As articulated
by Pew just prior to the 2008 presidential election: “while the world at large may be
concerned about Putin’s increased centralization of power and rolling-back of democratic
rights, there is little indication that Russians share these concerns.” The correspondent
continues: “In fact, surveys consistently find that Russians have a definite preference for
a strong leader over a democratic government, and large majorities say that a strong
economy is more important than a good democracy to solve Russia’s problems.”186
Desires for stability and strength, as well as a renewed sense of national identity,
have undoubtedly helped to propel Vladimir Putin to stardom. Yet stability comes with a
price. Putin’s policies and initiatives—even the projection of himself as a powerful and
capable leader—have simultaneously engendered a particular Idea of Russia and strictly
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defined gender identities that are not to be transgressed. Through his resurrection of
traditional symbolism and practices, Putin has redefined Russia in ways that inspire
nostalgia for a largely mythologized past, while prohibiting other possibilities. His critics,
whether potential political rivals such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, or outspoken opponents
such as chess-star Gary Kasparov, have been effectively silenced. Journalists who
contradict or criticize the leader tend to mysteriously disappear, while independent
corporations that become too powerful are subsumed under the auspices of the state. And
even though Putin routinely disparages attacks on ethnic minorities, such violence and
discrimination have become commonplace in a country where “Orthodoxy, Autocracy,
Nationality” have once again become the mantra of the day. Russia remains an unsafe
place for gay men, in particular, who continue to be scapegoated for Russia’s post-Soviet
decline: As recently as November 2011, a veritable “war against rainbows” has been
launched in St. Petersburg and other provincial Russian cities, making it virtually
impossible to rally in favor of gay rights, and signaling a likely crackdown on any public
display of “non-traditional” sexual identity.187
Despite the exuberant popularity and adoration that has been bestowed on
Vladimir Putin, it is also clear that the leader’s seemingly indefatigable power has not
been left unchallenged. In August 2011, Putin was photographed emerging from a “deep
sea” dive in which he had supposedly retrieved two pieces of ancient Greek pottery from
the depths of the Black Sea. Standing in his wetsuit, Putin displayed the pottery proudly,
posing for the cameras in a show of manliness and strength. The dive, however, was
quickly revealed to be little more than a poorly orchestrated hoax: the pottery that Putin
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“discovered” had been planted by his associates in water that was only about eight feet
deep. Then in November 2011, the leader was booed publically during his appearance at
a fighting match in Moscow—an event that was followed by a mysterious blackout of
state-run television stations and an onslaught of contrived excuses and explanations.
Combined with dissatisfaction over overtly fraudulent elections, these two incidents and
others like them ignited public disdain for Putin that had been brewing in the blogosphere
for years. Young professionals whose successes are largely attributable to the economic
and political changes that transpired under Putin’s leadership have expressed frustration
with the artificiality and corruption of Russian politics. They have turned out in droves to
protest Russia’s undemocratic electoral process, and in opposition to Putin’s heavyhanded political antics.
As Putin embarks upon his quest for a third and extended term as Russia’s
president, questions arise with regard to the future direction that the country and the
leader’s popularity will take. As president, then prime minister, Putin enjoyed remarkable
popularity. He played a significant role in restoring a traditional sense of machismo to the
Russian national landscape, and in doing so, defined the contours of acceptability for
masculine conduct. Out of the chaos of the post-Soviet period, he crafted an Idea of what
it means to be Russian based on nostalgic historical memory from Russia’s long past,
while positioning the male body as a prominent signifier within this new symbolic order
of Russianness. Consequently, two prominent, yet interconnected manifestations of
masculine Subjectivity have emerged: a stable and fortified Subject that is capable of
leading Russia gallantly into the future; and a Subject that is denounced for its weakness
and its inability to act. In both cases, a diffuse form institutional and historical power has
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been exacted over the male body, which has become directly implicated in Russia’s postSoviet quest for self-identity.
It is difficult to not be amused and even slightly enamored by the hoopla and
pageantry that have enveloped Russia’s social and political scene during Vladimir Putin’s
incumbency. To be certain, the leader can be charming and witty, and always entertains.
Yet the big picture reminds us that Russia’s future is a potentially slippery slope—not
because Russia is somehow returning to the autocratic days of yore, but because the
practices and symbolism that have been revived under Putin’s watch generate so much
public enthusiasm that the consequences are not always fully considered. As both the
nation-state and individual gender identities become inscribed with Ideals from a
mythologized past, the lives of living, breathing people are consistently in jeopardy. Care
must be taken to not only preserve Russia’s unique cultural heritage, but to also protect
the nation-state from the development of a restrictive and hegemonic discourse that
cannot be transgressed. As Putin begins his third term for the presidency, the fate of the
nation—and the men who are charged with making its greatness possible—are critically
at stake.
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Figure 1: “The Epoch of Clemency” by The Blue Noses

Figure 2: Putin on his shirtless equestrian journey across the Siberian steppes.
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Figure 3: Putin fishing in the Enisei River in the Republic of Tyva, Siberia

Figure 4: During one of Barak Obama’s trips to Russia, Putin stole the show by riding
with the Night Wolves—Russia’s incarnation of the Hell’s Angels—and later boasted of
performing a wheelie.
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Figure 5: Putin hugging a Bulgarian shepherd dog—a gift from Bulgaria’s Prime Minister
Boiko Borisov

Figure 6: Putin feeding a baby elk at the national park “Losiny Ostrov” (Elk Island) on
June 5, 2010
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CHAPTER THREE
IN THE SERVICE OF FAITH—ORTHODOXY AND MASCULINITY IN
RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES
The spiritual revival of the Russian Fatherland is unthinkable without the
revival of the faith of our fathers and grandfathers—Russian Orthodoxy.
Under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian society
will not only again overcome economic, political and moral crises, it will
be resurrected to new life. We believe and know that it will be so. Revival
of the Church will bring the revival of Russia.188
In February 2008, more than 250 boys aged eight to seventeen gathered in the
Vladimir region of Russia to participate in the fifth Interregional Suvorov MilitaryPatriotic Club competition. Comprising twenty-two teams, the boys competed in obstacle
courses designed by war veterans of Afghanistan and Chechnya. They navigated their
way through snowy terrain—crawling under a cord stretched inches above the ground,
running through icy streams, and climbing up ladders made of birch—all while dodging
play grenades and evading “enemy” capture. The participants who made it to the end of
the obstacle course were “met with a Suvorov ‘Hurrah!’ brotherly hugs, and hot tea.”189
In addition to the obstacle course, the competition included a military history quiz, as
well as rope tying, weight lifting, push-ups, chin-ups, and a “pneumatic rifle
competition,” where the boys demonstrated their skill at assembling and disassembling
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Kalashnikov machine guns. The stated objectives of the competition: “to attract the
government’s and society’s attention to the challenge of raising a young generation on
the foundation of traditional Russian values,” and “to help these youngsters become real
men, patriots, and citizens of their country.”190
At first glance, the organization of this type of competition seems relatively
unsurprising. Such patriotic events are not uncommon in contemporary Russia,
particularly as the military endeavors to bolster its capabilities and prestige after years of
debilitating decline. What lends uniqueness to this event and others like it is that they are
organized not by the Russian Government or the Russian Armed Forces directly, but
rather by organizations that are affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, such as the
military department of the Moscow Patriarchate and Vladimir Diocese, Orthodox Russia,
and the Center for the National Glory of Russia. Aleksandr Suvorov, for whom the
competition was named, is regarded as one of the greatest generals in Russian history,
battling successfully against the Prussians during the Seven Year’s War (1756-1763) and
the Turks in the Russo-Turkish War (1768-1774), in addition to serving in Poland, Italy,
and on many other fronts. He is said to have exhibited heroic leadership capabilities,
conducting himself with pious humility while defending the Fatherland with ruthless
determination. The glorification of Suvorov in Orthodox discourse and in military
competitions such as these exemplifies the church’s effort to assert the centrality of
Orthodox Christianity to Russia’s post-Soviet Idea, while simultaneously redefining the
Ideal Russian man as both an embodiment and defender of Russianness.
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Against the backdrop of a moribund Soviet Empire, the Russian Orthodox Church
began to assert its prominence as early as the mid-1980s. Welcomed by Mikhail
Gorbachev as a potential ally in his attempts to modernize and revive the fledgling Soviet
Union, the church found in the chaos of the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods an
opportunity to regain its stature and prestige. As this “perestroika of faith”191 began to
develop after years of atheistic communism, the church essentially picked up where it left
off in 1917: The Cathedral of Christ our Savior, which had originally been destroyed by
Stalin in 1931 and later turned into the world’s largest open-air swimming pool by Nikita
Khrushchev, was rebuilt under the direction of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov in 2000 as
an exact replica of the original; land that had been seized by Soviet authorities was
recovered en masse; and the icons that had provided access to the spiritual realm before
they were confiscated and destroyed by the Bolsheviks returned to both churches and
private homes across the Russian landscape.192 And the church’s increased prominence in
society has been profound: An astounding 80 percent of the Russian population selfidentifies as Orthodox, although the majority of these believers attend mass infrequently
and seldom participate in church rituals.193 Orthodoxy has returned as a powerful symbol
of Russianness, connecting people with a time that in their minds was characterized by
stability and grandeur, rather than unpredictability and turmoil.
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Although the role of the Orthodox Church in Russian society and its relationship
with the state have changed many times throughout Russia’s long past, Orthodoxy has
repeatedly been mythologized as constituting, on a foundational level, the essence of
what it means to be Russian. As prominent Russian philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev
wrote in his book The Russian Idea, “The mission of Russia was to be the vehicle of true
Christianity, that is, of Orthodoxy, and the shrine in which it is treasured…’Orthodoxy’ is
a definition of ‘the Russians’.”194 A central precept of the Russian Idea is the notion that
Russia has a special standing in the world because of its Orthodox faith, which is
“fundamentally different from the West and incompatible with Western political culture,
historical development and religious conceptions.”195 It has even been said that Russia is
destined to become the Third Rome, succeeding both the Roman and Byzantine Empires.
As Zoe Knox points out, a “key conviction of the Russian Idea is that the country’s
traditions provide a blueprint for its future, centered on the Orthodox faith, with its
collectivism and spirituality, epitomized by the concept of sobornost’.”196 And indeed,
Orthodoxy has come to play a decisively important role in constructions of Russia’s
future, becoming a foundational, defining element of what it means to be Russian in the
post-Soviet context. According to the church, Orthodoxy not merely serves as a spiritual
guide for the Russian people—it is what makes possible their existence to begin with.
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Discursively, the church has become a point de capiton of post-Soviet society—
uniting otherwise disparate signifiers within a unified network of meaning and defining
Russia’s national Idea in Orthodox terms. Emerging out of the social and symbolic lack
that was revealed upon the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the Orthodox Church has
asserted its centrality to Russian history and culture, and has established itself as not
merely one signifier of the Russian Idea out of many, but as a master signifier and the
nation’s principal, constitutive feature. It has presented a teleological depiction of history
in which Russia was founded upon principles of Byzantine Christianity in 988, and in
which Orthodoxy, despite the suppression of religion during the Soviet period, has
continued to endure as a quintessential element of Russianness. According to the church,
Orthodoxy is ingrained in the Russian dusha, or soul; to be Russian means to be
Orthodox, and to deny the centrality of Orthodoxy to Russian identity is to deny the
essence of this identity itself. Consequently, the state-mandated suppression of the church
during the Soviet period is oftentimes presented as constituting a rupture in Russia’s
historical mission as the authentic purveyor of the faith, thereby effectively severing
Russians from their roots. This suppression of Orthodoxy has, according to the church,
given rise to a host of physical and existential maladies that are said to threaten the future
of the Russia itself.
Physically, Russia’s future is said to be jeopardized by crime, disease, and a
rapidly declining population—all of which are oftentimes attributed to a lack of morality
and improper uses of the body. As lamented in 2000:
The Russian Orthodox Church has to state with deep concern that the
peoples she has traditionally nourished are in the state of demographical
crisis today… Life is threatened by epidemics, growing cardiovascular,
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mental, venereal and other diseases, as well as drug-addition and
alcoholism…197
Although it is true that Russia’s population has been declining rather steadily in the postSoviet period, the church fails to note that this decline actually has as a catalyst the
Second World War and Stalinist purges. Rather than attributing such maladies to the
economic and political decline that accompanied life after communism, the church has
argued that these issues are due largely to a “darkened state of the human heart”198 and to
a departure from the spiritual and moral practices of Orthodoxy. According to the late
Patriarch Aleksii, “the main reasons for the deep crisis of society and government lie in a
‘spiritual vacuum of society, which is filled with harmful influence, and is driving Russia
into the abyss of hatred and violence’.”199 Even as fires raged across Russia during the
summer of 2010, Aleksii’s successor, Patriarch Kirill, confirmed that “the cause of all the
earthly misfortunes is people’s sins,”200 and urged Russians to repent and pray for an end
to the devastation.
The church and its many supporters oftentimes argue that humanity has lost its
way; that traditional Orthodox teachings and practices have been abandoned in favor of
individualistic self-interest and physical lasciviousness. Such un-Orthodox behavior, as
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evidenced particularly by the decline of the traditional family and the increased visibility
of “non-traditional” sexualities and gender identities, is oftentimes depicted as a Western
import—as directly opposed to the God-given characteristics that constitute the essence
of Russianness. A 2006 article in the Siberian Orthodox Gazette demonstrates this
attitude poignantly by attributing issues such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, the
demographic crisis, and even matters of national security to the “mortal sin of
homosexuality,”201 while simultaneously pointing to the necessity of maintaining
Russia’s (Orthodox) distinction from Western societies, in which this “distortion has
become the norm.”202 As the church endeavors to construct Russia’s national Idea in
Orthodox terms, both the physical and spiritual survival of Russia have been predicated
upon a return to Orthodox traditions and practices—particularly as they pertain to control
over one’s body, its functions, and behaviors. According to the church, it is only through
a revival of Orthodox spiritual-morality (dukhovno-nravstvennost’) that power can be
restored to the once-mighty Fatherland and the salvation of Russia ensured.
By mythologizing spiritual and moral principles of the Orthodox Church as
timeless and ethereal, as representing a sort of innocence that existed prior to the evil of
the Soviet Union, the church and its proponents posit the “return” of spiritual-morality to
society as central to both ameliorating problems of the contemporary period and securing
Russia’s future identity and salvation—as key to re-creating a future Ideal based on
recontextualized teachings and practices of the past. As I. F. Goncharov argued in a 2005
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publication of Obrazovanie i Pravoslavie, “The complete disappearance of spirituality
means the disappearance of a tribe, ethnicity, nation. We are on the verge of extinction
because spirituality has left the lives of the majority of the Russian people.”203 Patriarch
Aleksii echoed this claim in a 2008 interview with President Dmitrii Medvedev, when he
affirmed that “the very welfare of the people is defined not as much in terms of their
material possessions as by their spiritual and moral state.”204 Consequently, if “sinful”
behavior such as non-traditional familial arrangements, homosexuality, pornography, and
other “non-natural” uses of the body are responsible for the nation’s physical and
existential demise, the only hope for the future is to break from the Godless past of the
Soviet Union and reestablish in society the moral behavior that is defined in accordance
teachings of the church. Such sentiments have found an audience in Russian politicians,
who as recently as fall of 2011 initiated a so-called “war against rainbows,” effectively
banning “propaganda of homosexuality” in the cities of Ryazan, Arkhangelsk, and St.
Petersburg.205 Meanwhile, thousands of Russians flocked to the Cathedral of Christ Our
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Savior in Moscow to catch a glimpse of what was believed to be the Virgin Mary’s
belt.206
This desire to break from the Soviet past and revive the Orthodox teachings and
practices that will supposedly transform society and lead Russia into a glorious future has
generated an intense push for Orthodox education among children and young adults.
With little recollection of Soviet ideology, this generation has been receptive to both the
consumerism of the West and the glorious “origin myths” that represent for them not a
failed empire, but the persistence of a unique sense of what it means to be Russian.
Consequently, the post-Soviet generation has provided one of the best opportunities for
the church to reclaim its central position in the Russian Idea and to instill a sense of
spiritual-morality, which, it claims, will guide these young people into adulthood and
ultimately change Russian society. Many of these educational endeavors have been
pursued through the inclusion of Orthodoxy in the Russian school system, which has
recently begun to require courses on religious history and Orthodox Christianity. After a
long fought battle that generated considerable debate over the separation of church and
state, a course entitled “The Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture,” which was proposed in
2006, finally made its way into the classroom in 2010. Within this discourse, young
people are taught the value of the “traditional” family, and are warned against the evils of
abortion, homosexuality, and promiscuity. They are taught that Orthodoxy is the
foundation and primary constitutive feature of Russian identity, and that without this
faith, the Russian people would cease to exist.
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Yet interestingly, this focus on Orthodox education has not been limited to the
“civilian” classroom—it has also taken center stage in Russia’s armed forces, where
control over the male body and the regulation of both individual and collective behavior
were already paramount. Military camps and patriotic competitions such as the
previously discussed Suvorov event have sprung up all over Russia, drawing large
crowds of impressionable young boys. Orthodox education has also begun to feature
prominently within branches of the Russian military itself, which is charged with
protecting Russia and ensuring its survival, while simultaneously symbolizing the nationstate’s strength and masculine prowess. After years of dilapidation and decline, the
Russian armed forces lost much of the prestige that they once enjoyed. Conditions have
been notoriously abominable, leading politicians and religious leaders alike to take up the
cause of fortifying Russia’s military apparatus. The inclusion of Orthodox chaplains on
army bases and the development of Orthodox educational programs within military
academies have been in many ways justified by the necessity of restoring honor to
Russia’s military and eradicating some of the abusive behavior that is known to take
place among the ranks. Infused with Orthodox teachings, the practices in which
conscripts are required to partake now involve not only training in defense and
reconnaissance techniques; they now also include patriotic educational sessions in which
soldiers are taught the foundations of Russia’s Orthodox history, its centrality to
contemporary culture, and the “normal,” or “natural” practices that they are expected to
embody and defend.
This influx of Orthodoxy into military discourse has given rise to a new symbolic
order of Russianness in which the infinite—eternal life and the salvation of the nation128

state—is pursued through the finite—the finalization of masculine Subjectivity. Within
this discourse, it becomes men’s essential duty (dolg) to both embody and defend the
timeless spiritual and moral teachings that are said to be at the heart of Russian identity,
while demonstrating a willingness to sacrifice their lives for a utopia that is yet to be
realized. They must attain mastery over the self, subjecting themselves not only to the
disciplinary techniques of the military, but now also to moral precepts of the church,
which require conjugal fidelity, procreative sexuality, and a dedication to family above
all else. Endeavoring to control their base instincts and aspire to a higher level of being,
men are required to transform their bodies into instruments of the divine and exhibit
spiritual and moral behavior that is said to lie at the heart of all “mankind.” According to
Metropolitan Filaret, “the moral law must be acknowledged as innate to mankind, that is,
fixed in the very nature of man…indisputable.”207 In every human conscience is “the
basis of universal morality.”208 Although the church recognizes the existence of sinful
temptation, it contends that through spiritual work and prayer—through the exercise of
free will—men can master their unholy vices and attain eternal life.
Military discourse is predominantly geared toward defining men’s conduct,
aptitudes, and capacities, and regulating their behavior through daily routines, exercises,
and training activities in order to “put them in the place where they will be most
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useful.”209 When infused with teachings of the church, this discourse has as its object
what Michel Foucault referred to as the “natural body”210—a body that is disciplined “not
simply in the pursuit of some mechanized ideal, but, rather, in the pursuit of natural and
organic life at the expense of a rational mechanics.”211 In this sense, the disciplinary
power of the church-military complex is “individualizing,” in that it requires of the
individual self-mastery pursued through control over physical desires; but it is also
“massifying,” in that this body, which is made to be “natural” as defined in accordance
with Orthodox teachings, becomes dedicated fully to a larger social cause. This discourse
deploys a form of power that is directed not only toward “man-as-body,” but also toward
“man-as-species,”212 where problems such as Russia’s declining birth rate, the increased
mortality rate, and the overall health of the population become the domain of the natural
body, which is made to be natural at the expense of all other alternatives. Subjected to
these teachings and practices, the masculine Subject becomes fixed within a constraining
disciplinary discourse in which men’s bodies, now dedicated to a larger existential cause,
are no longer their own. Rather, they are reified in accordance with constraining
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discourses of spiritual-morality in which any divergence from what is deemed “normal,”
or “natural,” is not only un-Orthodox, it is also fundamentally non-Russian.
As defenders of the Fatherland and an “authentic” Russian way of life, men must
be willing to sacrifice their bodies for the greater good. Through this willingness to die
for their country, men become enmeshed in a purpose that is literally larger than life.
They are subjected to a form of disciplinary power which functions, in Slavoj Žižek’s
terms, as a “stand-in for the radical negativity of Death—the absolute Master,”213 finding
meaning in the possibility of death that exceeds that of life itself. Abiding by the strict
moral discipline of church-military discourse, “the renunciation of bodily pleasure
becomes a pleasure of its own,”214 as the Subject is promised an escape from death
through the attainment of eternal life. In the words of Foucault, the mastery of the self
that Subjects must pursue bears the potential of generating a “radical detachment vis-àvis the world,” which may strain toward “a purification that will ensure salvation after
death and blissful immortality.”215 Yet at the same time, this disciplinary discourse binds
the Subject to characteristics that are deemed to be eternal and unchanging, rather than
variable and subject to redefinition. The resurrection of national military heroes, coupled
with an effort to revive time-honored teachings and practices, gives rise to a new
symbolic order of Russianness in which the Subject is “pinned down” by the point de
capiton Orthodoxy, whose teachings and practices are said to be timeless and unending.
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The outcome is a definition of masculine Subjectivity in which the desires and practices
of the body are rendered subservient to the pursuit of eternal life, and where an almost
monastic heterosexual masculinity is privileged over all other possibilities.
The following section addresses the ways in which teachings and practices of the
Orthodox Church have become integrated into the Russian Armed Forces, and assesses
the consequences of this process for constructions of both masculine Subjectivity and
Russianness. The first part focuses on the church’s efforts to reestablish its own flavor of
patriotism in the Russian military—the construction of a new symbolic order in which the
Subject is positioned—through the introduction of Orthodox education at military
academies and ministry in the ranks. This discourse establishes Orthodoxy as central to
Russian identity, elucidates historical relationships that existed between the church and
the armed forces, and declares it to be the calling of all soldiers to defend these traditions
and keep them alive. Secondly, the construction of a “natural” masculine Subjectivity is
examined, primarily through an analysis of discourse that details the purpose of Orthodox
education, through which soldiers are molded into Ideal versions of heroes of the past,
adhering to traditional family practices and curbing sinful temptation. Finally, the broader
social institutionalization of Orthodox discourse in Russian politics and culture is
considered and the consequences of the church’s popularity and military involvement are
discussed.
Orthodox Education in the Russian Military
Upon the downfall of the Soviet regime, the Russian military was in an abysmal
state. Armed with outdated weaponry and equipment, the armed forces were also dogged
by low morale and poor living conditions. Compensation was pitiful, as the benefits and
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prestige once awarded to military personnel had all but withered away. Deadly hazing
techniques known as dedovshchina, where young conscripts are made to perform
degrading acts for senior personnel, or “grandfathers,” proliferated throughout the ranks.
Senior commanders did little to stop this institutionalized violence, which has claimed the
lives of many young recruits—either as a result of severe beatings or suicide.216 In
addition to these internal problems, the military had lost its clout as a symbol of Russian
might. The Soviet war with Afghanistan was viewed as a catastrophic failure, and the
ongoing battles in Chechnya, which were draining the country of resources and getting
young men killed at a deplorable rate, did little to restore confidence in the Russian
military. According to data released by General Pavel Grachev in the early 1990s, more
than 60 percent of all young men conscripted into the army had failed to report to their
units.217 In response the violence that dissuaded many conscripts from showing up,
groups such as the Committee of Soldier’s Mothers (Komitet Soldatskikh Materei
Rossii)218 have voiced strong opposition to the current state of Russia’s armed forces,
pressuring political leaders to eliminate hazing practices and ensure that soldiers are
properly equipped.
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Amid these deplorable conditions—which have in many ways represented the
deterioration and vulnerability of Russia itself—the Orthodox Church has asserted itself
as an entity capable of restoring patriotism and moral behavior to Russia’s military.
According to Patriarch Aleksii:
[C]ooperation between the church and the army will bear fruit in the
affairs of strengthening the spirit of soldiers, instilling in them a sense of
patriotism, loyalty to country and military duty, in strengthening
friendship, discipline, and order.219
The website Nravstvennost’ v Obrasovanii (Morality in Education) echoes this claim,
stating:
All the centuries-old history of Russia and its armed defense proves the
indisputable fact that without a high spiritual, moral mobilization, respect
for its history and traditions, that is, without a unifying idea, there cannot
be a strong army capable of defending the Fatherland and the interests of
its people.220
In turn, Orthodox presence in the military would simultaneously enhance the stature of
the church by associating it with an institution that is generally known for generating
sentiments of patriotism and devotion to the Fatherland. Following Patriarch Aleksii’s
assurance that he would not “push for Orthodoxy to be a state church and would not
interfere in modern logistics and tactics,”221 a cooperation agreement emerged between
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the church and military in 1994 that gave the Orthodox Church a prominent place within
the Russian armed forces.
At a meeting between the patriarch and General Grachev, a “five-point plan” was
signed that enabled the development of a Coordinating Committee for Interaction
between the Russian Armed Forces and the Russian Orthodox Church, through which a
long term program of interaction was developed with regard to matters of “scientific,
cultural, religious and ethical fields” as well as “research into the religious situation” of
the armed forces, with the eventual aim of organizing “interaction in regeneration of
Russian spirituality and tradition of faithful service to the Fatherland.”222 At the signing
ceremony, Grachev explained:
[T]he army is in need of spiritual education…unfortunately, neither the
school nor the institutions of secondary and higher education provide the
upbringing required for the development of people who are patriotic
towards their Fatherland.223
Consequently, in 1995, the first Orthodox chapel that was built inside a military
institution was blessed by Patriarch Aleksii. Two years later, another chapel was erected
by the entrance to the Ministry of Defense—and also dedicated ceremoniously by the
patriarch. Orthodox priests began to bless military equipment and installations, in
addition to issuing awards to military officials. It was not long before Orthodox teachings
found their way into military classrooms and barracks, where young men would be taught
the foundations of Russian culture and history, in addition to learning how the
fortification of their own bodies and their ability to control physical desires would not
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only lead to eternal life for themselves, but would enable them to provide this future for
the Fatherland, as well.
Of course, this association between the Orthodox Church and the Russian military
has as a historical precedent the Soviet Union, when Joseph Stalin revived religion as a
tactic for rallying the troops to fight against the Nazis. In the post-Soviet period, the
introduction of Orthodox education into the Russian military was facilitated in large part
by the Patriarchate’s 1995 establishment of the Department for Relations with the Armed
Forces and Law-Enforcement Agencies (Sinodal’ny otdel Moskovskogo Patriarkhata po
vzaimodeistviyu s vooruzhennymi silami i pravokhrani- tel’nymi uchrezhdeniyami).
Headed by Archpriest Dmitrii Smirnov, this department has orchestrated a host of
military camps and educational seminars, in addition to coordinating relations between
various branches of the armed forces and the Orthodox Church. Its website boasts a
wealth of information on the church’s educational endeavors, in addition to making
available video clips and a photo journal that document the church’s undertakings.224
Citing a documentary that was produced in celebration of the tenth anniversary of the
department’s founding, Flemming Hansen points out the ways in which this foray into
educational undertakings has also served to elevate the standing of the church. The
documentary, he notes, “shows images of troops parading and firing guns at Chechen
rebels and of priests parachuting and breaking pieces of plywood with their bare
hands.”225 This mutually advantageous relationship between the church and the military
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grew quickly, culminating in the official support of President Dmitri Medvedev, which
the president announced at a July 21, 2010 meeting with governmental officials and
religious authorities.
At this July meeting, Medvedev declared:
I have decided to support these two initiatives: to teach the foundations of
religious culture and secular ethics in Russian schools; and to organize on
a permanent basis the work of priests in the armed forces, which I consider
[to be] timely.226
The plan, according to Medvedev, would be to phase in Orthodoxy gradually: by the end
of the year, chaplains would be appointed to military units abroad, particularly in
Armenia and Tajikistan, as well as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kyrgyzstan, and
Sevastopol; this infusion of chaplainry would then continue throughout the armed forces
within Russia; finally, a directorate would be established in the central administration of
the military, its districts, and fleets.227 The guide for determining which unit would be
sent a chaplain was the proportion of Orthodox servicemen relative to those of other
faiths. According to Medvedev, “If servicemen who belong to a particular religion make
up over ten percent of the entire personnel of a brigade, a division, or higher educational
establishment, a priest may be attached to them.”228 The entire process would be
complete by the end of 2010.
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With the blessing of the state, the church’s role in military life became official.229
Led now by Patriarch Kirill, the church began its campaign to restore patriotism to the
Russian armed forces—to create a new symbolic order of Russianness that would change
the context in which young men were positioned, calling for new behavior and a new
orientation towards their reason for military service. In a 2011 speech at the Military
Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Patriarch Kirill asked: “Why do they
[soldiers] shed their blood?” “For what must a man be ready to give his life?” “For what
did our ancestors defend the country, for what did they die?”230 Kirill continues his
speech by suggesting that soldiers in the Imperial Army were willing to sacrifice their
lives first and foremost for their beliefs. “First,” according to the Patriarch, “people
protect their beliefs, their faith…” People during the time of the tsars “defined themselves
as Russian, precisely because they associated themselves with a particular faith.”231
Claiming that nothing has changed, Kirill describes how soldiers’ desires to “not lose
their spiritual, cultural, and political sovereignty” remain strong.232 Soldiers must not
only practice Orthodoxy in their daily lives, they must also be defenders of the faith—a
229
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faith that constitutes the Russian nation-state itself, and which will enable it to either
persevere into the future or whither away in favor of non-traditional (non-Russian)
practices. “You should not be ashamed of going to church and teaching the Orthodox
faith to your children,” Kirill proclaimed, “Then we shall have something to defend with
our missiles.”233
This sentiment was echoed at the military section of the XVII International
Christmas Educational Readings, when Major-General Alexander Cherkasov, a professor
at the Military University, opened his presentation by describing the ways in which he
came to realize that Orthodoxy lies at the very heart of Russianness, and that it is the duty
of soldiers to protect this indisputable truth. “For every man,” Cherkasov stated, “there
are moments when he suddenly stops and ponders the meaning of his own life, the
meaning of all that he does.”234 Cherkasov describes that this point in his life came in
1992, when he visited for the first time the Holy Trinity-Sergeev Lavra, which left him
with “tears in his eyes and joy in his heart.”235
Suddenly, it turned into a simple realization of truth, that patriotism of the
Russian people comes from the very essence of Orthodoxy, which calls for
love of the earthly Fatherland (zemnoe Otechestvo) and considers this a
fulfillment of Christ’s commandment ‘love thyself as thy neighbor.’236
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Emphasizing the historical relationship that once existed between the church and the
armed forces and its centrality to Russia’s future salvation, Cherkasov points out:
For centuries the construction and development of the Russian state, its
army and navy were inseparable from each other and from Orthodoxy.
This unity was broken artificially and must be restored…this is the only
way to salvation and the preservation of Russia as a state.
He continues: “The spiritual rebirth of the Army and Navy of Russia on the basis of
Orthodoxy is an absolutely necessary condition for the revival and preservation of Russia
as a state.”237 This spiritual rebirth has been characterized in terms of a return of spiritualmoral behavior among the Russian troops, which has imposed a powerful form of
disciplinary power over the bodies of predominantly male soldiers.
“Spiritual-moral education in the army is a process of forming high spiritual and
moral qualities of defenders of the Fatherland, based on a belief in the sanctity of national
ideals, love for native land, and the belief in the triumph of good over evil,”238 argued
Aleksandr Belousov. The “spiritual and moral education of soldiers,” he continues, “has
been and remains the cornerstone of military and church cooperation.”239 The usurpation
of masculinity that this discourse engendered was again evident at a 2009 meeting
between the Synodal Department of the Moscow Patriarchate and agencies of the Russian
armed forces, where the topic of discussion was how to “shape the future patriot and
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family man,” who is charged with “defending his country and his loved ones.”240
Representatives of the Ministry of Defense, Russian Orthodox priests, professors from
military academies, and other associated Orthodox staff and law enforcement personnel
presided over plenary sessions such as “The Main Content of the Spiritual and Moral
Needs of the Armed Forces of Russia,” “The Church and the Army: The Role of
Orthodox Culture in Shaping the Spiritual and Moral Foundations of Military Service to
the Fatherland,” and “Family Relationships: The Norm and Deviations.” Each session
outlined the moral behavior that is expected of conscripts and tied this behavior directly
to the timeless and unchanging Orthodox teachings that are said to be at the heart of
Russianness. It is the soldier’s duty to fight against those who disavow such teachings,
while standing up for the spiritual and moral principles that are Russia. As Cherkasov
remarked, “Our church teaches that while there is evil in the world, it must be fought
against. In Orthodoxy, good and evil are seen as absolute categories” that must remain
distinct as soldiers take up arms.241
Central to this discourse has been the revival of the “traditional” family, upon
which the survival of the Russian state itself is predicated. As Major General Karim
Gasanov stated in 2009, “We know that a strong family [is] the foundation of any state.
The high purpose of the family is the birth and raising of children, passing on the
spiritual, moral, and cultural heritage to the new generation.”242 At the University of
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Moscow Russian Interior Ministry curricula have been developed that focus on the “basic
family values” that form “meaningful professional and personal qualities in the young
defender of law and order.”243 These teachings, which tie together the disciplinary power
of the armed forces with the moralizing discourse of the church, have oftentimes been
brought to life by memorialized heroes of the past, whom church officials and military
personnel view as representing a sort of Ideal for contemporary soldiers to emulate. By
memorializing these deceased heroes and inserting them into a contemporary discourse of
Russianness, the church creates a symbolic representation of the indisputable
timelessness of Orthodox teachings and its centrality to traditional ideas of what it means
to be Russian.
In a controversial move on August 14, 2000, the Russian Orthodox Church voted
in favor of canonizing Tsar Nicholas II and the Romanov family. After a long debate
between Patriarch Aleksii II and approximately 150 bishops over the tsar’s qualifications
for sainthood, with some participants pointing out the tsar’s inability of stopping
communist takeover in Russia, and others lamenting his weaknesses and
unresponsiveness to his people, a ceremony was held at the newly consecrated Cathedral
of Christ our Savior, and the Romanovs were glorified for their piety, humbleness, and
unending Orthodox faith.244 Nicholas II, his wife Alexandra Federovna, their five
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children, and even a few of their servants, were named saints strastoterptsy, or martyrs.
As proclaimed at the August 2000 Bishops Council in Moscow:
In the last Orthodox monarch of Russia and in the members of his Family
we see people who sincerely sought to live by the commandments of the
Gospel. In the suffering endured in captivity by the Imperial Family with
humbleness, patience and meekness, in their martyrs’ death during the
night of 4 (17) July 1918, the evil-defeating light of the faith of Christ was
revealed.245
For the church, the death of the Romanovs symbolized the death of Russia, which would
languish under communist rule for more than seventy years before experiencing its
Orthodox revival. Although some of Nicholas’s leadership capabilities were questioned,
Russia’s last tsar represented true, or authentic Russianness—someone who lived a pious
family life, which he ultimately surrendered for the Fatherland.
The canonization of Tsar Nicholas II, in addition to the commemoration of
national heroes such as Prince Vladimir, who is credited with founding Orthodox Rus’,
and Prince Aleksandr Nevsky, who defended Russia against the Teutonic Knights in the
13th century, represent the Orthodox Church’s efforts to infuse Russia’s military with
patriotic symbolism of the past, while simultaneously holding up these Ideal men for
contemporary soldiers to emulate. Although the church also recognizes heroes of WWII
and other more recent events, a striking feature of most of the men who are glorified in
church discourse is that they are no longer living, and therefore are incapable of
responding to the ways in which their lives have been portrayed. Their biographies are
no longer in a process of “becoming,” but rather have been fixed in both space and time.
Each of these men is made by the church to represent a time in which soldiers abided by
“natural,” God-given imperatives, relinquishing their lives for the preservation of these
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teachings, which form the basis of Russian identity. Their resurrection in contemporary
discourse demonstrates clearly the church’s efforts to generate a renewed sense of
patriotism among the ranks that is based on heroic symbolism of Russia’s long past,
while simultaneously defining the meanings of men’s lives in accordance with these
historical teachings and practices of the church.
At a ceremony dedicated to the swearing in of conscripts in January 2010, priest
Sergei Rybin encouraged young soldiers to “carry with honor and dignity the title of a
Russian solder,” which had been handed down to them by these great leaders of the past.
Most importantly, soldiers were instructed to develop self-discipline and to be willing to
give their lives for the homeland. As Rybin articulated to the new young soldiers:
Although it is a peaceful time, you are called upon at any time to protect
our Motherland and to give your life for it, which is a great honor and
glory for the Russian soldier. I wish you all God’s assistance, good mental
and physical health, internal discipline, and most importantly—victories
over yourselves, so that you can really overcome all difficulties and
become true warriors, real defenders of our country.246
Within this discourse, young conscripts are taught to embody the qualities of the great
men who came before them, while attaining mastery over the self so that they, too, might
aspire to such greatness—and to immortality. Each of these men is glorified not only for
his service to the Fatherland, but also for living in accordance with supposedly
unwavering spiritual and moral principles of the church, particularly with regard to their
roles as leaders of their families.
After all, the family, for the Orthodox Church, is viewed as a malen’kaia tserkov,
or “little church.” Within this family, men are expected to adhere to their “natural”
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characteristics of strength, intellectual acumen, and leadership capabilities—while
women are viewed as mothers and helpers who possess an essential nature that
predisposes them to the home and children. As stated in the Basis of the Social Concept,
which is essentially the church’s millennium manifesto:
While appreciating the social role of women and welcoming their
political, cultural and social equality with men, the Church opposes the
tendency to diminish the role of woman as wife and mother. The
fundamental equality of the sexes does not annihilate the natural
distinction between them…247
The maintenance of this distinction is a spiritual and moral issue, as demonstrated by
treatment of women who transgress these natural boundaries and men who are considered
be “effeminate,” or who act on physical drives and desires that go against their natural,
God-given essences. Unsurprisingly, marriage is one of the foundational elements of the
traditional Orthodox family. As Patriarch Alexii put it, “Marriage and the family founded
upon it is the first natural, established and blessed union by God between a man and a
woman in the free election of a joint and mutual love.”248 It is the foundation of both
society on earth and reflective of God’s kingdom in heaven. It is crucial for the proper
upbringing of children, and therefore for raising a new generation of the Russian family
that is once again guided by principles of Orthodox morality. From the Basis of the Social
Concept:
The role of family in the formation of the personality is exceptional; no
other social institution can replace it. The erosion of family relations
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inevitably entails the deformation of the normal development of children
and leaves a long, and to a certain extent indelible trace in them for life.249
Through self-discipline and victories over the self, solders would become Ideal
family men and true patriots of their country, which would put eternal life within their
grasp—and provide for the future of the nation-state itself. As St. John of Kronstadt
explained, in order to obtain eternal life, one must know God with their heart and mind,
“reject worldly desires and passions, sinful habits, tendencies and proclivities to sin,” and
have a “desire for perpetual holiness and perfection.”250 In other words, men must attain
mastery of their bodies, rejecting earthly temptation and accepting the disciplinary
teachings of the church; divorce, adultery, and pornography are denigrated as responsible
for the downfall of both the individual and society. As a result of men’s transgressions
and their failure to adhere to the “traditional roles of men and women,”251 children
become delinquent, mothers are forced into the double burden of work and home, and the
birth rate plummets. As Marina Vasil’eva stated in her presentation “Guardian of Order,
the Father,” “The Russian family is experiencing a difficult crisis,” which is “associated
with a change in the traditional roles of men and women. In the Christian world-view
each sex has its place. Man is conceived by God not as a separate individual,” but as a
being who has a specific role to play in family life.252 Lamenting the consequences of
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this “family crisis,” Vasil’eva explains that “85 percent of children with behavioral
problems grow up in ‘problem’ families,” which provide “fertile soil for crime.”253 The
main causes of this catastrophe, according to Vasil’eva, are “selfishness (sebialiubie) and
egoism,” “sexual freedom” and egoistic passion.254 A man’s behavior not only affects his
own life and fate; it also has the potential to either make Russia great or lead to its
demise.
Much of the military discourse that has recently emerged on the education of
conscripts is so permeated with Orthodox teachings that it is hard to tell that it has as its
audience soldiers, police officers, and military personnel. This discourse, which stipulates
men’s behavior both in and out of uniform, exerts significant disciplinary power over the
male body in ways that define individual Subjectivity as a property of the collective, and
which by defining this Subjectivity in accordance with characteristics that are deemed to
be timeless and “natural,” contributes to its finalization. It is men’s responsibility to not
only perpetuate traditional familial practices—which will lead to a healthy generation
that is equipped to handle the challenges that come its way—but to also defend these
practices against threats that seek to undermine their role as comprising an authentic
Russian heritage. Consequently, during their lives, men are defined in accordance with
characteristics that the church considers to be indisputable truths; in their deaths, they are
memorialized for leading a pious life characterized by these truths. “In the Imperial
Army,” Archpriest Iliashenko explains, “an officer who betrayed his wife was expelled
from the society of officers, because you cannot deal with a treacherous man. If you are
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unable to be faithful to your family, then you should not be relied upon.”255 In today’s
army, it is apparent that little has changed. Russia’s military has become a symbol of the
nation-state’s might, based on principles that must be upheld by the courageous men who
make it possible to begin with.

Conclusion: Orthodoxy and Masculinity in the New Russia
In August 2010, seventeen years after the decriminalization of homosexuality in
Russia, German Sterligov, one of Russia’s first legal billionaires whose fundamental
Orthodox views are well known, proclaimed on the radio show Culture Shock that all
gays and lesbians should be killed. “As it is written by the Apostle Paul, Let it be their
blood upon their heads…This is what is written about homosexuals,”256 he adamantly
professed. Then three months later, anti-gay protestors (which included ultra-nationalist
skinheads standing beside devout Orthodox babushkas) hurled eggs and shouted insults
at participants of an attempted gay rights rally in St. Petersburg—a rally, which, like
others before it, was cut short due to rapidly escalating violence. Despite initial hopes that
Russia’s inceptive democracy might precipitate a decline in deplorable scenarios such as
these, institutionalized discrimination against those who diverge from rigidly defined
gender identities—particularly masculinity—has proliferated since the downfall of the
Soviet Union. Although Russia has made great strides in rehabilitating its economic and
political institutions, such accomplishments have been accompanied by the ascendance of
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increasingly powerful and politicized principles of the Orthodox Church—principles that
define ideas of what it means to be Russian in unyielding, Orthodox terms, while
engendering conceptualizations of masculine Subjectivity in which any transgression of
the Ideal is viewed as immoral and fundamentally non-Russian.
Although the church would most likely condemn extreme viewpoints such as
Sterligov’s, its increased presence in not only the military, but also in society and politics
more generally, has engendered new debates over the ideas and traditions that
characterize Russianness, as well as the practices and viewpoints that are deemed
permissible. Since the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Orthodox Church’s
influence has increased at a remarkable rate. During the late Soviet period, only about
6,800 churches and eighteen monasteries operated in what is now the Russian Federation.
Upon the end of Soviet control, the church experienced a renaissance. Figures released by
the Patriarch in February of 2010 indicate the existence of over 30,142 parishes served by
207 bishops, 28,434 priests, and 3,625 deacons. The church also presides over 788
monasteries, including 386 for men and 402 for women.257 By providing a common
sentiment around which the Russian people could unite during the tumultuous postSoviet period, Orthodoxy has made tremendous gains in prominence and stature: The
patriarch is frequently in attendance at official state events; a national holiday has been
established to mark Russia’s conversion to Orthodox Christianity in 988; and just before
the Christmas season of 2010, Russia adopted a draft bill that has enabled the church to
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reclaim up to 17,000 additional buildings, as well as museum pieces, that had been
confiscated by the Bolsheviks in 1917.
This increased prominence is reflected in public opinion surveys. According to
Levada polls, approximately 66 percent of the population within the Russian Federation
self-identifies as Orthodox, with Islam coming in at a distant 3 percent, and nonreligious/”other” comprising the remaining 31 percent.258 In fact, during each year
between 1998 and 2007, an average of 80 percent of the population had been baptized in
the Russian Orthodox Church.259 The Russian Center for Public Opinion Research
(VTsIOM) has reported slightly higher figures, citing a 73 percent following of
Orthodoxy in 2008.260 Yet despite this relatively high self-identification with the
Orthodox Church, as of 2008, only 5 percent of the population considered themselves to
be “very religious,” 39 percent never attended church, and 78 percent never received
communion.261 Only half of Russians believe in God, and many of those who do believe
also confess to believing in omens (21 percent) or sorcery and magic (8 percent).262 This
curious discrepancy indicates that Orthodoxy, while gaining in popularity in Russian
society and discourse, serves more as a marker of identity than as a deeply internalized
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set of religious principles and values. Similar to the role that Communism played during
the Soviet period, Orthodoxy functions as an ordering principle in the post-Soviet
context—giving Russians something to grab onto during a time of tumultuous
uncertainty, but not being wholeheartedly accepted by all. As Alexey Krindatch points
out, “Under conditions of public frustration and low confidence placed in institutions of
state power and political organizations the Church has been seen by many as a symbol of
stability and a last stronghold of declining moral and family values.”263
Orthodoxy has also been glamourized in films that emerged in the latter part of
the post-Soviet period, where it is oftentimes mythologized as representing an authentic
facet of Russianness that was suppressed by the Bolsheviks, but which is, at its heart, the
epitome of Russian identity. Within such films, strong men who are devout in their faith
and therefore able to rein in their passions in the face of temptation feature prominently.
Aleksandr Kolchak, as portrayed in the 2008 historical epic film Admiral, exemplifies
such a man.264 As a prominent naval commander who later went on to become the head
of the counter-revolutionary White army during the Russian Civil War, Kolchak is, in
many ways, portrayed as an Ideal Russian man. At the beginning of the film, Kolchak’s
ship crosses paths with the SMS Friedrich Carl, an armored cruiser of the German
Imperial Navy. As his ship is fired upon and seems all but doomed, Kolchak informs his
men that the only possibility of victory (and survival) is to lure the German ship through
the underwater minefield that the Admiral and his crew have just laid. As Kolchak’s ship
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continues to be pounded by German ammunition, the Admiral leads his men in Orthodox
prayer, asking for God’s protection and guidance. After a close call in which their ship
almost hits one of its own mines, the Admiral’s prayers are answered, and the German
ship is blown up and sunk.
Guided by marked intelligence and a cool demeanor, in addition to his powerful
status and moderate attractiveness, Kolchak is rendered susceptible to many
temptations—including an affair with Anna Timireva, the wife of his subordinate officer,
Sergei Timirev. But as the Ideal Orthodox man, Kolchak, while confessing to his wife his
sinful attraction to Anna, tells her: “You are my wife and I am your husband. That is how
it always shall be.” Nevertheless, after hearing one of Kolchak’s speeches about the
necessity of defeating the Bolsheviks and “restoring Russia,” Anna braves brutally frigid
weather to find her true love. The love story continues throughout the end of the film, and
the two eventually end up together. But in keeping with Kolchak’s Orthodox manliness,
the affair is legitimized by the Admiral’s request for a divorce from his wife, and by a
scene in which the Admiral and Anna are seen attending the Divine Liturgy together,
presumably to soon be married. Finally, as history would have it, Kolchak is killed,
rather unceremoniously, at the hands of the Red army. The film, which would have been
unthinkable during the Soviet period but which has grossed over 38 million dollars since
its production, makes this prominent admiral of the White Army—the Tsar’s army—into
an almost saint-like figure. And in so doing, redeems Orthodoxy and its place in Russia’s
past, as well as its future.
In addition to the promotion of Orthodoxy by church officials and its appearance
in contemporary cultural productions, prominent politicians have also self-identified with
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the faith and equated Orthodoxy with what meanings of Russianness. As Leustean points
out, the origin myth of Orthodoxy and its continuous re-production over time has
extended “from the mere hic et nunc to a supernatural reality offering legitimacy and
power to religious and political actors.”265 In contemporary Russia, political figures such
as Vladimir Putin and former Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov have spoken out
prominently about the importance of reviving Orthodox tradition in contemporary society
as a way of replacing what had been lost, and in so doing, have bestowed upon church
teachings both legal and political backing. As Putin stated in a 2000 speech praising the
Orthodox Church:
The Russian Orthodox Church plays an enormous role in the spiritual
unification of the Russian land after many years of life without faith, [of]
moral degradation, and atheism…The church is recovering its traditional
mission as a key fore in promoting social ability and moral unity around
general moral priorities of justice, patriotism, good works, constructive
labour and family values…the past decade has become a unique time for
the real regeneration of the moral foundations of society.266
It is not uncommon in Russia for politicians to use Orthodoxy as a means of enhancing
their political standing by demonstrating, through shows of faith, their love and respect
for Russia’s great past. Political figures are frequently in attendance at church functions,
and the church regularly participates in political ceremonies and events. Some scholars
have suggested that the relationship between the church and state is beginning to
resemble the symphonia that was shared between the two institutions during much of pre-
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Soviet Russia, where the tsar was considered to rule by divine rite and the patriarch was
regarded as “co-tsar.”
Yet as with any socio-political institution, the Orthodox Church bears within it
divergent viewpoints and different levels of social conservatism. As Bourdeaux wrote in
the mid 1990s:
[T]here is a fairly significant number of active priests and laity oriented
toward the ideal, traditional for the monarchical period of Russian history,
that the Orthodox autocratic reign is the only form of government worthy
of the church’s blessing; but there are also many people—mostly members
of the Christian democratic parties of the so-called liberal tendency—who
believe that the modern Russian Christian social doctrine should be
adopted from Western sources. These two tendencies at times are utterly
polarized and frequently are expressed in extremist viewpoints.267
Perhaps the most prominent Orthodox priest who advocated interfaith dialogue and
somewhat less conservative tendencies was Father Alexander Men, who oftentimes came
out in favor of maintaining a strict separation between church and state, in addition to
touting the practice of Orthodoxy based on principles of democracy. On September 9,
1990, Men was assassinated as he walked on a wooded path to the local train station from
his home in the village of Semkhoz. In his article “Orthodox Bolshevism,” Mikhail
Sitnikov suggests that the continually increasing power of the Orthodox Church—
particularly regarding its inclusion in educational curricula—may eventually lead to a
new form of totalitarianism that is characterized by Orthodoxy rather than communism.
Although this viewpoint is rather strong, the increased prominence of the church in
Russian society and the potential consequences of this presence cannot be ignored.
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By appealing to popular desires for a return to “normality”—to an almost
primordial conceptualization of Russian identity—Orthodox discourse has become
institutionalized in Russian society, where its conservative tenets have borne not only
normative sanctions, but oftentimes legal sanctions, as well. As Aleksandar Štulhofer and
Theo Sandfort have written:
[R]ising religiosity and the growing social impact and influence of the
Church as the ultimate moral authority strengthened conservative
viewpoints and policy initiatives, especially in discussions on abortion,
sex education, homosexuality, gender roles, and family violence.268
A return to “traditional,” God-given gender identities has comprised a substantial portion
of the church’s post-Soviet discourse, which, when backed by the state, has borne
important legal and political consequences for both gay and straight men alike. The state,
which controls the police, media, and educational system, frequently employs the
discourse and symbolism of Orthodoxy in appeals to national unity, and has supported
initiatives such as the inclusion of Orthodox education in public schools, the
establishment of exclusively Orthodox ministry for the military, and the prohibition of
artwork and literature that portrays “moral depravity,” or which in any way denigrates the
Orthodox faith. Whether society will continue along its conservative trajectory or begin
to adopt more liberal tendencies will depend on much more than the influence of the
Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that the church plays a powerful
role in Russian society and politics, where it impacts the lives of men and women alike.
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Figure 1: Orthodox Priest Blessing the Troops: Photo from RIA Novosti

Figure 2: Military-Orthodox procession, source unknown
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CHAPTER FOUR
PERFORMATIVITY AND THE NEGOTIATION OF MASCULINITIES IN LATE
SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET FILM
Everyone knows that there was “no sex in the Soviet Union.” At least, such was
the proclamation of a woman in the audience of a 1986 televised talk show when asked
about sex in the Soviet media. And indeed, the woman’s assertion largely rang true.
Although topics such as contraception, abortion, and incentives to produce big families
had become mainstays of official political discourse, all such issues were framed within
the building of communism and the good of the Soviet state, while censorship ensured
that almost nothing was spoken publically about matters of sexuality, relationships, or the
existence of gender identities that deviated from the official party line. As Laura
Engelstein points out, “it was precisely the ability to represent, elicit, and satisfy sexual
desire in publicly available forms that the regime inhibited; it repressed sex as a cultural
language and commercial practice.”269 It wasn’t until 1988 with the screening of Vasili
Pichul’s now infamous Malen’kaia Vera (Little Vera) that the silence was broken and the
assertion was made, through the portrayal of a sex scene that was rather tame by
contemporary standards, that people really did have such enjoyable encounters outside of
the confines of marriage. During the first showings of the film in Moscow, members of
the audience reportedly stormed out of the theater in protest of the unspeakable having
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been spoken. The film went on to receive six awards, including “Best Actress” for
Natalya Negoda’s performance as Vera, and with over fifty million viewers, became one
of the Soviet Union’s most popular films.270
It was not that Soviet citizens were so puritan in their beliefs that they had never
before engaged in such practices themselves, or that they were somehow innocently
unaware that such things took place. Rather, Soviet life had come to be defined by an
official vocabulary that only allowed for the expression of ideas, identities, and practices
that were fully sanctioned by the state. Within this vocabulary, the limits of permissibility
were rigidly defined in accordance with very particular ideas of what it meant to be
Soviet. It was a context in which the private had been subsumed by the public, and where
the characteristics of citizens were supposed to be synonymous with those of the empire.
With the decline of the state and the introduction of perestroika and glasnost’ came a
“discursive ‘sexual revolution’,” where “sexual values became a critical battleground for
national regeneration.”271 As negotiations began to take place over topics such as sex
education in schools, marriage, and family planning, an onslaught of cultural productions
emerged on the scene that directly tackled the confused relationship between gender
identities, sexuality, and the identity of the nation in the post-Soviet period. Literature by
the likes of Vladimir Sorokin, Viktor Pelevin, and Venedikt Erofeev mocked both Soviet
ideology and capitalist “democracy,” oftentimes using blatant references to sex and the
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body in their critiques of post-Soviet life. And as the work of Brian Baer, Luc Beaudoin,
Dan Healy, Helena Goscilo and others has illustrated, pornography, in both text and on
film, quickly became a powerful means of expressing what had hitherto been
prohibited.272
This expression of the previously inexpressible was not merely a result of the
elimination of censorship and the opening of Russian society—rather, questions of sex,
gender, and modes of acceptable conduct have become deeply implicated in Russia’s
quest for an identity, or Idea, that is uniquely its own. As discussed in previous chapters,
the decline of the Soviet state has oftentimes been regarded as masculinity lost. The once
powerful Fatherland, now weak and impotent, had been prostituted out to the West, both
economically and culturally, with the now fragile Motherland left to fend for herself. As
Russians sought to forge a new network of meaning in which their lives would once
again make sense, the contours of masculine Subjectivity were simultaneously redefined
in accordance with ever-changing ideas of Russianness. And the characteristics of this
Subject were as indeterminate and conflicted as definitions of Russia itself. Sexuality,
ethnicity, and religion became terms of negotiation in an unceasing tug of war between
“centripetalizing” discourses of the church and state, which have sought to revive socalled “traditional” norms and practices, and alternative voices that seek to push back
against both Soviet life and the new Russian establishment in order to make room a more
open and permissible future.
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These alternative voices, transmitted primarily through cultural productions such
as literature, art, and film, have generated substantial controversy in both society and
politics. In 2002, Sorokin was charged with the dissemination of pornography for
portraying Josef Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev as gay lovers in his novel Goluboe Salo
(Blue Lard). Around the same time, the pro-Kremlin youth group “Moving Together”
made headlines when they ripped up Sorokin’s novels and threw them into a giant toilet.
The legal charges were eventually dropped, accomplishing little more than to generate
public interest in Sorokin’s novels, causing its sales to spike. In 2007, seventeen pieces
of artwork were removed by the government from the exhibit “Sots-Art: Political Art in
Russia”273 for their supposed immoral content. The exhibit was finally reopened in Paris,
where it gained considerable notoriety. Then again in 2009, an art exhibit that was
organized at the Sakharov museum by Tretyakov Gallery directors Andrei Erofeev and
Yuri Samodurov drew criticism for bringing together works that were considered to be
“pornographic, antireligious, or otherwise objectionable.”274 Clearly, literature and art
have served as popular mediums for those attempting to push back against the
establishment and forge a space for something new. Yet they both, by nature, remain
somewhat hindered in the extent of their discursive reach: literature pushes the
boundaries of acceptability through language and engages the reader in dialogic
exchange, but it is limited in scope by the confines of a finite vocabulary; art, likewise, is
oftentimes restricted to visual techniques alone. Film, on the other hand, incorporates
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both linguistic and visual mechanisms into a larger discursive text that includes elements
of performance, symbolism, lighting, and sound, drawing the viewer into a creative
dialogue that is at once interpretive, subversive, and a powerful means of resistance.
As Robert Stam has pointed out, “Film not only includes utterances in the form of
verbal discourse; it is itself utterance, a socially informed communication.”275 Once
tightly controlled by the state as a finely tuned instrument of propaganda, post-Soviet
film has come into its own as an influential social and political commentary—a
commentary that engages with both the past and the present, and which renders the
audience implicit in the construction of meaning on a variety of levels. Pornographic
film aside, contemporary Russian productions are well equipped to grapple with the highs
and lows of Russian history, in addition to coming to terms with the tumultuous changes
that have taken place in over the past few decades. Some point to a more radiant future;
others are less optimistic. But in both cases, they address in some unique way the context
in which they are situated and the challenges of etching out a new identity in an uncertain
time. In many respects, film functions like a language—where camera angles position the
actors in relation to both one another and the audience; and where a story unfolds through
the construction of multiple layers of interpretive dialogue. Through the performances of
the actors themselves, diverse gender identities, sexualities, and their relationships to
ideas of Russianness are brought vividly to life. And through such gendered
performances, the parameters of both masculine Subjectivity and ideas of what it means
to be Russian are perpetually redefined.
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This chapter evaluates the ways in which masculine Subjectivity is called into
question, negotiated, and reshaped as a signifier of Russianness in post-Soviet film.
Whereas the preceding two chapters elucidate the ways in which discourses of the church
and state have contributed to rigid conceptions of both masculinity and the nation, this
chapter deviates somewhat from this emphasis to suggest that film, as a creative and fluid
medium that is no longer directly regulated by the state, provides a means of contesting
identities that have become hegemonic and oftentimes unquestioned as quintessentially
Russian. Drawing largely from the work of Judith Butler, the argument is made that
performativity, as an element of discourse, makes it possible to displace essentialist
conceptions of masculinity and to forge a space for the construction of diverse
masculinities that signify Russia in all its complexity. Performativity enables the
emergence of fragmented Subject positions—the construction of multiple, oftentimes
contradictory masculinities that interact with symbols of Russianness in ways that
challenge the monolithic and centripetlizing status quo of both “normal” or “natural”
masculinity and “authentic” Russian identity. Through such performances, masculinity
becomes enmeshed in a historical web that is at once mocked, ridiculed, and reshaped.
Film simultaneously speaks to a context that is in perpetual transition, and encourages the
audience to participate as co-creators of a new Russian text. Within such works, the
familiar is both evoked and displaced, new associations are made, and the audience is
rendered implicit in the construction of the film’s meaning, which is connected directly to
the larger social and political milieu.
The first section of this chapter traces shifting constructions of gender identities in
Soviet and Russian film, where film was first employed as a medium of state-sponsored
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propaganda, and then later became both a reflection of contemporary affairs and a
powerful means of resistance and change. As an industry that had previously been not
only regulated, but also subsidized by the state, film production underwent a severe
decline with the downfall of the Soviet Union, with the end of Soviet support eroding
both the quality and the quantity of the films produced. Next, I provide a brief theoretical
lens for interpreting performativity as negotiation and resistance in late Soviet and postSoviet film. Drawing from the work of Judith Butler, gender identities are presented as
contingent constructs that can be reshaped through displacement and critical
reformulation. Ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin help to elucidate the role of the viewer in cocreating meaning in Russian film. Lastly, these concepts are applied to three prominent
films, dating from 1990, 1997, and 2004, respectively: Pavel Loungine’s Taxi Blues
(Taksi bliuz), which portrays the late-Soviet “crisis” of masculinity with vivid lucidity;
Aleksei Balabanov’s Brother (Brat), which is oftentimes credited with reviving the
fledgling Russian film industry with its portrayal of a new national hero; and Olga
Stolpovskaia and Dmitri Troitski’s You I Love (Ia liubliu tebia), which has been
enthusiastically proclaimed by some as Russia’s first major gay film. Through an analysis
of masculine performativity in each of these films, an attempt is made to demonstrate the
ways in which alternative voices have asserted their independence amid a flurry of statesponsored narratives, providing new possibilities for conceptualizing both the nation and
constitutive masculinities.
Russian Film: from Propaganda to Impetus for Change
Vladimir Lenin once referred to film as “the most important of the arts.” Viewed
during Soviet times as a mechanism for the dissemination of propaganda, film was
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revered for its ability, through techniques of visual imagery, lighting, and sound, to
deliver powerful messages to audiences from diverse linguistic, educational, and
economic backgrounds. Silent films such as Sergei Eisenstein’s 1929 The Battleship
Potemkin (Bronenosetz Potemkin), Alexander Dovzhenko’s 1930 film Earth (Zemlia),
and Dziga Vertov’s 1930 production of Man with a Movie Camera (Chelovek s kinoapparatom) made possible expressions of society in its revolutionary development, while
simultaneously forging a space for a radiant future that was yet to be realized. By
infusing familiar contexts with new elements of Soviet symbolism, filmmakers acquired
the ability to not only sketch out a future reality for their audience, but to also position the
audience within that reality in very specific ways: Camera angles could establish the
viewer as the master of a new tractor or as subordinate to an authoritative leader;
perpetual motion, created through techniques of montage and enhanced by upbeat
musical scores, situated the viewer as a catalyst in processes of rapid social change; and
through powerful imagery of a repressive empire lost, the viewer was encouraged to
abandon the past and engage in the pursuit of a future in which imperialism would have
no place. Soviet film did not simply convey information unilaterally to a passive
viewer—it drew the viewer into the film itself and made her or him an integral part of the
building of “socialism in one nation.”
Within this most important art form, the social identities and potentialities of men
and women were clearly defined, and were presented as mutually constitutive of the
inceptive Soviet empire. Films such as Chapaev (Chapaev), which glorifies the career of
the Red Army leader Vasily Chapaev and highlights the capabilities of women in the
Revolutionary effort, and The Circus (Tsirk), a 1936 melodramatic comedy that tackles
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issues of racism in its portrayal of Russia as a multiethnic land, demonstrate in particular
the centrality of the New Soviet Man to the building of a communist utopia. As John
Haynes has described him: “Clean-cut and square-jawed, the New Soviet Man was the
figurehead of the people’s government of the revolutionary Soviet Union, the populist
proselytizer of a qualitative change in human nature.”276 Men in Soviet film were to
embody the empire. As soldiers, laborers, or aviators, men were portrayed, particularly
during the height of Soviet industrialization, as machines whose bodies were hardly their
own. Since “no single part of the machine was counted as self-valuable, all Soviet
citizens could be portrayed as working in synchronized harmony, as a team, with no more
than the customary lip-service paid to the Party as the ‘driving axle.”277 Largely through
portrayals of masculinity as tantamount to the Soviet project, society itself became
“masculinized.”278 The performance of heroic deeds brought to life a strong and powerful
empire that was embodied by idealized masculinity, while concretizing “normal”
masculine Subjectivity in terms of this mechanized heterosexual Ideal.
Filmmakers of the early and mid-Soviet periods were well adept at ensuring that
their productions were shining examples of state ideology; to do otherwise, particularly at
the height of Stalinism, would have proven perilous at best. However, as a malleable
form of high art with a variety of discursive tools at its disposal, film has also provided
opportunities for expressing viewpoints that have not necessarily been fully sanctioned
by the state. The religious themes of Andrei Tarkovski’s Andrei Rublev (1966), as well as
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the blunt symbolism of late Soviet-era films—such as the 1975 film The Irony of Fate
(Ironiia sud’by), the 1981 Academy Award winning Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears
(Moskva slezam ne verit), and the infamous 1988 film Little Vera (Malen’kaia Vera)—
demonstrate some of the ways in which film has historically lent itself to creative
interpretation, and at times, outright resistance to an otherwise monolithic and
centripetalizing discourse. This bifurcated form of representation, in which film is
capable of both exposing unappealing characteristics of the present and constructing a
future that is yet to be realized, became especially prominent toward the end of the Soviet
period and in post-Soviet Russia, once censorship had been lifted and producers were free
to create works that at once entertained and shocked. No longer required to fulfill
propagandistic purposes, film in contemporary Russia has developed into a powerful
means of exploring and negotiating identity on a variety of levels. Within such works, the
boundaries of what it means to be Russian, as well as ideas of masculinity and femininity,
are perpetually tested and redefined.
With the downfall of the Soviet Union came a dramatic decline in the Russian
film industry. Formerly subsidized by the state, production studios such as Mosfilm,
Lenfilm, and Gorky Studio were left with no financial support and little audience interest.
As Birgit Beumers has discussed, “What remained were large, unmanageable film studios
which were gradually split up into small, independent production companies and
privatized.”279 And as a consequence of the dire financial situation of the time, film
production plummeted sharply: only twenty-eight films were released in 1996, compared
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to 300 in 1990 (when filmmaking was a popular medium for money-laundering).280 The
film-going audience also declined precipitously, with ticket sales in 1996 dropping to
roughly one-fifteenth of the 1990 total.281 According to Susan Larsen, only 10 percent of
the films playing in Russian movies theaters were even produced in Russia, and of that 10
percent, only 5 percent had been produced recently.282 Imported television productions,
especially badly dubbed Mexican soap operas, became more accessible and in some ways
more entertaining than shoddy Russian films. Yet along with this decline of the film
industry also came increased opportunity. Filmmakers were no longer restricted to the
monoglossic and monologic confines of Soviet ideology, but rather were free to portray
Russia in all its complexity—a complexity that involved coming to terms with the past,
exposing the shortcomings of the present, and deciphering what it would mean to be
Russian in a new and uncharted future.
In productions that were intended to expose and poke fun at both the failures of
Soviet ideology and capitalist “freedom” in the new Russia, filmmakers of the early postSoviet period rejected imperatives to construct a radiant future; they also moved away
from the dissident defense of spiritual values that had taken place primarily underground
during Soviet times. Instead, they portrayed the reality of the post-Soviet context with
striking lucidity. As Beumers explains:
What they saw was a bleak picture: beggars on the streets, impoverished
pensioners, economic chaos, street crime, Mafia shootings, pornographic
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magazines and videos, decaying houses and ramshackle communal
apartments, and the emergence of a new class, the New Russians, who
adapted quickly and learnt how to make money in a society under
reconstruction.283
In both literature and film of the early post-Soviet period, authors and directors were
intent on capturing the ugliness of everyday life, while simultaneously attempting to
grapple with both successes and failures of the past. As Liliia Nemchenko points out:
The experience of changing paradigms of the view of the world, of a way
of life, of values; the experience of a search for identity, often in negative
terms…the continuous reassessment of the past, along with nostalgia and
ruthless criticism—all these factors had to be assimilated by contemporary
cinema.284
This effort to come to terms with both the past and the present is exemplified by
films such as the late Soviet production Come and See (Idi i smotri), which poignantly
exposes to viewers the atrocities that were inflicted upon the Soviet Union during the
Second World War. A host of other films have attempted to grapple with the ethnic
conflict that proliferated toward the end of the Soviet period and into contemporary
Russia. Films such as Pavel Lounguine’s 1991 production Luna Park (Luna Park) uses
powerful metaphors and symbolism to deal with issues of anti-Semitism in the late Soviet
period and to portray the roller coaster ride that was society at the time. Sergei Bodrov’s
1996 production of Prisoner of the Mountains (Kavkaskii plennik) reinterprets the
original short story in a way that enables a more hopeful understanding of the conflicts in
the Caucuses, presenting expressions of masculinity that differ from those mandated by
the confines of Soviet ideology and linking them to new manifestations of Russian
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identity. In each of these examples, the negotiation of the nation and its ideals are brought
to life through the performances of the main characters, most of whom (particularly in the
war films) are men. Through such performances, men come to embody and signify both
the strengths and the fragility of the Soviet, then Russian experience. In turn, ideas of
what constitutes normal, or natural masculinity are shaped and redefined.
The post-Soviet period has witnessed an onslaught of diverse cultural productions
that have each contributed to understandings of Russianness after communism. Film from
this timeframe necessarily reflects and grapples with the context in which it is produced,
while simultaneously engaging in a “dialogue with itself and with the traditions of
Russian (pre-1917) and Soviet (post-1917) film and literature.”285 Within such
productions, masculine Subjectivity is framed as a prominent signifier for what it means
to be Russian—whether this identity is falling apart, such as portrayed by the two
protagonists in Taxi Blues, or is being cautiously revived, as is evident in Brother, or is
being intentionally mocked and criticized from within, as is the case in You I Love. The
male protagonists in each of these films are troubled in their own way, while
simultaneously maintaining a particular inner strength. Through their performances, they
signify Russia in all its complexities, while simultaneously enabling the possibility of
resistance and change.
Theorizing Performativity and Resistance through Film
The notion that the masculine Subject is constituted discursively—within a
symbolic order that precedes it and defined by a vocabulary of limited scope—is
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oftentimes thought to preclude any possibility of agency or resistance. As Bert Olivier
concedes, “At best, one can be ‘relatively’ autonomous, insofar as everyone, no matter
how independently-minded, is to some degree dependent upon other people, on
conventions and on things that he or she has not created, such as language.”286 Yet
subscribing to the contention that meaning is only made possible within power-laden
systems of representation that precede and outlive the actors that are caught up in them,
and which are equipped with a language that is limited and finite, does not require an
abandonment of the possibility of pushing back and forging a space for something new.
Although discourse in many respects determines the contours of possibility with regard to
Subjectivity, it is a construction that is shaped, molded, and transformed by the same
social actors that are embedded within its nexus—actors who are capable of recombining
signifying elements in ways that bring about new variations on a theme of universal
import, thereby articulating alternative viewpoints and potentialities for self-definition.
According to Olivier:
Wherever discourse operates, a counter-discourse can be activated, which
means that dominant discourses can be discursively opposed from the
position of the speaking subject, as opposed to that of the one that is
‘spoken’ or constructed.287
Subjects are able to draw on “intersecting alternative or counter-discourses which allow
them to escape the straitjacket of monodiscursive determination.”288 Martin Flanagan
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echoes this claim, pointing out that “The environment in which discourse lives is a
volatile, constantly evolving one, where meaning is constantly in dispute.”289
This potential for resistance and change is not intended to imply that actors are
capable of assuming positions outside of the discourses in which they are situated,
asserting an essentialist agency that is unmediated by context. Rather, the implication is
that through discursive mechanisms such as language, performance, and the strategic use
of lighting, sound, and symbolism, it is possible to question the systems of meaning in
which actors are positioned, disrupting constructions that have become “normalized,”
revealing the lack that lies at the heart of hegemonic structures, and opening a space for
the emergence of alternative possibilities. As Judith Butler explains:
To intervene in the name of transformation means precisely to disrupt
what has become settled knowledge and knowable reality, and to use, as it
were, one’s unreality to make an otherwise impossible or illegible
claim.290
The disruption of this settled knowledge requires an acknowledgement that gender
identities do not inhere in the actor, but rather are contingently constructed and
maintained within different socio-temporal contexts:
[G]ender is in no way a stable identity or a locus of agency from which
various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in
time—an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts. Further,
gender is instituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be
understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and
enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered
self.291
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Through this stylized repetition of acts, gender identities are brought to life in a way that
makes them appear to be “normal,” or “natural”—as emanating from an essential and
unchanging nature. Yet as Butler maintains, “There is no gender identity behind the
expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very
‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”292 Ideas of what constitutes “normal,” or
“natural” masculinity and femininity inhere not in the actor, but in the socially
constructed discourses in which actors are situated, which includes performance: “Gender
reality is performative which means, quite simply, that it is real only to the extent that it
is performed.”293 As with other aspects of discourse, performativity and associated
gender identities are shaped by the context in which they are situated, while
simultaneously giving form to that context. They are historically contingent, drawing
from discourses and practices of the past, while in no way being unilaterally determined
by them. Perhaps most importantly, the context that shapes identities and the
performances that bring them to life is not static, but rather is malleable and can be
reshaped by the actors that are embedded in its web. “Subjective experience,” Butler
claims, “is not only structured by existing political arrangements, but effects and
structures those arrangements in turn.”294
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It is largely through performance—both on the stage and off—that ideas of both
the nation and masculine Subjectivity can be perpetuated, negotiated, and potentially
displaced. Performance serves as a form of discourse through which national and gender
identities are articulated, both within filmic texts and in the broader context in which they
are situated. Within this discourse, the ways in which the body are displayed, positioned,
and maintained are central. The body, as “an intentionally organized materiality,” “is
always an embodying of possibilities both conditioned and circumscribed by historical
convention.”295 Change is made possible by subverting the status quo, rather than
maintaining convention and continuously repeating performances of the past as though
they flow naturally into the present. As Butler has written: “the possibilities of gender
transformation are to be found…in the possibility of a different sort of repeating, in the
breaking or subversive repetition of that style.”296 Consequently, the process of selftransformation and redefinition, on both individual and national levels, requires the
displacement of established systems of knowledge and the forging of a space for new
articulations to emerge—a process that can be cleverly facilitated by film, where
performances are deliberately scripted and the bodies of actors carefully positioned in a
way that challenges established and hegemonic norms and practices. Yet as Mikhail
Bakhtin has taught us with regard to creative mediums such as literature and film, the
production itself is only half the story; such texts must also be interpreted and
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internalized by the viewer, who becomes rendered co-creator of the meaning that is
constructed.
Film is unique in that it has at its disposal not only language, which has been
somewhat inept at navigating the new complexities of the post-Soviet terrain—
particularly with regard to matters of gender and sexuality—but also techniques of visual
imagery and performance, which draw the viewer into an “interpretive community” based
around a particular filmic text.297 Drawing from Bakhtin, film may be regarded as a form
of discourse that comprises a heterogeneity of diverse voices, which combine to produce
a text that is subject to interpretation and is perpetually unfinalizable, but which
nevertheless is capable of altering the boundaries of acceptability of the broader sociopolitical community in which it is situated. Within this “text,” the viewer is not only a
passive recipient of predetermined meaning, but rather is invited to participate in the
construction of this meaning. As Flanagan convincingly argues, film, like the novel, may
be regarded as “not only the producer of meaning but also the site and recipient of
meanings projected back onto it by its dialogic communicant and adversary, the
spectator.”298 Flanagan argues, drawing from Bakhtin, that a filmic text should be located
within “the back and forth of anticipation, interpretation, reception and, inevitably,
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argument that makes up that sphere in all its complexity and vitality.”299 In film, much of
this anticipation and interpretation is fostered by the ways in which performance is
attached to symbols of Russianness, which carry both positive and negative connotations.
Such performances draw from the past and the present, grasping at pieces of meaning that
together paint a vivid picture of both masculinity and Russian identity in the post-Soviet
period.
In late Soviet and post-Soviet film, performances of masculine Subjectivity are
intimately connected with symbols of the nation. The Subject embodies the trials and
tribulations of the early 1990s, literally performing the nation through its attempt to
navigate an inhospitable and meaningless terrain. In the mid-1990s, productions emerge
in which a cautious sort of nationalist pride combines somewhat uncomfortably with an
aura of hopelessness and despair. And by the early to mid 2000s, we begin to see a
blatant mocking of not so much the Soviet past, but of the post-Soviet experience and the
influences of a capitalism imposed by the West. The following section evaluates three
very different films, each demonstrating the ways in which performativity is used to
mock, ridicule, and displace the constructed realities of contemporary Russia, while
providing for its subjects multiple positions that offer the potential to embrace new and
less constraining possibilities. The first film, Taxi Blues, exposes the post-Soviet decline
through performances of masculine Subjectivity and in many respects sets the stage for
the others that follow. Although the film Brother and its sequel Brother 2 have been
widely discussed in both academic literature and informal film reviews, any discussion
on masculinity in post-Soviet Russia would be incomplete without at least a tertiary
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treatment of the film’s major themes. Lastly, the film You I Love diverges from the
previous two in its relatively open portrayal of diverse gender identities and sexualities as
linked to new conceptions of Russianness. Combined, these three diverse films offer a
glimpse of Russia’s efforts to come to terms with both its past and a perpetually
unpredictable future, while exposing the centrality of gender and sexuality—particularly
masculinity—to the signification of Russianness during an uncertain time.

Negotiated Masculinities in Late Soviet and Post-Soviet Film
Class Schisms and Destabilized Masculinities in Pavel Lounguine’s “Taxi Blues”
Produced in 1990 and therefore technically a late-Soviet era film, Pavel
Lounguine’s Taxi Blues portrays vividly the displacement of both a coherent Soviet
sensibility and a corresponding masculine Subjectivity. Representing a genre known as
Chernukha, (literally, “black”), the film employs an unlikely male dyad—a jazz musician
and a taxi cab driver—that generates questions of shifting class-consciousness, attitudes
toward ethnic and religious minorities, and the ability to cope with an identity lost. Over
the course of the film, a competition of sorts emerges between the two male protagonists,
where the masculinity of one becomes propped up at the expense of the other’s
emasculation. This derision, as Dawn Seckler has pointed out, falls unfailingly on “the
one who initially articulates a patriarchal or Soviet point of view,”300 thereby rendering
the performance of the main characters representative of the state of affairs in soon to be
Russian society. As the “two masculine characters’ worlds collide, at least one man of the
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pair becomes unhinged and comes to discover how his fundamental way of understanding
the world around him is, in fact, a misapprehension of that world.”301 The changes that
each character undergoes over the course of the film in many respects speaks to changes
taking place in Russia itself, where the Soviet hero was effectively displaced—men’s loss
of status, their inability to make ends meet, and divisive gaps in class and status came to
characterize the new Russian landscape.
Actor Piotr Zaitchenko plays Ivan Shlykov, a working-class taxi driver with a
tough face and a muscular body. Piotr Mamonov, who was in real life a well-known rock
musician with the group Zvuki Mu, plays a Jewish jazz musician named Lyosha
Zeliverstov. Many film critics and viewers of Taxi Blues regarded Lyosha’s personality
in the film to be indistinguishable from Mamonov’s own. A review in Iskusstvo kino
suggested that “Mamonov didn’t play anybody in this film, not even himself—here he
sought out himself. . . In this role, Mamonov perhaps lived out a certain portion of his
own personal fate.”302 Hence, the line between fiction and reality, performance on screen
and performance in real life, was deftly blurred in this film, and the audience, who would
have been familiar with Momonov and his musical history, were immediately brought
into the film’s interpretive community. The masculinity that Mamonov embodied on
stage was seen as almost synonymous as that in his everyday life and career—both direct
reflections of the reality of the time. Through this performance, reality becomes twisted
within a fictional narrative in which both the characters’ attributes and the context in

301

Ibid., 104.

302

Quoted from Herbert Eagle, “Review: Taxi Blues by Pavel Lungin,” Slavic Review 52,
no. 2 (1993): 353-354.
177

which they are embedded are called into question, while a space is forged for a still
uncertain future.
The stage of the film is initially constructed through a dualistic portrayal of
Moscow: panoramic shots of the city during a holiday celebration, with red flags
decorating a bridge where the celebration takes place and fireworks exploding in the
background, is juxtaposed sharply with darker images of late 1980s-early 1990s Russia,
including the entrance of Red Square that is still adorned with a picture of Lenin, and a
scene of drunken rabble-rousers in search of a party and more vodka. This dualism is
embodied throughout the film by the two main characters. Whereas Shlykov is portrayed
as thick-necked, thick-skinned, and capable, although a bit hardened by life, Lyosha
appears somewhat gaunt, frail, and lacking the strength of a working-class man. This
contrast is maintained over the course of the film, where the two men are oftentimes
portrayed side-by-side, but glancing in opposite directions. As Seckler aptly notes, this
portrayal of the men together, yet maintaining their autonomy, suggests that two
monologues are taking place. Because “the genre employs its characters to represent
opposing points of view, it is reasonable to place characters in such a way that
symbolically underscores that they do not see eye-to-eye.”303 As the film progresses, the
characters’ physical personae become aligned with those of the city—and with the uneasy
transition from Soviet life to the new Russia.
Our introduction to the main characters takes place inside a taxicab, where four
men are cruising around Moscow after dark in search of excitement. Three of the four
men eventually head home, leaving the alcoholic musician, Lyosha, with the task of
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paying the driver, Shlykov, a seventy-ruble cab fare. Lyosha promises to pay the cab
driver, but instead disappears into an apartment building on the edge of the city, stiffing
Shlykov for the fare. Amid the decrepit backstreets of a declining city, Shlykov tracks
down Lyosha, only to discover that Lyosha is unable to pay the fare in anything but
fashionable Western clothing. Shlykov insists that Lyosha work off the fare, repaying his
debt by washing cars for the taxi company. Lyosha soon moves in with Shlykov—a move
intended to keep Lyosha out of trouble and away from drunken brawls. Soon after
Lyosha moves in, Shlykov is seen confiscating his saxophone, which gives the audience
their first glimpse of Lyosha’s former life as a famous musician, whose behavior has
since turned irresponsible. The instrument becomes an extension—or perhaps rather a
detachment—of Lyosha’s self-worth: Shlykov turns down the opportunity to sell the sax
for a decent price, instead opting to save both the sax and Lyosha.
Through the performances of each male protagonist in Taxi Blues, the perils and
contradictions of the late Soviet period are brought to life: a life in which a well-known
Jewish musician finds himself scrubbing grime off the bottoms of taxi cabs; and where a
poor cabbie is finally able to seek vengeance for a wrong committed against him—only
to realize that he, himself, is fundamentally misguided. Shlykov clearly signifies the
declining Soviet empire, whereas Lyosha signifies a much maligned, although somewhat
more sophisticated presence. This signification is accomplished through performance,
and through specific characteristics of each man’s body. As Seckler has pointed out with
regard to Shlykov:
His socialist persona is evident in his thick, muscular physique, in the
places he frequents—his modest room in a communal apartment and his
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workplace, the taxi depot—and in his violent reactions against people he
perceives to be ‘class enemies’.304
He is a late-Soviet representation of the New Soviet Man, but unlike the proletarian
heroes of earlier Soviet fiction and film, his imperfections are made visible for the
audience to see. His car (in Russian, his mashina) enables the Soviet unification of man
with machinery to take place, as might have been suggested by films such as Man with a
Movie Camera and Earth. Yet unlike machines of the early Soviet period, which actually
produced a product or altered the environment in some way, Shlykov’s car never seems
to arrive at any meaningful destination. Rather, the driver spends his time shuttling
around other people, relying upon the black market vodka economy to support his meager
existence.
Nevertheless, Shlykov sees himself as a sort of Socialist Realist hero, trying to
teach other people how to live, and for a while at least, unwaveringly believing in his
own righteousness. He exercises on an antiquated contraption in his apartment,
maintaining a muscular physique and positioning himself in the role of a mentor, or
educator to Lyosha. The emphasis on Shlykov’s body hearkens back to earlier Soviet
ideology directly, where a strong body was also believed to signify a strong mind and a
strong nation in the Soviet empire. As Seckler notes with regard to Shlykov’s physical
prowess, “the display of his physicality also communicates the high degree to which he
quite literally embodies this dominant Soviet trope.”305 The physicality of his body and
its unification with machines puts Shlykov into stark contrast with Lyosha, where it is, in
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Shlykov’s view, his task to reform Lyosha and bring him into socialist consciousness.
Yet this portrayal of Shlykov as a sort of late-Soviet “New Soviet Man” is anachronistic,
as Shlykov is clearly not an Ideal Soviet man, nor do his actions any longer fit the context
of the soon to be post-Soviet Russia. He displays blatantly anti-Semitic behavior towards
Lyosha, who, despite having “a frail body and pallid complexion marred by deep-sunken
eyes, missing teeth, and short-cropped thinning hair,”306 goes on to achieve international
fame, leaving Shlykov with diminished authority and a realization of his ineffectuality.
By the end of the film, Shlykov’s perception of late Soviet society—and of himself—has
fundamentally changed.
The film begins with the premise that a hard-working, muscle-bound, Muscovite
cab driver should be superior to the penniless, Westernized, alcoholic Jew. Yet as the
film progresses, the audience is presented with the dilemma of Lyosha’s success and the
downfall of the New Soviet Man. After watching scene after scene of Shlykov asserting
his authority over Lyosha and others whom he deems inferior, the viewer is confronted
with the realization that Shlykov’s work ethic no longer gets him anywhere—literally.
Conversely, Lyosha’s dismissal of long-standing Soviet values enables him to experience
a freedom of sorts, where his Jewish (non-Russian) identity does not impede his
international success, and where the only “machine” with which he becomes united is his
saxophone—a blatant symbol of anti-Soviet ideology. On his sax, he plays
improvisational, free-form jazz—a form of music that had formerly been associated with
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bourgeois elitism and therefore highly suspect during much of the Soviet period.307 He is
a holy fool of a new age: existing within an alcohol induced alternative reality,
proclaiming himself as a “freak,” and claiming, like a saxophone-playing Rasputin, to
communicate directly with God in his pursuit of success and notoriety.308 Lyosha’s rise to
fame, it quickly becomes clear, is due in large part to his abandonment of antiquated
Soviet ideology. Through his musical success, Lyosha embodies the failure of
communism—and serves as a clear signifier of the Soviet Union’s demise.
Taxi Blues has been regarded by some critics as similar to the American “buddy
film,” where two men come together around the necessity of solving a problem or
navigating untenable circumstances. However:
Whereas the American buddy film, from Butch Cassidy and the Sundance
Kid to We’re No Angels, depicts opposites who come to appreciate each
other and work together with a deepened appreciation for each other, Taxi
Blues offers no such easy sense of growth, maturity, or acceptance.309
Rather, the two male protagonists in this film represent very different aspects of the
Soviet, and soon to be Russian experience. The film is a political allegory of sorts, where
Shlykov—through his proletarian work ethic and unification with his car-as-machine—
represents the old system, while the Lyosha attempts to come to terms with the new. As
Herbert Eagle has written:
The film is naturalistic, ultra-realistic, in its raw depiction of what used to
be forbidden territory for Soviet cinema: poverty, overcrowded living
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conditions, rampant alcoholism, a ubiquitous blackmarket economy, a
disillusioned and depressed working class, and an aimless and cynical
intelligentsia.310
The more aesthetically pleasing aspects of Moscow are used as a Potemkin village of
sorts, masking the ugliness that unsuccessfully hides behind its fabricated walls. This
visual dualism is created through a unique cinematic style, which blends fiction with the
reality of 1980s Moscow.
As Eagle has written with regard to the style of Taxi Blues:
What might be termed Lungin’s hyper-realist style combines actual
documentary realia, stylistic excess and paradoxical collisions to produce
a full-scale assault on socialist realist norms and the aesthetic strategies
that they encouraged.311
The film blatantly displaces the mandates of Soviet Socialist Realism and the ideal of the
“New Soviet Man,” aligning two very different masculinities with Russia’s transition into
to the post-Soviet period. The two protagonists in this film become signifiers of a past
that is no longer welcome and a future that is disturbingly uncertain. For this portrayal,
the film won the award for best director at Cannes in 1990 and went on to become a
controversial, albeit popular with young audiences both in Russia and abroad. In a 1991
interview with NPR, director Lounguine expressed his desire to have his characters
represent the chaos and contradictions of the late Soviet period:
Of course, it’s a traditional Russian artist, it’s a traditional Russian Jew. It
presents some chaos which is—which is now in Russia and the Soviet
Union, where the people doesn’t really understand how they should live,
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where to go and-you understand, it’s—it’s really, I wanted to show
some—a piece of real life with many contradictions.312
And though this film, the contradictions of the late Soviet period come to life through the
performances of these two men. The actors are living significations of both a hegemonic
masculinity and a social stability that has been displaced and traded in for an uncertain
future. In post-Soviet films of the mid- late-1990s, an attempt would be made to grapple
with this uncertainty and reclaim a masculinity lost. The next film discussed, Brother, is a
quintessential example of this new and subversive genre.

A New Hero of Our Time? Masculinity, Criminality, and a Reclaiming of Russia in
“Brother”
Aleksei Balabanov’s 1997 production of Brat (Brother) is oftentimes credited
with reviving the Russian film industry. At a time when life was dismal, when intrusions
from the West were seen as responsible for society’s problems and violence in Russia’s
southernmost region was at its apex, and when the country appeared to lack anyone
capable of remedying such maladies, the hero of Brother appealed to a tired and hopeless
audience—both for his relatively positive attributes, and for his blatant imperfections.
The film, like many others that were produced during the mid-1990s, was somewhat
cathartic in its portrayal of society it all its bleakness. A far cry from the techniques
Soviet Socialist Realism that had been mandated during the Soviet period, where society
was to be portrayed in both an idealized state and in its “revolutionary development,”
there is no Ideal in Brother, nor was there any hint of a shining, optimistic future. Rather,
it is crime, violence, and a dilapidated city that set the stage for Brother, and for its
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troubled young hero Danila Bagrov, played by the famed actor Sergei Bodrov Jr., to
navigate this rocky and unpredictable terrain.313 A crime film, Brother clearly differs
from the chernukha model employed in Taxi Blues, where men are largely victims of
their circumstances. This new “killer-hero” still “lives on the spur of the moment,”314 but
now maintains a degree of control over his actions and his circumstances. Through the
performativity of both Danila and supporting characters, who oftentimes appear as less
than authentically Russian in light of the protagonist’s heroic deeds, masculinity is
cautiously rebuffed and reclaimed, coming to signify both the problems and pride of the
post-Soviet 1990s.
Physically, Danila has a strong and muscular build, and exhibits a calm and
measured persona.315 Andrew Horton’s description of Danila as a “geeky-looking youth”
is perhaps somewhat harsh; other critics have pointed out that although he is no
Hollywood bodybuilder, the protagonist displays a strength of both body and spirit that
Russia desperately lacked. As Yanna Hashamova has put it, “Brother introduced a new
type of hero in post-Soviet film: the hit man who follows his own moral standards and
becomes a Russian Robin Hood under the new social and political conditions.”316 Some
critics have compared Danila to Chapaev, the heroic Red Army commander for whom a
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1930s Soviet film was named. Others claim that he has the face of a member of the
Young Pioneers.317 And in a way, these disparate accounts are all accurate. Danila
clearly signifies the complexities of the post-Soviet period—a time in which desperation
and a lack of hope for the future were met with anger over the injustices that had been
inflicted upon Russia and a desire to avenge certain wrongs, while reasserting a sense of
capability and pride in Russia’s historical accomplishments. The hero of Brother is a
young man who exhibits extreme maturity at times, while displaying an almost teenage
preoccupation with music, drugs, and the concert scene, at others. He embodies Russia’s
transition into capitalism, displaying both ruthless violence and a desire for something
better. As Susan Larsen has argued, the “pathos” of films such as Brother
…derives from a common anxiety about what it means to be Russian at
the end of the twentieth century, and most of the films articulate that
anxiety in terms of a threat to masculine ‘honor’ and ‘dignity’…or
national ‘might’ and ‘right’.318
The film begins with Danila unapologetically traipsing through the video shoot of
the rock band Nautilus Pompilius as they film their latest album, Wings. That Danila is
introduced while interrupting the filming of another film is significant in that it
establishes the hero as somehow more “real” for the viewer and less like a character who
is being observed only from the outside. The actors in the “film within the film” are
clearly acting, but viewers are now united with Danila in his vision of this staged
performance, and on the journey upon which he will soon embark. The band and the song
both acquire symbolic importance as the film progresses, as Danila plays Nautilus music
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on his personal CD player, pursuing a sort of escape from the grim reality in which he is
ensnared. The song Wings, however, which laments the loss of a certain freedom, and
explicitly confines the hero to his circumstances, remains out of Danila’s reach. An
excerpt from Wings demonstrates powerfully these circumstances and, through feminine
imagery of an abused Russia whose wings have been removed, simultaneously calls
Danila to action and traps him within an inhospitable terrain:
You remove your evening dress
Standing facing the wall
And I see fresh scars
On your velvet-smooth back.
I want to cry from pain
Or forget myself in sleep.
By the way, where are your wings
which I liked?
Where are your wings
which I liked?
Where are your wings
which I liked?
Before, we had timeNow we have things to do.
Proving that the strong devour the weak.
Proving that soot is white.
We have all lost something
in this mad war.
By the way, where are your wings
which I liked?319
Over the course of the film, the song comes to serve as an anthem of sorts, symbolizing a
loss of innocence and powerlessness experienced by the Soviet people, who now had to
fight for their own survival, with no opportunity for escape.
When Danila is arrested for his intrusion in the film and for getting into a fight
with the film’s producer, the viewers learn that he has recently finished his military
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service in the conflict-ridden Caucasus. He claims to have served in an administrative
position, but his detailed knowledge of firearms and his willingness to use lethal force
soon indicate otherwise. Danila himself is fatherless, further symbolizing the idea that
he—and by extension, the youth of his generation—are now left to fend for themselves.
He is eventually sent by his mother to St. Petersburg (which she still calls Leningrad) to
live with his brother Viktor, who is supposed to be a positive role model for Danila and
prevent him from suffering the same fate as his father, who was killed in a prison fight.
As the viewers soon discover, however, Viktor turns out to be a hit man who quickly
involves Danila in his criminal world, turning him into a contract killer for the mafia.
Through the relationship that emerges between Danila and his brother, we gain a
greater understanding of the confused and interrelated statuses of both national identity
and masculinity in 1990s Russia—and of the ability of filmmakers to express and mock
this confusion through their characters. Viktor is not simply Danila’s brother. On many
different occasions, Danila and his mother both describe the ways in which Viktor took
his father’s place for Danila and helped to raise him like a son. This is an unreliable
fraternity, however, as it soon becomes apparent that Viktor has set up Danila and is
exploiting his brotherly camaraderie. Viktor enlists Danila to help kill a gangster known
only as “the Chechen,” who is accused of being a former terrorist and is persecuting not
only Viktor, but also the “Russian people” more broadly. Yet as the viewer knows,
Viktor himself has long been hired by a rival gang of Russian bandits to kill the Chechen.
This betrayal is a direct signification of the “betrayal” of the Soviet regime and the loss of
patriotism that was experienced throughout the 1990s. As Larsen points out: “Viktor’s
many betrayals of Danila’s trust suggest that brotherly love—like its national equivalent,
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patriotism—is only a convenient fiction, not a moral absolute.”320 The fiction in which
many citizens had come to believe had been displaced, acted out vividly by two
conflicted and disturbed male characters. Danila performs a distorted form of patriotism
throughout the film, avenging wrongs that have been committed against the Russian
people, while himself proving to be an imperfect new hero.
While going about his “business” as an assassin, Danila encounters a host of
diverse characters, each of whom shapes his own persona in some unique way. And
through his interactions with these characters, the viewers are presented with symbolism
that links Danila’s masculinity with particular aspects of Russianness. On a grimy street
infiltrated by crime and poverty, Danila comes to defend an older German man, known
only as Hoffman, against a racketeer who is attempting to extort his meager profits. In
this scene, Danila demonstrates a certain penchant for righteousness, while
simultaneously demonstrating his anti-Semitic tendencies. Danila later befriends
Hoffman, while clearly expressing his distaste for Jews. In another scene, Danila helps a
tramway attendant collect the fares of two Caucasian passengers who are unwilling to
pay. He refers to the culprits as “black-assed worms,” retrieves the money, and warns
them to never return. Here his principled sense of responsibility comes into stark contrast
with blatant racism and an effort do define a true Russian “us” against “them.” Then later
in the film, Danila shoots in cold blood his girlfriend Sveta’s abusive husband,
demonstrating once again his lack of tolerance for what he perceives as a wrongdoing,
while expressing no remorse for taking a life himself. Through each of these encounters,
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we see contradictions that make up the essence of Russianness during the mid-1990s, all
signified by this “heroic” male protagonist. As Beumers has articulated this signification:
In the tradition of the romantic hero, he is a knight, who keeps his word;
but he is also a killer. He combines within himself the contradictions at the
heart of the ‘Russian Idea’: self-assertion and self-effacement, the right to
judge and the compassion to redeem, West and East.321
The idea that this hero is regarded as a “brother” rather than a father figure is also
significant, as it represents the transition from a society in which men’s statuses were
determined in relation to the state as an omnipotent father, to one in which a man’s status
is determined in relation to other men, with no grand leader at the helm. At the film’s
conclusion, Danila learns that his brother Viktor, who had been like a father figure to
him, has set him up. Yet rather than avenging the wrong and shooting Viktor as coldly as
he has dealt with the other hit men, the younger brother is shown sparing Viktor’s life,
giving him money and sending him to Moscow to live with their mother. Viktor, the once
powerful hit man who exploited his younger brother for criminal means, is seen cowering
on the floor in tears—having become the victim of his own erroneous deeds. Although
Danila is portrayed throughout the film as a ruthless killer who has no qualms with
shooting his enemies in cold blood, the last few scenes of the film prop him up a as a hero
of sorts—and as a more Idealized new Russian man—where it becomes apparent that
although such ruthlessness may be necessary for navigating the post-Soviet terrain,
Danila is a true Russian hero.
Over the course of the film, questions arise with regard to whether Danila can be
regarded as a new “hero of our time,” to invoke the famous writings of Mikhail
Lermontov, or whether, as in Lermontov’s novel, Danila is more of an imperfect Byronic
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hero. In either case, he is, as Beumers has pointed out, “the product of the absurdity and
chaos of the time.”322 But was his character intended to put an end to the chaos, or
provide the chaos with corporeal representation? To be sure, Danila is calm, measured,
and boasts a strong and healthy physicality—something that contradicts the state of
affairs (and the characteristics of many men) in Russia at the time. Yet the racism, antiSemitism, and almost adolescent preoccupation with music, drugs, and the concert scene
cast doubt on the promise of Danila as a hero. As Hashamova has critically observed,
Brother “created a cult character and turned actor Sergei Bodrov Jr. into a cult figure in
Russia mythologizing aggressive and xenophobic masculinity that marginalizes
women.”323 It was a “hero” that appealed in particular to the younger generation who
longed for a hero with whom they could identify, and for a way of making sense of a
turbulent time. As Anna Lawton explains:
So, what if his values were not those of the archetypal hero? What if they
were closer to those of a skinhead gang chief? What if the hero displayed
zero values? No problem. The moral vacuum gives Danila unlimited
freedom and superhuman power. The film exalts that power and caters to
the aspirations of the young viewers.324
Danila is, literally, an embodiment of the 1990s and a signifier of what it meant to be
Russian during this difficult time.
Brother appealed to audiences because of its construction of an imperfect, yet
capable hero—one that displaces the New Soviet Man and presents an alternative option
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for something new. Yet it could be also be argued that Brother became popular,
particularly with the younger generation, for its relative simplicity—and perhaps because,
unlike most of the films that were produced during the turbulent 1990s, it was
entertaining. As Lawton has written with regard to the film’s popularity:
This has been a great box-office hit, notwithstanding, or perhaps because
of, the predictable plot and the sex-and-violence clichés borrowed from
the American B-movies that had saturated the Russian screens in the past
ten years.325
Finally, Russia had its own action film, where the hero was not a muscle-bound
Schwarzenegger type, but rather embodied desirable Russian characteristics, with all their
imperfections.

Russianness and Gay Masculinities in You I Love (Ia Liubliu Tebia)
Dubbed enthusiastically by some critics as “Russia’s first gay-friendly film,” Olga
Stolpovskaia and Dmitry Troitsky’s You I Love (Ia Liubliu Tebia) (2004) stands apart
from the nationalist, war, and gangster films that dominated much of the 1990s and early
2000s. It is certainly a far cry from the Brother films that resuscitated the Russian film
industry with their creation of a new, albeit imperfect national hero. And given that the
first Russian film to show a sex scene wasn’t released until 1988 with the production of
Malen’kaia Vera (Little Vera), and that anti-gay demonstrations had been gaining
traction in social and political discourse throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the
film is also unique for its open and relatively positive portrayal of diverse sexualities and
relationships. Although it could be argued that the gay men in the film are in some
respects portrayed as less than authentically Russian, and that the main female character
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is highly sexualized, the film, partly by forging into new territory and partly through its
interpretable presentation, provides a space for conceptions of both masculinity and
Russianness to emerge that have rarely been possible publically. Through the
performance of diverse masculinities, the film presents the viewer with a different set of
options for thinking about masculine Subjectivity as an embodiment of what it means to
be Russian in the contemporary period.
You I Love playfully depicts the intersecting lives of three main characters:
Timofei Pechorin, an advertising executive who is caught up in Russia’s rocky transition
to capitalism; Vera Kirillova, a sexy news anchor who, incidentally, is the only character
in the film to speak in the first-person; and the exotic Ulumji, a young Kalmyk man who
overcomes homelessness by tending to reindeer at the local zoo, and who dreams of
becoming a circus performer.326 With striking lucidity, each character clearly embodies a
certain aspect of Russia’s lack and the post-Soviet quest for meaning. As Andrew James
Horton points out, it is clear that both Timofei and Vera “suffer from a certain spiritual
hollowness in their roles as vanguard of Russia’s head-forward lunge into capitalism.”327
Timofei seems disengaged from his work, playing video games during company
meetings, and Vera has an insatiable appetite, unable to ever get quite enough food.
Amid this lack of direction and unfulfilled desire, blatant symbols of consumerism
abound: workers parading the streets dressed as company mascots literally embody the
new capitalist landscape, and the repetition of the advertising slogan “Freedom is Cola!”
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mocks both the capitalist enterprise and the idea that freedom is now a feature of the new
Russia.
The first character to whom viewers are introduced is Ulumji, as he strolls the
streets of Moscow in search of work. With his furry winter earflap cap and dark facial
features, Ulumji is clearly a foreigner, whose slight build becomes intermingled among
overt signs of capitalism, on one hand—such as a worker who is wearing a Nike
windbreaker—and traditional symbols of Russianness, on the other—such as massive
Orthodox cupolas and a tapestry displaying an image of the Virgin Mary. From the
outset, it is clear that Ulumji has wandered into a confused city, where Russian tradition
and Western capitalism have become uneasy bedfellows. Viewers are next introduced to
Timofei and Vera—through performances, quite literally. The audience first comes to
know to Timofei only through his voice, as he conducts market research by telephone.
Our first glimpse of Vera is during one of her news broadcasts, where she laments the
intrusion of migrant workers into the Russian capital. Such workers, Vera explains, are
“detrimental to Moscow’s budget” and are “responsible for 11 percent of all crime in
Moscow.” As these three characters become acquainted, the performance of each
signifies the emptiness that persists in early 2000s Russia, while simultaneously etching a
space for new possibilities.
A chance meeting during a pickpocketing incident in a Moscow café brings
together Timofei and Vera, who begin dating and find in each other a certain fulfillment
of a void by which each of their lives has been plagued—a void which is deeply
intertwined with the social and cultural context of the time, and which is further
complicated by the arrival of Ulumji, who, while performing a balancing act atop a fence
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next to the road upon which Timofei is driving, falls onto the hood of Timofei’s car (an
Audi) and literally drops into the couple’s life. When a Moscow hospital is unwilling to
treat Ulumji properly, Timofei takes the unusual young man home and sets him up on his
sofa to heal. The plot begins to thicken when Vera returns to Timofei’s apartment, only to
find the two men sitting on the floor in their underwear, with Timofei’s hand resting
casually on Ulumji’s thigh.
It is the scene just prior to Vera’s arrival that reveals a budding relationship
between Timofei and Ulumji, and where once seemingly stable identities come to reveal
much more complex and bifurcated Subject positions. Ulumji’s provincial character is
highlighted when, rather than sleeping soundly on Timofei’s sofa, he is shown turning the
lamp on and off, mesmerized by the fringe that accents the shade. When Timofei gets up
to see what is going on, Ulumji asks him if he has anything to smoke, then offers to sing
Timofei a folk song, at which point he dances mystically around Timofei until both men
settle on the floor. Upon finding the two men together, Vera is at first surprised and
annoyed, before reluctantly returning to the apartment and spending the night with
Timofei. The commercial that appears on TV in the morning as the three uncomfortably
share breakfast: “What is love? Love is Cola!” The next few scenes show Timofei’s
gradual realization of his lust for Ulumji and his desire to enhance his physical fitness
(which is intermingled with commentary on who makes the most or least amount of
money) while Ulumji discovers the magazine GQ.
The scene that makes the men’s sexualities even more explicit and links them
specifically to Ideas of Russianness is when Timofei and Ulumji again find themselves
alone in Timofei’s apartment and engage in a wild, almost animalistic romp around the
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living room. Ulumji begins jumping up and down on the furniture, then on Timofei’s lap,
before finally engaging Timofei in comical frolicking that eventually leads both men to
the bathtub, where, while fully clothed, they become soaking wet. As loud music thumps
in the background, a statue of the composer Tchaikovsky, who is one of Russia’s most
prominent gay historical figures, bounces off of a shelf and crashes onto the hardwood
floor. Inconveniently, an older woman from the apartment below rings the doorbell and
inquires about the screaming that she heard from above. Timofei explains that he had a
“terrible dream”—a “terrible dream about love,” (strashni son pro liubov) smiles coyly,
and returns to his scandalous escapade. The two men are eventually found by Vera, as
they sleep together on a bear rug on the floor of Timofei’s living room.
As the female protagonist in You I Love, Vera engages in a bifurcated form of
narration, acting out the conflicts between capitalism, tradition, and sexuality in the new
Russia. As a news reporter, it is her job to enlighten Moscow (and the viewers of the
film) about the goings on of the city, which include issues in which the other characters
are implicated, such as migration. But as the only character to speak in the first person
within the film itself, we also come to understand the other characters, and their
relationships with one another, largely through Vera’s voice and the expression of her
anxieties. After a night spent trying to come to terms with her boyfriend’s newfound
bisexuality, Vera shows up at the news station exhausted and weary. In true Russian
style, she takes a shot of vodka and carries on with her work as the quintessential
suffering woman.
Over the course of You I Love, symbols of capitalism become directly linked to
representations of masculinity and sexual prowess. While Timofei and Vera are eating
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lunch in a trendy Moscow café, Timofei explains to Vera that although he likes his work
in advertising, he finds it to be exhausting. He tells her that his friend used to work at the
stock market, “and his virility depended upon the value of the dollar.” Sometimes,
Timofei explains, “he was basically impotent.” Vera, meanwhile, can’t get enough of her
salad, and when one of Timofei’s commercials is broadcast in the café, she suggests
enthusiastically that they order pizza, as well. In the next scene, Ulumji is revealed to be
so “backward” and lacking of masculine prowess that he fails to comprehend the
workings of an ATM. “See how much money there is!” he exclaims to his older male
companion from the zoo. “I tried to stick my card in there, but nothing happened.” Later
in the film, capitalism is further dissociated with Ideal Russianness when the
business/marketing director for whom Timofei works, who is black and speaks mainly
English, also turns out to be gay.
In many respects, the film You I Love raises as many questions as it answers,
leaving the viewers to fill in the gaps and come to their own conclusions. Other than
Timofei’s work life, we know relatively little about the character’s background. Has he
engaged in relationships with men in the past, or is this experience with Ulumji truly
novel for him? Similarly, as the primary narrator of the film, Vera provides snippets of
information about her own understanding of this unusual situation; but these accounts are
fragmented and never seem to lead to a grander conclusion. As Gerald McCausland
laments:
At times we seem to be hearing the story of Vera’s path to a kind of
Buddhist enlightenment, a developing ability to see beyond the limitations
of the material and social world in which humanity tries to exist. But this
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narrative voice is not sustained, nor is Vera the focal point for the larger
storyline.328
And perhaps most conflicted of all is the character Ulumji, who is made to appear
stereotypically “backward” and exotic—seducing Timofei through hypnotic ritual,
invoking Eastern mysticism in his everyday life, and entirely unfamiliar with anything
modern, such as the lamp in Timofei’s living room or the workings of an ATM. But at
the same time, Ulumji oftentimes comes across as the most insightful character in the
film. In his primitive “half-civilized man-boy”329 state, he is untainted by capitalism and
the fast pace of life in the new Russia.
Despite the ambiguity that permeates the characters and their relationships in You
I Love, sexuality as a marker of identity in contemporary Russia takes center stage. As
McCausland remarks, “this fluidity of identity is neither celebrated nor mourned, but
rather put on display in a way that is half play and half manipulation.”330 Both Timofei
and Ulumji overcome great obstacles in the actualization of their sexuality, but their
performances remain somewhat mediated and confined to the reality of contemporary
Russia. For Timofei, it is the world of advertising and televised representation that keeps
both his history and the authenticity of his bisexuality at bay. Ulumji is trapped by
traditions and stereotypes, which equate his (presumably) homosexuality with mysticism
and an almost feminine presence. Nevertheless, unlike most Russian films, You I Love
ends happily. The three characters eventually come to an arrangement in which they can
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coexist, with Vera eventually having Timofei’s baby and all three raising the child
together. Debates over whether this film is truly a positive representation of gay
masculinities aside, it is a relatively open portrayal of diverse Subjectivities that had long
been silenced in Russian discourse. Its prominence—and the fact that it was produced
and shown publically at all—are positive developments that once again demonstrate the
ability of film to push back against the establishment and forge a space for something
new.

Conclusion—The Future of Film in the New Russia
The lack of meaning and permanence that was revealed upon the Soviet Union’s
breakup created an opportunity for meaning to be constructed anew, exposing the
contrived nature of the discourse that preceded it and opening a space for ideas of both
the nation and masculine Subjectivity to emerge. This lack and the possibilities that came
with it are portrayed vividly in late-Soviet and post-Soviet film, which was an industry
that closely reflected the Soviet Union’s demise and the reconstruction of Russia. Yet
with this lack of oversight also came increased possibilities for creating works that not
only failed to adhere to requisites of the past, but which also were capable of blatantly
mocking that past and forging a space for new ideas of both Russianness and masculine
Subjectivity to emerge. Unlike other creative media such as literature and art, film has at
its disposal a variety of discursive media that enable it to reach out to viewers, situating
them within an interpretive community and engaging them in a dialogic co-construction
of the film’s meaning. Through performance, identities and practices that have become
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regarded as “normal,” or “natural,” can be effectively displaced and a space forged for
the emergence of new alternatives.
In films of the late 1980s and early 1990s, we see primarily a mocking of the
Soviet regime and a reflection of the disillusionment that permeated society and discourse
at the time. The hopelessness and despair that characterized the everyday experiences of
most were brought to life on the big screen, in stark contrast to the contrived idealized
society of the past. Social and economic tensions were brought to life by characters who
literally embodied this new and confused Russian landscape, where the so-called
“demasculinization” of the empire becomes clearly etched on the bodies of men who
attempt to cling to a dying past. In the award-winning Taxi Blues, the rocky transition to
post-Soviet life is acted out through two male protagonists, whose physicalities become
aligned with the contours of the city, as each man becomes aware of the potentialities and
prohibitions of this uncharted time. The circumstances in films such as Taxi Blues are
grim, pointing not toward a radiant future, but rather eulogizing the loss of a once hopeful
past.
Although portrayals of post-Soviet life continue to be grim in films of the late
1990s, the construction of a new “hero of our time” in Brother revived the film industry
and went a long way toward restoring masculine prowess to the once impotent
Fatherland. Danila Bagrov is no saint—he kills his “enemies” in cold blood, displays
overtly racist and anti-Semitic tendencies, and comes across as a bit of a womanizer.
Nevertheless, he stands up for what could have been regarded at the time as
quintessentially Russian values. His military service speaks to his willingness to serve his
country, with his battle against the Chechens extending into his return to Moscow, then
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St. Petersburg. And at the end, he is shown to be a truly benevolent and forgiving brother
through his treatment of his brother Viktor, who has been thoroughly demasculinized and
sent home to live with their mother. By equating violence and supremacy over women
with masculinity, Brother undoubtedly reinforces traditional masculine stereotypes that
have played out in contemporary Russia in dangerous ways. Yet this late 1990s film also
served as a clear articulation of Russia’s lack, and of the ineffectiveness of capitalism and
democracy to fulfill the gaping void that the end of Soviet life revealed. These themes are
carried forward in the film You I Love, which, while maintaining its critique of capitalism
and “freedom” in the new Russia, opens the space for alternative masculinities—and
Ideas of Russianness—to emerge.
You I Love broke ground as Russia’s first film to portray openly and publically the
lives and relationships of non-heterosexual characters in a relatively positive light.
Through the performances of Timofei and Ulumji, we see criticisms of the post-Soviet
terrain—where masculinity is equated with capitalist success, and where people who
embody less than stereotypically masculine traits are presented as backward, nonauthentically Russian foreigners. Vera, the only female protagonist in the film whose
voice carries us into the inner recesses of both Moscow and each character’s psyche, is
highly sexualized, objectified, and in the end, left to navigate circumstances that are
largely beyond her control. Yet despite certain negative attributes, the film does end
happily, and the men are allowed to enjoy their relationship openly. The performance of
each character brings to life new possibilities for both Russianness and masculinities,
forging a space that had never before been possible in Soviet, then post-Soviet discourse.
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Once used almost exclusively for propagandistic purposes, genres of film in
contemporary Russia are now as varied as ideas of Russianness themselves. Much like
the initial “shock” reaction to, then eventual popularity of Malen’kaia Vera, each of these
films has contributed in some way to the process of identity negotiation and formation in
contemporary Russia. The previously inexpressible is now being expressed, as Russia’s
vocabulary continues to grow through an amalgam of language, sound, symbolism, and
performance. And in each of these films, masculinity and the relationship between the
Subject and ideas of Russianness are central. The performances of male protagonists
literally embody the trials and tribulations or Russian society, while simultaneously
making it possible to displace established meaning and forge a space for something new
to develop. As an industry that is still relatively unregulated by the state, film serves as a
powerful medium for mocking, ridiculing, and poking fun at the establishment, both past
and present. It will be interesting, looking into the future and across Russia’s ever
changing landscape, to watch the film industry continue to evolve as both a barometer
and catalyst of change.
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Figure 1: Piotr Mamonov and Piotr Zaitchenko in Taxi Blues, 1990

Figure 2: Sergei Bodrov Jr. as Danila Bagrov in Brother, 1997

Figure 3: The stereotypically “exotic” Ulumji in You I Love
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Figure 4: Ulumji and Timofei in You I Love

Figure 5: Vera, Timofei, and Ulumji in You I Love
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CONCLUSION
MASCULINITY AND RUSSIANNESS IN AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Robin Hessman’s acclaimed 2010 documentary My Perestroika, which chronicles
the lives of five classmates who came of age during the end of the Soviet period, jumps
seamlessly between original footage of life under communism and the dramatic changes
that came with the end of Soviet rule. During one point in the film, a flashback to the
Soviet period portrays schoolchildren writing essays about their heroes, while a narrator
proclaims the importance of becoming a “real human being” (nastoiashchii chelovek). “It
is important that you decide as early as possible who you want to be your role model,”
the narrator asserts. He continues: “Yes, becoming a real person is not simple, but you
have great examples to follow. Our Party has brought up millions of real people.
Communists—fighters for the people’s happiness.”331 During the Soviet period, the
characteristics of the empire and the success of the communist project were directly
dependent upon the dedication of people to the Soviet cause, with men and women each
contributing to the collective endeavor in accordance with their “natural” abilities. The
strength of the Fatherland came to be synonymous with masculine prowess, whereas the
life-giving Motherland was embodied by glorious “heroine mothers.” Upon the
disintegration of the Soviet regime, a quest began to not only construct a new
understanding of Russianness, but also to redefine the parameters of what constituted a
“real human being” in the post-Soviet period.
331
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Upon the downfall of the Soviet regime and the displacement of the monolithic
Soviet discourse that had defined social reality for more than seventy years, an
omnipresent lack was revealed that created, for the first time in most people’s lives, the
opportunity for a diversity of actors to assert their presence on the new Russian stage.
How would Russians establish an identity, or Idea that was uniquely their own, and how
would social identities and potentialities of women and men fit into this new and
uncharted context? During the Soviet period, identity had been framed largely in
accordance with the requisites of the Soviet project, with the signifier “communism”
serving as a point de capiton, or “anchoring point,” in the construction of both collective
and individual identities. In post-Soviet Russia, an amalgam of heterogeneous, yet
interrelated discourses have asserted their presence, each vying for positions of
hegemony in the construction of a new Russian Idea. Within such discourses, gender
identities—and particularly masculinity—have become directly implicated in the
(re)construction of Russianness, with the male body serving as a terrain upon which such
negotiations are mapped.
Setting the stage for the moralizing principles of the church and the autocratic,
centralizing tendencies of the state under Putin were Russia’s so-called “oligarchs”—the
criminally inclined “businessmen” who made a fortune during Russia’s rocky transition
to capitalism, and whose pampered, well-fed bodies came to be seen as embodiments of a
malign capitalism and democracy. In many respects, this handful of ultra-wealthy men
remapped the Russian frontier, taking Russia’s major industries under their purview, and
for a short while, commanding substantial influence over Russia’s corrupt political
apparatus. For their wealth and lavish lifestyles, they were envied; for their criminality,
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corruption, and Western inclinations, they were seen as pillagers of the Motherland and
as fundamentally non-Russian. They came to exude a masculinity that was, itself,
heterotopic—directly opposing both the failed utopia of the Soviet empire and the
democratic equity that many people had envisioned for Russia’s new future. The disdain
that developed in Russian society over the oligarchs’ unimpeded wealth, their criminal
antics, and their scandalous, Western-oriented business endeavors generated substantial
support for Vladimir Putin, who would base a significant proportion of his presidential
discourse on the necessity of bringing down the oligarchs and bridging the wealth
disparities that had become so prevalent in the new Russia.
At the beginning of his presidency, Putin enjoyed significant popularity and
support. In contrast to many Russian men, who were perceived as either über-wealthy
robber barons or ineffectual drug addicts and alcoholics, Putin was strong and clean cut,
measured in his actions, and had the appearance of a powerful leader who could guide
Russia out of the chaotic 1990s and into a new and hopeful future. Through both his
policies and his hyper-masculinized persona, Putin became, for many people, Russia’s
Ideal man. He resurrected national holidays and celebrations, glorified the Russian
language against all others, and came out in strong support of the Russian Orthodox
Church, which is viewed by many citizens as representing the foundation of Russianness.
Throughout most of Putin’s tenure in office, his approval rating has hovered between 6080 percent. He has been particularly popular among lower income Russians and youth,
who saw in his persona the strength and unity that Russians lacked. Yet through his
centralizing and autocratic political endeavors, and by mythologizing the past in his
construction of a future Ideal, Putin has etched out a very particular image of what not
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only Russia, but also the citizens who reside within its boarders, should be. Women are
now compensated monetarily for producing multiple offspring, while men are
encouraged to be strong in body and spirit—brave and courageous defenders of the
fatherland, and unwaveringly heterosexual.
The Orthodox Church has gone a long way in supporting the return of
“traditional” gender identities and sexualities as central to the revival of Russia itself. It
has called for a return of “spiritual-morality” to everyday life, and particularly to the lives
of men, as evidenced by the church’s recent foray into the Russian Armed Forces.
According to prominent representatives of the church, it was the sinfulness and
waywardness of the people that led to the maladies of the post-Soviet context—maladies
ranging from illness, to Russia’s population decline, to fires that raged across Russia in
the summer of 2010. The only way out of such conundrums is to return to Russia’s
roots—Orthodox Christianity—and the practices that go along with it. These practices
primarily involve care of the self and dedication to family, which are defined in highly
gendered terms. “Normal” gender identities and sexualities are regarded as essential and
given by god. Any derivation from what the church stipulates as constituting essential
masculinity or femininity is viewed as sin, and as detrimental to the future survival of
Russia itself. Yet despite this emphasis on the revival of traditional church practices, it is
apparent that most people regard the church as a marker of identity than as a true spiritual
guide. As stated in previous chapters, church affiliation has at times been estimated at
around 80 percent of the Russian population. Yet a much smaller proportion of the
population reports actually attending church or engaging in church rituals. The church
for them stands in as a fulfillment of the void that was revealed upon the displacement of
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communist ideology, providing a stable (and historical) identity with which they can
connect. This connection, alone, has been enough to propel the church to great popularity
in Russian culture and politics, where its conservative tenets have borne consequential
legal sanctions for men and women alike.
Despite the centripetalizing and authoritative discourses of the church and state,
which have served to define both normal masculine Subjectivity and Russianness in
unyielding and essentialist terms, voices have emerged in post-Soviet society that have
attempted to contradict the status quo and forge a space for something new. Authors such
as Vladimir Sorokin and Viktor Pelevin, as well as artists whose work has been deemed
“pornographic,” “anti-religious,” or otherwise objectionable, have spoken out
prominently against both the absurdities and injustices of both Soviet and post-Soviet
life. Coupled with prominent film productions of the 1990s and early 2000s, such works
have used gender and sexuality, particularly through performance and representations of
the body, to mock discourses that had otherwise become hegemonic and unquestioned,
while making room for new alternatives to emerge. Within such works, we see an
onslaught of diverse gender identities and sexualities, which become aligned with
symbols of Russianness in a way that enables them to signify Russian identity in all its
complexity.
As of March 2012, Vladimir Putin is facing stiff opposition in the major cities.
The same citizens who largely prospered from his economic and political initiatives are
now protesting the corruption and cronyism that persists in Russia, oftentimes calling for
Putin’s ouster and demanding a more open and democratic electoral process. According
to Levada Polls, however, his approval rating officially is high, at about 60 percent. This
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“support” is oftentimes most prominent in Russia’s outskirts, where living conditions,
although still somewhat bleak, have stabilized from the tumultuous 1990s. And it
oftentimes arises out of a lack of other viable alternatives. As Lyudmila Kisilyova, a 60year-old pensioner, told the New York Times when she was asked what would happen if
Putin lost the election:
We will stay in one place or return to the old, terrifying days of the 1990s.
There is a huge difference today in comparison with those days. There was
no work, there was nothing. The stores were empty, and it was a terrifying
time to live. I can’t say that everything is great today: Pensions are small,
and we’re scared about the future of our children,” she said. “But life is
better than in the 1990s.332
This sense of security, which many people believe to be a direct result of Putin and his
policies as President, then Prime Minister, have inspired an otherwise indifferent
electorate to show up at the polls and cast their vote once again for Russia’s seemingly
omnipotent leader. Associates of Putin may be stuffing ballot boxes, but citizens who
understand their stability and livelihood to depend upon Putin’s incumbency are also
implicit in perpetuating his rule. In the same New York Times article, it was reported
that a woman named Olga Klubnichkina, who is the director of a technical school in
Lyubertsy, was recorded threatening her staff with “disciplinary measures if they failed to
bring in 11 absentee ballots marked for Putin—their own and 10 from friends and
family.”333 She was recorded saying: “I think that all understand that our future depends
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on this…We need to submit to one commander in chief, like in the army. Someone
commands, and like soldiers we follow.”334
Having won the 2012 presidential election with just over 60 percent of the vote,
Putin will embark on a third and extended term as Russia’s president, and Dmitri
Medvedev will continue to be his puppet as prime minister. Yet this term may be
different. As evidenced by the protests of late, and by the obviously staged nature of
Putin’s most recent antics, people who once genuinely supported him are now beginning
to waver. His party, United Russia, seems to be suffering the biggest loss of popularity.
But it is clear that Putin himself will need to redefine himself, his party, and his third
term in office if he intends on restoring and maintaining his image as Russia’s Ideal man.
In any case, the ways in which Putin and other prominent actors articulate the nation and
people’s places in it will be of supreme importance.
“Russia,” as Winston Churchill once famously remarked, “is a riddle wrapped in a
mystery inside an enigma.” For centuries, Russia has endured tumultuous strife, fearful
invasions, and glorious victories. Its borders have been redrawn, the will of its people
tested, and its history rewritten. All the while, questions of what it means to be Russian
have persistently bubbled to the surface—as if it might be possible to pin down a
dogmatic and unchanging signifier of Russianness that is distinct from the everyday
practices, beliefs and discourse of an ever-changing populace. And at every turn, gender
identities have become implicated in Ideas of what it means to be Russian, with
masculinity taking center stage. As Russia sketches out another chapter of its future, the
lives, potentialities, and prohibitions of its citizens are critically at stake. ~Fin~
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